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Preface
This dissertation is comprised of four self-contained chapters that contribute to re-
search in Latin American anthropometric history, international economics and gender
economics. Each chapter can be read independently of the other chapters. Still, the
contributions can be embraced under the theme ‘Of firms and (wo)men’, since German
firms, female firm owners and Latin American men are in the focus of the analysis.
One of the main contributions of this dissertation is the acquisition and exploration
of three new micro data sets, that have not or not extensively been scientifically exam-
ined before. For the empirical analysis of the first chapter, I gained access to historical
records of convicts from a prison in Rio de Janeiro. The second chapter is based on a
cross-section firm survey of the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK)
that is not publicly accessible. In Chapter 3 and 4 I work with German firm-level panel
data of the KfW Bankengruppe. This data set serves as an empirical basis for in-house
policy reports and publication series of the KfW Bankengruppe that are addressed to
the public. Access to the data is very restricted and is approved only for research on
specific topics that are of interest to the institution.
The first chapter of this dissertation examines the anthropometric history of three
Latin American countries during the 19th and early 20th century. More precisely, the
study investigates the development of average body heights in Argentina, Brazil and
Peru and relates them to GDP estimates for the respective time period. The analysis
for Argentina is based on military data, whereas for Brazil and Peru we use prisoner’s
data from Rio de Janeiro and Lima, respectively.
In modern economic history, anthropometric studies are conducted to quantita-
tively explore the long-term evolution of the biological standard of living. It is not
only in historical contexts that biological measures of the standard of living are consid-
ered an important alternative or complement to more conventional measures like GDP
per capita. GDP as the traditional indicator of welfare and economic progress has its
limits in describing a populations economic well-being. The biological components of
physique are useful indicators for socio-economic welfare as they correlate with health
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and life expectancy. Furthermore, there is evidence that a taller physical stature is
related to higher social status, income and education. The average stature of a pop-
ulation mirrors the average quality of nutrition, the availability of medical care, the
epidemiological environment and also to some extent a nation’s income distribution
(Steckel 1995). While individual physical stature is of course determined by genetic
as well as environmental factors, genetic factors are negligible when studying averages
at a population level. We are the first to provide comparative evidence on the welfare
development of three Latin American countries that experienced dramatic economic
and political changes in the 18th and 19th century. Furthermore, we assess regional
and social differences for every country under study. We contribute the first anthropo-
metric evidence for Peru in the 19th century. We add to the results of Frank (2006) on
Brazil by performing a more elaborate analysis with a larger and more detailed data
set. Regarding Argentina, we broaden the existing knowledge on Southern Argentinean
provinces whose anthropometric history has not been examined before.
We relate our findings on biological welfare trends to the development of historical
GDP estimates from Maddison (2001). Argentinean GDP grew substantially during
the period 1870-1913 and by the beginning of the 20th century Argentina was one
of the richest countries in the world. Argentinean men were tall to begin with, but
heights stagnated until 1910 and welfare as measured by average height did not grow
proportionally to GDP. The only exception were farmers and landowners, who benefited
from the Argentinean export boom. Brazil and Peru experienced only modest GDP
growth during the observed time period compared to Argentinean standards. GDP
growth rates were somewhat higher in Peru than in Brazil while both countries started
at relatively low height levels. In Brazil, biological progress in height trends did not
significantly increase until the 1860s. Then, Brazil made substantial progress during
the ‘coffee boom’ from the 1860s to the 1880s. In contrast, Peru did not catch up.
According to GDP estimates we would have expected greater height development in
Peru. Our results highlight the importance of biological indicators as complementary
welfare measures to GDP, particularly for historical contexts where GDP estimates are
imprecise.
The object of investigation in Chapter 2 are German small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs) and their international activities. The importance of SMEs as
growth and job-creation engines has often been highlighted (EU Commission 2009).
Yet, there is still little empirical knowledge on increasing international activity of SMEs,
the related employment changes and the differences in motivation as compared to large
firms. The second chapter fills this gap by contributing to a better understanding of how
SMEs differ from large firms regarding their motivation for foreign direct investment
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(FDI) and the related employment changes. Furthermore, it examines for all firms
whether jobs at home and abroad are complements or substitutes.
The empirical analysis is based on a firm-level survey from the German cham-
bers of industry and commerce (DIHK) that was conducted in 2005 and includes only
firms that are internationally active. First descriptive evidence shows that export-
ing is the most important international activity for large firms as well as for SMEs.
FDI in contrast is still an activity where large firms are on average more active than
SMEs. Regarding the motivation for FDI, the data suggests that there are only small
differences between SMEs and large firms. For all firms horizontal motivations are
more important than vertical motivations. The proximity to customers matters more
for large firms while SMEs give on average more weight to less bureaucracy, personal
reasons and better availability of employees.
The core of the analysis is the estimation of a bivariate ordered probit model of
employment changes in the home country and in the host country after FDI for all
firms. A bivariate approach accounts for the interdependence between employment
changes at home and abroad, as the two processes are correlated either directly or
through unobserved effects. The two estimated variants, a simultaneous and a seem-
ingly unrelated model, yield nearly identical parameter estimates and standard errors.
The changes in employment after FDI at home and abroad are mainly explained by
size, host region and motivation for the investment. The results reveal that the rela-
tionship between employment changes at home and abroad is positive, suggesting that
these are complements rather than substitutes. SMEs show a higher probability of
increasing employment in the home country after engaging in FDI compared to large
firms. Firms with higher sales volumes have more positive job changes at home while
firms with more than 200 employees are more likely to shed jobs.
Our findings suggest that horizontal motivation results in job gains while vertical
motivation has no significant impact on job changes. Relocation of production however
leads to a higher probability of decreasing work force in the home country compared
to firms that do not relocate their production. Additional evidence on the host region
of FDI reveals that FDI to a distant region like USA/Canada with similar factor
endowment leads to job gains at home while FDI to close and similar regions like
Western Europe does not have a significant effect. Investments in Eastern Europe,
a close region with lower labor costs, significantly lower the probability of positive
employment changes in the home country.
Chapter 3 and 4 provide the first evidence on gender differences in investment be-
havior, investment financing, credit application and credit denial rates in Germany.
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The two contributions add to a better understanding of gender differences in en-
trepreneurship and firm size by analyzing how and why female firm owners make
systematically different investment and financing decisions. The empirical analysis
is carried out on a sample of firms drawn from the KfW Mittelstandspanel, a repre-
sentative survey of German SMEs for the period from 2003 to 2009.
Previous research on gender differences in entrepreneurship has mainly concen-
trated on firms at the start-up stage. There is little evidence on gender differences
between firm owners of established firms. Yet, there are significant differences in the
characteristics of female and male-owned firms. Female-owned firms are on average
smaller and have lower growth rates. They are over-proportionally represented in the
service sector and underrepresented in construction and manufacturing (Allen et al.
2007). The smaller size of firms owned by women is still a puzzle that cannot entirely
be explained by differences in other firm and owner characteristics. However, gender
differences in firm size might depend to a large extent on differences in firm investment
and other entrepreneurial decisions.
The results indicate that gender differences in investment and financing are not
based on gender discrimination but rather on differences in preferences, which in turn
may be based on cultural norms. In Germany, the incidence of female part-time em-
ployment and the gender wage gap are higher than the OECD average. The tax-system
benefits single-earner families more than dual-earner couples and incentivizes the low-
est income-earner, often the women, not to work or not to work more than part time
(OECD 2011). Furthermore, particularly in West Germany, childcare facilities are
scarce and often do not allow for full-time employment of both parents. It is well
known that these circumstances have a considerable impact on women’s labor mar-
ket participation. They may also affect gender specific entrepreneurship behavior and
female owner’s lower growth aspirations.
Chapter 3 focuses on gender differences in investment activity. An analysis of the
extensive margin of investment, i.e. the investment decision, reveals that female-owned
firms are less likely to invest. For the intensive margin there is evidence that if female-
owned firms invest, their average investment rate is lower than for male-owned firms.
Furthermore, female investment is less sensitive to cash flow, which indicates that it is
unlikely that lower investment by women is driven by difficulties in acquiring external
finance. Previous studies have found that women are on average more risk-averse, less
overconfident and have different entrepreneurial objectives. These differences may be
reflected in investment behavior, too. An analysis of stated investment goals reveals
that women indicate to a lesser extent aspiring and growth-orientated investment goals
like sales increases, innovation/R&D or implementation of new products.
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The central theme of Chapter 4 is the analysis of gender differences in investment
financing, credit application and credit denial rates. Access to finance is a main con-
cern for entrepreneurs. Although the findings in Chapter 3 suggest that the investment
gap is driven by preferences rather than financial constraints, women may face higher
barriers to accessing finance due to firm or personal characteristics. It is therefore
relevant to examine whether there are gender differences regarding financing patterns
and access to credit. The data suggests that female-owned firms differ as the share
of internal capital in investment financing is higher and the share of external funds
is lower than for male-owned firms. An analysis of the credit application process of
investing firms shows that differences in investment financing cannot be explained by
discrimination on the credit market. Women are not more likely to be denied credit.
Yet, the probability that they apply for credit is on average lower. Discrimination on
the credit market could therefore be underestimated as the female-owned firms that
apply for credit are very likely to be a positive selection of all applying firms. A further
analysis shows that the gender difference in the probability of credit application is only
evident when considering firms with negative or neutral sales expectations. There is
no significant gender difference in credit application rates of firms with positive sales
expectations. Previous research suggests that there are not only gender differences in
risk aversion and overconfidence but also women report more intense nervousness and
fear than men in anticipation of negative outcomes (Croson and Gneezy 2009). Possi-
bly, women act in a more risk-averse way only when negative outcomes are expected.
This could explain why the application rates differ only in the case of non-positive sales
expectations. Nevertheless, whether women’s more cautious or men’s more risky invest-
ment and application behavior generates better business outcomes remains a question
to be answered by future research.
In all chapters I use econometric methods to capture aspects of economic phe-
nomena in anthropometrics, international economics and gender economics. The ap-
proaches are not based on fully-specified theoretical models as these are not available
for the questions under study. Hence, I employ an exploratory and inductive, rather
than a structural approach, without claiming identification of causal impacts. The
search for an adequate econometric specification without strong theoretical founda-
tions has its drawbacks. The main problem may be that by working in a way which
is not theory-driven the data assume a certain double-duty, as they are used to for-
mulate hypotheses for which they provide also empirical evidence (Spanos 2000). Yet,
a data-driven approach is able to discover economic puzzles that ask for a theoretical
explanation. Besides, the application of a strict theory-first approach can be criticized
as well. Juselius (2011, p. 426) states that ‘statistics is often (ab)used as a tool to
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procure certain theoretically meaningful estimates irrespective of their statistical mean-
ing. By following strict theoretical rules and principles, one is less open to signals in
the data and runs the risk of producing empirically irrelevant and misleading results’.
Both approaches are complementary and have their justifications and relative merits.
However, it is often the observation of economic reality in a data-driven approach that
discovers economic puzzles and inspires the development of economic theories. Fol-
lowing such a data driven approach, the results presented in this dissertation might
contribute to the development of new economic theories that offer explanations for the
observed phenomena.
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Chapter 1
The anthropometric history of Argentina,
Brazil and Peru during the 19th and early
20th century∗
1.1 Introduction
Anthropometric evidence can shed light on historical trends in living standards. The
analysis of average heights offers insights on welfare and development, as differences
in stature have often been found to correlate with differences in health, physical ro-
bustness and life expectancy (Komlos 1985, Steckel 1995, Fogel 1993). While 60-80%
of individual height variation is attributable to genetics, differences in average height
between populations are determined by environmental factors (Steckel 1995). The
quality of nutrition during pregnancy and in the first three years of living as well as
health care are related to stature. The crucial components of nutrition are proteins,
contained mainly in dairy products and meat. There is also evidence that an increase
in physique correlates with increases in cognitive abilities, educational attainment and
higher wages (Cinnirella et al. 2011, Persico et al. 2004, Case and Paxson 2008).
Finally, as Arora (2001) argued, height trends correlate positively with GDP growth
and negatively with the degree of income inequality. An increasing monetary living
standard of a population improves the biological living standard as it facilitates the
access to high-quality food. As a result the average height of a population increases.
The purpose of our study is to estimate height trends for Argentina, Brazil and
Peru and to compare them with GDP estimates, a conventional measure of welfare.
Furthermore, we assess regional and social differences in height for each country. Of
∗This chapter is joint work with Jörg Baten and Linda Twrdek from University of Tübingen and has
been published in 2009 in Economics and Human Biology, 7(3).
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Table 1.1: GDP per capita in selected Latin American economies
year 1820 1850 1870 1890 1900 1910 1913 2001
Argentina 1,311 2,152 2,756 3,822 3,797 8,137
Brazil 646 686 713 794 678 769 811 5,570
Peru 817 975 1,037 3,630
Total Latin 
America 
692 681 1,109 1,481 5,811
Notes: GDP per capita in 1990 Int. $ (Geary-Khamis Dollar). Source: Maddison (2001)
course, height and GDP per capita do not measure the same components of welfare.
Also, there are conceptual differences between height and GDP measurement of liv-
ing standards. GDP is much more sensitive to urbanization and industrialization,
whereas height reflects the quality of nutrition and medical care (Steckel and Floud
1997, Komlos and Baten 1998). We gain new insights by studying the extent to which
our estimates of height trends correspond to historical GDP levels and to long-term
welfare growth.
Maddison (2001) estimates historical GDP trends for Latin American countries
(Table 1.1).1 Yet, the economies and populations of the three countries under study
present distinctly different GDP trends. Argentina’s GDP grew substantially during
the period 1870 to 1913. GDP rose from $1300 to $3800 (in 1990 Geary-Khamis-
$), and real wages reached European levels (Williamson 1995).2 By the end of the
19th century Argentina was one of the richest countries in the world. For Brazil,
Maddison (2001) assumes that the growth rate of GDP per capita from 1820 to 1850
was similar to the period from 1850 to 1913, for which the first data-based estimates
were published by Goldsmith (1986). Brazil’s economy grew little between the 1820s
and 1910s, certainly modestly by European or by Argentinean standards (Maddison
2001).3 For Peru, Maddison (2001) assumes that during the decade before 1913, Peru’s
development matched the average growth rate of Brazil and Chile. An additional
estimate by Seminario and Beltrán (1998) suggests a modest upward trend from 1896-
1913, but does not cover the period which came before it.
1We should mention though that there are general doubts about the strategy with which to estimate
GDP based on backward interpolation, see Fukao et al. (2007).
2There are other GDP estimates for Argentina by Cortés Conde and Harriague (1994) and della
Paolera and Taylor (2003).
3see also Goldsmith (1986) for the post-1850 period.
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Our hypothesis to be tested is that anthropometric trends are similar to GDP trends.
The GDP estimates in Table 1.1 imply that:
1. Argentina experienced rapid economic growth during the export boom of 1870
to 1913, which should have resulted in some height increase.
2. Brazil experienced very modest improvements in living standards during the 19th
century.
3. Peru had a modestly higher standard of living than Brazil.
We use new anthropometric evidence for all three countries. By contributing data on
the 1820s to 1880s for Peru, we fill an important gap in Latin American anthropometric
history.4 Table 1.2 provides descriptive evidence for the data under study.
Table 1.2: Average heights in cm by country and birth decadeTable 2: Numbers of cases and raw average height in cm by country and birth decade 
year
N=
6,953
av. 
height
st. dev.
N=
6,771
av. 
height
st. dev.
N=
1,139
av. 
height
st. dev.
1810 75 164.3 (6.58)
1820 323 164.3 (7.38) 65 162.8 (7.15)
1830 705 164.8 (7.3) 205 165 (8.47)
1840 1265 164.6 (7.04) 317 162.2 (8.08)
1850 1604 164.5 (6.85) 146 164.5 (7.13)
1860 1740 165 (6.71) 78 164.3 (6.16)
1870 668 167.6 (6.49) 887 166.5 (6.77) 158 163.5 (6.68)
1880 1475 167.6 (6.39) 172 166.1 (6.53) 170 164 (6.85)
1890 1842 167.8 (6.28)
1900 2066 167.9 (6.58)
1910 902 167.8 (6.6)
  Argentina   Brazil   Lima (Peru)
Our results confirm previous findings that heights in Argentina did not increase during
the 1870-1913 period (Salvatore 2004a, 2004b, 2007). We therefore reject the first
hypothesis, as the only significant benefit was to Argentinean farmers. In Brazil,
biological progress as measured by height trends stagnated between the 1810s and
the 1860s. However, we can confirm and extend the second hypothesis, as Brazilian
heights in our urban sample increased substantially between the 1860s and 1880s. We
find that heights in Lima, Peru, remained at a modest level. Brazilian anthropometric
4Previous studies consider only Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia (Lopez-Alonso and Condey
2003, Carson 2005, Meisel and Vega 2007, Frank 2006, Salvatore 1998, 2004a, 2004b, 2007, Salvatore
and Baten 1998, Bogin and Keep 1999).
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indicators show higher values than those of the inhabitants of Lima. We therefore reject
the third hypothesis, that the quality of life in Peru was higher than that of Brazil.
Hence, only for Brazil the GDP estimates correspond to our results on the biological
improvements in living standard.
We focus separately on each of the three countries, beginning with Argentina,
followed by Brazil and Peru. We describe each country’s social and economic history,
its main export goods, and food supply and discuss the new anthropometric evidence.
1.2 Argentina
1.2.1 Social and economic history of Argentina
Between 1870 and 1913, Argentina became a major player in the world economy. Its 56
million hectares of pampa plains, ideally suited for temperate-zone agriculture and for
raising livestock production, but sparsely populated in the mid-19th century, became
a magnet for European immigrants and capital (Ferrer 1967). Argentina’s society
changed considerably during the 19th century as its population became increasingly
dominated by recent European arrivals. They arrived in great numbers in the second
half of the century, driven by a desire to escape poor living conditions in Europe and
attracted by this vast territory. By 1914, the Argentinean census reported that one-
third of the population was composed of people that were not born in the country
(República Argentina 1916).
Many economists have supported Douglass North’s theory that exports increase a
nation’s productivity, especially in the NewWorld, if world markets demand at least one
of its export staples (North 1966). The availability of export staples in turn could have
a positive impact on other sectors of the economy, raising the population’s standard
of living. Argentina had become well-integrated into the world market by 1913 and
gained large export revenues. It became well-known for producing export surpluses,
mainly in beef and wheat. During the first decade of the 20th century, Argentina’s
growing export economy (Diaz Alejandro 1970) provided its citizens with one of the
highest per-capita incomes in the world. This period is considered the ‘Golden Age’ in
Argentinean economic history. However, as Salvatore (2007) argued, export-led growth
raises the general standard of living only if export revenues also benefit lower-income
groups. Whether this actually took place is an empirical question, which Salvatore
(2007) answered negatively.
10
1 The anthropometric history of Argentina, Brazil and Peru
1.2.2 New anthropometric evidence on Argentina
To learn more about the military potential of its male population, Argentinean author-
ities measured all men in 1927, recording their heights and other physical data. The
study registered both native-born and naturalized men born between 1820 and 1915.
For our study, we consider a random sample between ages 17 and 52 (birth cohorts
of 1875 to 1910). Our sample of 6,953 observations was drawn from a randomly cho-
sen series of registration books preserved in a general register in the military-history
archives in Buenos Aires.5
Figure 1.1: Spatial distribution of heights in ArgentinaFigure 1: Spatial distribution of heights in Argentina  
 
Notes: Only the grey-shaded provinces plus the cities of Buenos Aires and Junín are included 
in the sample. Their mean heights in cm are reported in the white boxes. 
 
5Servicio Histórico del Ejército, Archivo General del Ejército, Calle Defensa (entre C. Mexico y Chile),
Capital Federal, Argentina.
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We take a convenience sample from the following provinces and cities: Misiones, Tu-
cumán, San Juan, Córdoba, La Pampa, Buenos Aires city, Junín city, Río Negro, and
Chubut/Santa Cruz. Figure 1.1 indicates global height averages by province. Average
height values in the Argentinean provinces were quite similar, except for the Northwest,
especially in Tucumán and to a lesser extent in San Juan, where the male population
was shorter. Moreover, those in Río Negro and the city district of Buenos Aires were
slightly shorter than those in the other six provinces. We include Southern provinces
in the sample that have not been studied before.
1.2.3 How representative is our Argentinean data?
Military data often suffer from truncation problems, as armed forces usually require
a minimum body height for admission. Our data for Argentina benefit from the fact
that the entire male population was recorded in the data source. Figure 1.2 shows that
our data is virtually normally distributed for every country under study.
Figure 1.2: Distribution of heights in our samples for Argentina, Brazil, and LimaFigure	2:	Distribution	of	heights	in	our	samples	for	Argentina,	Brazil,	and	Lima	
 
Argentina                Brazil 
 
 
Peru 
 
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
140 150 160 170 180 190
Height in cm
Density 
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
Density
120 140 160 180 200
Height in cm
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
Density
120 140 160 180 200
Height in cm
12
1 The anthropometric history of Argentina, Brazil and Peru
Because the Argentinean military census did not record the country of birth, our study
includes immigrants as well as native born Argentineans. Previous studies exclude
immigrants since the focus is mainly on estimating the determinants of heights within
Argentina (Salvatore 1998, 2004a, 2004b, 2007). But, as we compare our results to GDP
estimates, we are interested in long-term trends in heights for the entire Argentinean
population, as is done in GDP estimation where the contributions of migrants that
permanently reside in a country are included.
1.2.4 Armstrong’s classification of occupational groups
We used the Armstrong (1972) scheme of occupations to get a clearer understanding of
the social structure of Argentinean society. It was developed for 19th century censuses,
and was designed to capture the skill level and social status level of different occupations
during that period. Clearly, some occupations can span several social strata. However,
this classification scheme has proved useful for a large number of applications. In
anthropometric history, it has been employed in a number of studies (e.g., Johnson
and Nicholas 1995).
Accordingly, we classify our observations into six categories that capture occupa-
tional status. The first group consists of unskilled workers, including domestic servants
and similar low status occupations. The second group includes semiskilled occupations,
such as house painters, which do not feature the lengthy craftsmen-type extended sort
of apprenticeship required for skilled crafts. The third group consists mainly of skilled
craftsmen and other workers with higher craft levels and responsibilities, e.g. shop
assistants. The fourth category consists of semiprofessionals, such as clerks and tele-
graphers, whose occupations clearly require a somewhat greater skill level, but not as
much as the fifth category, that of the professionals. The typical member of the latter
group has usually attended high school and in some cases also university (e.g., lawyers
and physicians), or has attained success as an entrepreneur, thus acquiring considerable
social status. We code the farmers as a separate group since they might have benefited
from direct access to land ownership and food production (Komlos 1987). Most of
our Argentinean sample consists of farmers, unskilled and semiskilled workers (around
74%). As one might expect, a higher share of skilled persons are found in Buenos Aires
than in the rest of the country.
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1.2.5 Regression results
We estimate two regressions for Argentina (Table 1.3). In regression (1) we include the
whole sample, in regression (2) only farmers. The results in regression (1) show that
average heights remained nearly constant during the 19th century. The insignificant
time coefficients indicate that the increase compared to the 1870s constant was close
to zero.
Table 1.3: Determinants of heights in Argentina
(1) (2)
Argentina  
full sample
Argentina 
farmers only
1870 ref. cat. ref. cat.
1880 -0.00 0.94
1890 0.25 1.13*
1900 0.40 1.04
1910 0.30
Unskilled ref.cat.
Semiskilled 1.64***
Skilled 0.59**
Semiprofessional 1.58***
Professional 2.88***
Farmer 2.04***
Constant 166.42*** 168.02***
Observations 6951 1356
R-squared 0.03 0.00
Notes: We estimate an OLS regression with robust standard 
errors. Dependent variable: body height in cm. *,**,*** refer to 
significance levels of 10,5, and 1%. The constant in model (1) 
refers to an unskilled male, born in the 1870s; model (2) refers to 
farmers only, and excludes the 1910s. 
The absent growth of average heights confirms in the main Salvatore’s findings (Sal-
vatore 2007). In Figure 1.3, we compare our own height trends with the trends of
Salvatore (2007) and López-Alonso (2002). Earlier historians, states Salvatore, who
described this period as the ‘Golden Age’ of Argentina, did not take into account the
fact that the standard of living of lower-income groups did not improve during the
country’s so-called Golden Age, and that heights in fact stagnated.
Our results also confirm height gaps between occupational groups. The difference
between unskilled and semiskilled persons was relatively large in Argentina. Farmers
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Figure 1.3: Comparison of various height estimates for ArgentinaFigure 3: Comparison of various height estimates for Argentina  
 
were 2.04 cm taller than the unskilled group in the 1870s (regression (1)), and profes-
sionals were even by 2.88 cm taller. We find that farmers’ heights did not only start at
a higher level, they also benefited from the export boom more than unskilled workers.
From the initial height gap during the 1870s between farmers and unskilled people,
the height difference between these two groups increased by almost one centimeter in
height until the 1890s, which is statistically significant (regression (2). At the same
time the heights of unskilled workers stagnated.
Argentina, and especially its Pampas region, was successfully integrated into the
world market thanks to the international trade in beef and grain, and to the influx of im-
migrants (Salvatore 2007). At the same time its population suffered from marked social
inequality. Salvatore (2004a, 2004b) argues that the arrival of large numbers of immi-
grants during this period contributed to nutritional stress. Native workers competed
in the labor markets with European immigrants, who were often more highly skilled.
Hence, Salvatore (2004a, 2004b) concludes that labor supply increased so rapidly that
native Argentinean workers had difficulties maintaining their living standard as rising
food and rent prices diminished real wages. He also notes that the share of protein
provided to infants and toddlers may have been relatively low during this period. In
general, wages rose from 60% to 80% (of the British level in 1905) during the 1880s and
1890s, and from 90% to 100% during the 1900s (Williamson 1995). Real wage increases
may have been lower, since higher costs of rent and non-tradable products often bias
purchasing-power estimates, especially during periods of rapid urban growth. We can
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safely conclude that GDP per capita increased much more than real wages did and
that disparities in income increased as well. Unregulated child labor, crowded housing
conditions in the cities as well as spread of infection and disease mitigated an increase
in living standards.6
Obviously, the notable growth of wealth in Argentina from 1870 until the 1920s
did not benefit all sectors of the population equally. While landowners and farmers
made some gains, workers did not enjoy a proportionate growth in their income (Cortés
Conde 1986). As the big height gap in Argentina was between unskilled workers and
more skilled occupational groups, we find that a strong middle class represented by
the latter groups had already emerged by the late 19th century. These results for
Argentina are somewhat similar to those of Cranfield and Inwood (2007) on physical
well-being in Canada. They found that during the 19th century the physical stature
of Canadian-born men stagnated or declined slightly in spite of a substantial increase
in income. Similar findings were recorded in the U.S. during the 1860s to the 1890s,
when the agricultural-exports boom began (Komlos 1998). This divergence between
height and GDP seems to be the pattern for food-exporting New World countries which
initially had small populations.
1.3 Brazil
1.3.1 Social and economic history of Brazil
Throughout the 18th century, Brazil’s economy was agrarian and monocultural. In
1815, Brazil became a monarchy with equal rights for its citizens and it remained
a monarchy after gaining independence from Portugal in 1822. Furthermore, Brazil
made a fairly peaceful transition to independence despite repeated efforts by secession-
ists (Bernecker et al. 2000). Though political conditions were stable, the Brazilian
economy is often assumed to have grown too slowly or even to have stagnated on ac-
count of low agricultural productivity and a lack of capital, infrastructure, and financial
institutions. A slow transition to industrialization did not begin until the end of the
19th century. Latin American economic history has traditionally held the view that
6During the period studied in this paper, life expectancy at birth in Argentina rose from around
33 years in 1883 to 40 years in 1905 (Somoza 1973) and mortality rates declined from 24 per 1000
inhabitants between 1881 and 1890 to 18 per 1000 inhabitants during 1901-1910 (Elizaga 1973).
This can however also be viewed as a convergence to the more favorable levels of other countries
with similar incomes at the time. For instance, life expectancy in Paris was already 47 years in 1880
and mortality rates in Paris and London were 6 to 8 per 1000 inhabitants accordingly (López-Alonso
2002).
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newly independent Brazil fell under the economic control of Great Britain. In fact,
Brazilian trade with Great Britain was based on special treaties. Haber and Klein
(1994) argue that ‘Brazilian policy makers were not British puppets’ and that it is not
clear whether these treaties resulted from Brazil’s independence or from its prior close
relationship with Great Britain.
Slavery still played a vital role. Although the importation of slaves had been
prohibited since 1850, Brazil did not abolish slavery until 1888. It was the last country
in the world to do so, and then only because of British pressure. As a consequence,
prosperous coffee plantations in the South soon found themselves short of workers. A
vast southward migration of former slaves from stagnating sugar plantations in the
Northeast began. Meanwhile, European immigrants arrived in large numbers. Coffee
planters pressed Brazil’s central government and the province of São Paulo to pay
the transportation costs of immigrants from southern Europe (Leff 1994), who might
otherwise have sought higher wages in the United States or Argentina. Coffee planters
were more willing to finance immigration from Europe than migration within Brazil,
as they preferred ‘hardworking white people’ to black Brazilian workers (Vainer and
Brito 2001). This preference was in line with the prevailing intention of ‘whitening’ the
Brazilian population, a policy that the government acknowledged in the second half of
the 19th century (Skidmore 1990).
Brazil was an agricultural economy both before and after independence. Sugar
exports led the world market until 1815, but then stagnated on account of growing
competition from other Latin American countries and later from European sugar-beet
producers. As a result, coffee soon overtook sugar as Brazil’s most important export
staple. Northeastern sugar and cotton exports declined, and per-capita income fell
below that of the boom region in the southeast (Leff 1994).
Johnson and Frank (2006) point out that focusing on aggregate economic perfor-
mance tends to obscure the level of wealth and economic dynamism in southeast Brazil.
Moreover, Frank (2006) discovers that mean wealth in Rio de Janeiro in the first half
of the 19th century was surprisingly large and growing steadily, although the period
was marked by a high level of economic inequality.7
What can be said about the nutrition of Brazilians? As the concentration on cattle
raising might suggest, the amount of animal protein per capita was potentially higher
in inland Brazil (Bauer 1986). Meat and especially milk have a positive effect on human
height (Baten 2009). However, meat was consumed both in fresh and in dried forms,
7Frank (2006) calculates a Gini coefficient of 0.87 for the 1820s and 1850s in Rio de Janeiro and
estimates a top decile share of 77 to 78%.
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which had different health implications. The process of salting and drying destroys
the thiamine (vitamin B1) and mostly also the fat in the meat (Kiple 1989). In the
Northeast in the 19th century the basic diet was nothing but dried meat and manioc
flour. The diet in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo consisted of fresh meat and beans for
the rich, and dried meat and cornmeal or manioc flour for the poor. In Minas Gerais
both rich and poor consumed a great deal of pork, cornmeal, and beans, while in Rio
Grande do Sul the diet featured fresh meat, cereals, and vegetables. Kiple (1989)
pointed out that the diet of dried meat and manioc was seriously deficient in thiamine,
and that beriberi, the disease caused by this deficiency, was a serious health problem
in Brazil during the latter half of the 19th century. High consumption of beans helped
overcome some of the health problems, and bean soup with offal, feijoada, became an
indispensable national dish (Fish 1978). High in protein, feijoada improved the diet of
many Brazilians.
1.3.2 The data set
Our Brazilian sample consists of 6,771 male prisoners from the Rio de Janeiro city jail,
measured between 1861 and 1903.8 The sample was drawn from a randomly chosen
series of registration books. The data include height, origin, occupation, birthplace,
age, and skin color. Until 1879, height was measured in Portuguese feet, and from then
on in meters. One Portuguese inch equals 2.75 centimeters. Frank (2006) has studied
a smaller data set stemming from the same prison with 1,142 observations of the 1850s
to 1860s. He finds that on account of measurement error in the Rio prison, it is more
accurate to calculate 2.73 cm to the inch. Prison records document the heights of some
individuals in both centimeters and feet, and an analysis of the double measurements
leads to this correction. We follow Frank’s reasoning and adopt this approach.
The prisoners came from many regions of Brazil as well as from other countries.
We pool the information on skin color into three categories - white, black, and mixed.
The description of skin color varies for mixed-race individuals, but the manifold terms
used at the time to denote skin color (e.g., crioulo, moreno, acaboclado, fula, cabra)
cannot be unambiguously classified. The individuals in the sample pertain to birth
cohorts of the 1810s to the 1880s. Standard deviations of the height distributions are
relatively high, as we would expect for a country with pronounced social inequality
(Table 1.2).
8Rio de Janeiro/Brazil: Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro - APERJ - Depositum Casa de
Detenção do Rio de Janeiro.
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How representative is our data? In prison samples, there might be occupational bias.
The proportion of prisoners from the lower class is often greater in prison than in the
overall population. We agree with Frank (2006) that the sample is somewhat biased
towards the poorest portion of the population. In Table 1.4 we compare our sample
means for the share of occupational groups, slaves and skin color with the Brazilian
census of 1872.
Table 1.4: Occupational and social structure in Brazil in 1872
Brazil census 
share 1872
Brazil sample 
share 1870s
Occupational group
No occupation n.a. 3.1
Unskilled 33.9 35.9
Farmers n.a. 1.7
Semiskilled 26.5 34.5
Skilled 20.6 21.1
Semiprofessionals 13.5 3
Professionals 5.5 0.7
Slaves
free 84.3 82.9
slave 15.7 17.1
Skin color
White 38.5 41.6
Mixed 41.5 30.4
Black 20 28
Notes: Without considering farmers. 
Source census share: Recenseamento (1872)
We use the Armstrong scheme of occupations for Brazil, too. Comparing our sample’s
measurement cohort of the 1870s with the census, we find that the share of unskilled
workers is quite similar, but the prison sample contains about 10% more semiskilled
workers (Recenseamento 1872). By a similar percentage, there are fewer semiprofes-
sionals in the sample. With less than 1%, professionals are nearly absent in the sample,
compared with 5.5% in the census population. The share of slaves in our data and the
share in the census are almost equal. Compared with the census, our sample describes
more persons as ‘black’ (28 vs. 20%) and similarly fewer ‘mixed’ (30.4 vs. 41.5%). This
may be a true difference, or it may reflect different definitions of skin color used by the
prison and the census. We analyze descriptively the distribution of heights for each
birth decade separately, but we observe no systematic changes over time (see Appendix
Figure 1.6 and Table 1.8).
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Table 1.5: Determinants of heights in Brazil
(1) (2) (3)
full sample
only native 
Brazilians 
native Brazilians 
without slaves
1810 & 1820 ref. cat. ref. cat. ref. cat.
1830 0.55 -0.02 0.44
1840 0.35 -0.34 0.11
1850 0.37 -0.34 0.11
1860 1.07** 0.30 0.75
1870 2.49*** 1.74*** 2.16***
1880 2.83*** 2.17*** 2.59***
Age 19 -1.86*** -1.93*** -1.89***
Age 20 -1.02*** -0.93** -1.00**
Age 21 -0.65 -0.53 -0.47
Age 22 -0.49 -0.33 -0.32
Age 51-60 -0.18 -0.26 -0.17
Rio de Janeiro ref. cat. ref. cat. ref. cat.
Southeast w/o Rio 1.88*** 1.91*** 1.89***
South 0.75 0.75 0.83
Northeast 0.18 0.19 0.05
North/Middle West 0.77 0.79 0.27
Africa 0.04
France 0.69
Germany 3.66***
UK 3.17***
North America 3.57***
Spain 0.33
Portugal -0.05
Italy 0.49
Other Immigrant 1.84***
Unskilled ref. cat. ref. cat. ref. cat.
Semiskilled 0.55*** 0.45** 0.65***
Skilled 0.85*** 0.90*** 0.86***
Semiprofessional 0.75* 1.20*** 1.26***
Professional 2.77*** 3.65*** 3.68***
Farmer -1.20* -0.66 -0.76
Round Age -0.67*** -0.78*** -0.71***
White ref. cat. ref. cat. ref. cat.
Black 0.53* 0.60** 0.61**
Mixed 0.12 0.14 0.16
Slave -0.98** -0.65
Constant 163.7*** 164.3*** 163.8***
Observations 6,760 5,613 5,257
R-squared 0.035 0.028 0.028
Notes:  We estimate an OLS regression with robust standard errors. Dependent variable: 
body height in cm. *,**,*** refer to significance levels of 10,5, and 1%.  The constant refers 
to a criminal unskilled free white man aged 23-50 born in the Federal State of Rio de Janeiro
in the 1810s or 1820s. We pool the decades 1810 and 1820 due to small number of 
observations, and include only adult males aged 19-60. `Northeast´ refers to the Federal 
States Pernambuco, Bahia, Sergipe, Alagoas, Paraíba, Rio Grande do Norte, Ceará, Piauí, and 
Maranhão. `South´ refers to Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná and Santa Catarina. `Southeast w/o 
Rio´ refers to São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo. North/Middle West refers to 
today's Goias, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Amazonia, Pará, Acre, Roraíma, Tocantins 
and Amapá. 20
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1.3.3 Brazilian height trends
In Table 1.5 we report three height regressions for Brazil: regression (2) excludes immi-
grants, regression (3) excludes immigrants and slaves, whereas regression (1) includes
both and controls for slave status and the origins of the immigrants with dummy vari-
ables.9 Interpreting the birth decade dummies, we find that Brazilian heights stagnated
at first, but time coefficients after 1860 imply a distinct upward trend which is robust
in all regressions and confirm the descriptive impression from the raw data (Table 1.2).
Brazilians born in the 1880s were 2.83 cm taller than those born in the 1810s or
1820s if we consider all Brazilians and 2.59 cm taller if we include only native Brazilians
and exclude slaves. We also control for age composition by including dummy variables
for the ages 19, 20, 21, 22 and 51 to 60 in the regression. The reason for selecting these
age groups is that those in the younger group have not yet achieved their adult height,
whereas some of those in the older group may have actually shrunk. The results are as
expected, with the exception of those aged 51 to 60, who were not significantly shorter.
Among the young men, height continued to increase until the age of 21.
1.3.4 Regional height differences and migration
We collected our data from a Rio de Janeiro prison, but the places of birth of the
prisoners vary widely. Of the adult males, 58% were born in the South or Southeast
(including Rio), 39% were born in the Northeast and a mere 3% in the West or in the
North.
Figure 1.4 provides a rough descriptive picture of regional height differences. The
tallest Brazilians were living between São Paulo and Bahia and in Paraíba. With the
exception of residents of the latter two states, Northeasterners were relatively short,
as were those in the coastal regions of Rio de Janeiro, Santa Catarina, and Espírito
Santo. Looking at Bauer’s map of agricultural specialization, we note that the highest
average body heights were found in grain- and cattle-producing regions (Bauer 1986).
This holds true for the booming São Paulo and Minas Gerais coffee plantation belt.10
9The R2 are generally low, which is quite common in individual height regressions. We know that we
cannot capture individual genetic height variation, which accounts for a large share of the unexplained
part. As soon as heights are averaged, for instance by regions, and the genetic component averages
out, R2 increase strongly, see Baten (1999).
10Baten (1999) finds very strong height advantages of proximity to the production of perishable
proteins. E.g., milk or offal could not be transported and traded over longer distances before the
mid-20th century (see Baten 1999, Komlos 1996). The proximity had the effect of relatively positive
health and height levels, even among populations of modest purchasing power. We should note
though that the South attracted many tall Europeans. Moreover, in Minas Gerais there was a
remarkably high number of freed slaves. Characterized by smaller plantations, the number of slaves
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Figure 1.4: Heights in Brazil by states	 	 				Figure 4: Height by Brazilian states 
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In contrast, the plantations in the Northeast (cotton, sugar, and tobacco) and those
of Espírito Santo (cocoa), on the southern coast, had shorter-than-average people,
perhaps because the diet there was based on local, low-protein foods, or because they
could not afford adequate housing. The taller population of Paraíba can be explained
by the favorable economy of its cattle farming and coffee plantations, which stretched
to the coast. The unexpectedly moderate heights recorded in the Rio de Janeiro region
may be partly due to the rapid expansion of the city itself. Frank (2006) hypothesized
that Rio, in becoming one of the two largest cities in Latin America along with Mexico
City, imposed an ‘urban penalty’ on its population.
In order to control for potential bias in the anthropometric trend, we include four
dummy variables for Brazilian regions with the Federal State of Rio de Janeiro as
per slaveholder was relatively small in Minas Gerais, a situation that may have fostered social
interaction between slaves and their owners (Klein 1986).
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reference category in the regressions. We find that only prisoners born in the booming
Southern coffee-plantation region had significantly larger heights than prisoners from
Rio de Janeiro. For other regions there is no significant difference. However, we cannot
exclude the possibility that the significant result could have been caused by selective
migration as well.
Another possible trend distortion could derive from European immigration. In
the second half of the century Brazil was the destination of increasing numbers of
immigrants, mostly from Portugal. The influx of taller individuals into a region could
have brought an upward trend in height, but regression (2) shows that this was not
the case. There is also a substantial upward trend among native Brazilian prisoners
only. Moreover, those who emigrated from Portugal, Italy, Spain, and France, were
not statistically different from those born in Brazil. In contrast, German, British, and
North American immigrants were more than 3 cm taller.11
1.3.5 Heights by occupation and numerical skill
Modest but significant differences in height can be observed between unskilled and
skilled groups, with the exception of professionals, who were as much as 2.77 cm taller
than unskilled workers, and even as much as 3.65 cm if we consider only native Brazil-
ians. Thus, the greatest difference in height was between the elite and the rest of the
population, and not between the unskilled workers and skilled craftsmen. Farmers in
the sample were shorter than all other groups, but in regression (2) the difference is
not significant. The significance in regression (1) is probably driven by migrants who
had left their country in search of work, having failed at farming.
Another strategy for assessing educational levels in historical samples is to examine
‘age heaping’, an indicator for numeracy. Persons who cannot state their exact age often
round it off to a multiple of five, and such persons are typically less educated than
average (Baten et al. 2009, Crayen and Baten 2010). Age-heaping indices correlate
negatively with other human-capital indicators, such as literacy and school enrollment,
and even more so with modern measures of mathematical skills (A’Hearn et al. 2009).
The Whipple Index of age heaping is calculated by dividing the number of persons
reporting an age ending in 0 or 5 by the total number in the study, multiplied by
500. The Whipple Index runs from 0 to 500, with typical values located between 100
(no age heaping, good numeracy) and 500 (extreme age heaping, bad numeracy).12
Values substantially higher than 100 indicate problematic numeracy; the higher the
11We include only immigrant groups with more than 50 observations.
12A value of 0 would mean complete avoidance of all multiples of five.
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number, the greater the problem. Manzel and Baten (2009) estimate a value of 205 for
Brazilians born in the 1850s, while our data produce a slightly more positive index of
178. How large is this difference? Throughout the 19th century, values in the Middle
East and South Asia were near 500, whereas in European industrial countries they were
closer to 100, with those of Latin America ranging from 100 (Argentina, 1890s) to 290
(Ecuador, 1880s). The difference of 27 in the two data sets for Brazil is small but not
negligible. Our regression estimates show that those prisoners who rounded off their
age were significantly shorter. However, according to the comparison of census shares
with our sample shares in Table 1.4 we conclude that the prison sample does not have
a strong negative educational bias, we attribute this to a more urban sample.
1.3.6 Height differences by skin color and slave status
Even after controlling for occupation, slave status, birth decade and all other charac-
teristics, black people were significantly taller than native Brazilian white people on
average. However, this differences refers to black free men, as slaves were significantly
shorter than white people. The fact that black Brazilians were relatively tall in spite
of their low status probably cannot be explained genetically, as black people born in
Africa were in fact shorter than those born in regions of Brazil where feijoada was
an important component of the diet. On average, black people of African birth were
161.7 cm (N=151) tall, while those born in Brazil were significantly taller, at 164.9 cm
(N=921).13
Slaves in the United States were considerably taller than their Brazilian counter-
parts. According to Margo and Steckel (1983), the mean height of U.S. slaves (ages
25 to 39 in the 1790s to 1840s) was 4 cm greater than that of Brazilian slaves. The
white population in the U.S. was also considerably taller than that of Brazil: around
173 cm from the 1800s to the 1830s, and then falling to 169.1 cm in the 1890s. In the
U.S. South, whites were about 2.5 centimeters taller than slaves (Komlos and Coclanis
1997). Fogel and Engerman (1974, 1995), Steckel (1986) and more recently Rees et al.
(2003) have argued that U.S. slaveholders provided those of their slaves who reached
adulthood with reasonably nutritious food. As importing slaves became more difficult
13Our results are in line with the arguments that Eltis (1982) has provided against strong height
selectivity in slave-trade. For example, he argues that if traders put a significant premium on taller
slaves, prices and volumes of slaves traded in those areas with taller populations would have been
higher, which does not appear to have happened in the 19th century. Second, by the 19th century,
physically strong (and tall) Africans were also demanded by Africa’s plantations and farms. Finally,
Eltis (1982) observed that the height distributions from all regions were quite normal. If there had
been something like a minimum height requirement of slaves or a height interval which was much
less demanded, slaves from the regions with shorter stature should have displayed some shortfall.
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and expensive, some slaveholders began to provide their slaves with offal and other
cheap sources of protein. It is questionable whether this may have been true for Brazil
as well.
1.4 Peru (Lima)
1.4.1 Social and economic history of Peru
The pronounced stratification of Peruvian society can be traced back to the conquis-
tadors, who took possession of most of the fertile land and introduced slavery. Peru
gained independence from Spain in 1821, but the social and economic inequalities in-
troduced during the colonial era did not diminish significantly (Gootenberg 1990). The
legacy of the Spanish Empire was a two-class system defined by rigid social rules and
tax laws where white elite held the privileged positions (Contreras 2004). The elite
appropriated the riches of the country and was able to protect its social status and
profit over time. White men often had children by their Indio servants, creating a
mixed racial group, mestizos. The abolition of slave trade, in the 1850s, had serious
consequences for farmers, who had relied on slave labor.
Peru was a an important exporter of silver throughout the colonial era, but in the
early 19th century investments and profits declined during and after the independence
conflicts (Contreras 2004). In the same period, Peru launched a new export good,
guano, a fertilizer and commodity for gun powder made from excrements of seabirds.
Guano replenished the public treasury and enabled an enormous amount of profits to
be captured until the 1860s. Due to the demand of many middlemen and retailers for
other goods, income increased also for other inhabitants of the capital (Gootenberg
1990). Nevertheless, Peru’s finances remained unstable. Violent political upheavals,
including frequent coups d’état, made governing the country next to impossible and
contributed to a rise in government debt. The government borrowed on future revenues
from guano and then squandered the money within a few years. After three decades
of frenetic prosperity, Peru sank into a recession in the mid-1870s. The country’s
undiversified export structure depended on the markets of Great Britain and France,
and orders diminished as international trade in general slowed (Gootenberg 1989).
Cotton plantations dominated the coastal region around Lima while sheep, llamas,
and alpacas were raised in the interior of the country (Bauer 1986). In Peru’s north-
ern mountains, cattle production was more pronounced, and the meat consumption of
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Lima’s upper class may have therefore been fairly high.14 However, the cost of trans-
porting meat from the North was probably prohibitive for the urban poor. Due to the
distance, milk was not consumed in large amounts in Lima, neither by rich nor by poor
persons.
1.4.2 New anthropometric evidence for Lima
For Peru, as we did for Brazil, we rely on a prison sample comprising 1,139 cases, mostly
convicts from Lima and a modest number of immigrants.15 They were measured in
the years 1866 to 1909, allowing us to study the birth decades of the 1820s to 1880s.
Since sample size for each birth decade would be too small, we aggregate Peruvian
birth cohorts into 20-year birth groups.
We compare the social and occupational structure in the mostly urban prison sam-
ple with the 1876 census of population born in the Lima district (Table 1.6). The 1876
census provides information about the social structure of Peruvian society, including
such variables as skin color, religion, and nationality (Díaz Alejandro 1974). We refer
to the census report from Pinto and Goicochea (1977) and classify all occupations in
the sample according to the Armstrong scheme. We limit the sample to those con-
victs measured during the 1870s. This sample actually overrepresents skilled people
in comparison to that for the Lima district, which includes the city’s rural surround-
ings. However, in combining semiskilled and skilled groups, the prison sample is quite
representative for the Lima district, with the exception of farmers, who are of course
underrepresented in our urban sample. In contrast, professionals and semiprofessionals
are well represented, among the prisoners some were slightly better off than most aver-
age male person. This may help to explain why the standard deviations of the height
distribution are relatively large (Table 1.2). The prison population includes merchants
and traders, convicted of business-related crimes . All skin-color groups except Asians
(which usually meant Chinese) are well represented in our sample. Immigrants compose
22% of our prison sample, in contrast with 3% in the census for the Lima district.
14Peru had by far the smallest number of cattle per capita, with only 1 million in 1917 relative to a
population somewhere between less than 3 million in 1876 and 7 million in 1940 (Mitchell 1993).
Brazil had 31 million cattle in 1912 and 17 million population in 1900, and Argentina’s per capita
values declined from more than 7 per capita in the late 1860s/early 1870s to 4 per capita in 1910.
Hence in Peru 5-6 inhabitants ‘shared’ one cow, whereas Brazil had initially around 2 cattle per
capita and Argentina between 8 and 4 cattle per capita. The decline of cattle per capita in Argentina
could have contributed to the disappointing stagnation of heights, but of course, Argentina had a
much higher export of first salted, later refrigerated cattle meat, hence production did not equal
consumption.
15Lima/Peru - Archivo General de la Nación. Archival source ‘penitenciaria central’, the main prison
in Lima, and Guadalupe prison. Libros de Entrada y Salida de Reos, Nr. 3.20.3.3.1.1.4 to 26.
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Table 1.6: Occupational and social structure in Lima in 1876
Lima census 
share 1876
Lima sample 
share 1870s
Occupational group
No occupation 0.1 0.6
Unskilled 16.3 16.5
Farmers 47.8 18.4
Semiskilled 21.7 14.6
Skilled 9.4 34.8
Semiprofessionals 4.2 12
Professionals 0.5 3.2
Skin color
White 22.7 20.7
Indio 44.1 43
Mestizo 15.7 21.8
Black 6.8 10.5
Asian 10.7 3.2
Immigrants 3 22
Source census share: Pinto, H. and A. Goicochea (1977)
Furthermore, we assess representativeness by comparing the Whipple Index of the
prison sample to the overall population. The Whipple Index of age heaping of the
whole prison sample is 127 (ages 33 to 62, 1820s to 1880s). Manzel and Baten (2009)
estimate a Whipple Index for Lima’s population at 139 for the birth cohort of the 1880s,
a much better value than in Brazil. In other words, from an age-heaping perspective,
our prison sample and the overall population are quite similar.
1.4.3 Height, ethnicity and occupation in Lima
We estimate one regression for native Peruvians only, and one including immigrants
(Table 1.7). Unfortunately we cannot assess growth patterns or differences between
immigrant groups. Heights of the birth decades before 1859 were lower than those
after 1860. A yellow-fever epidemic during the 1840s must have made life in Lima
exceedingly difficult (Sánchez-Albornoz 1986).
There were no significant differences in height by occupation. The reason why
the occupation coefficients are insignificant could be that most Indios in the sample
were categorized as ‘unskilled’ or ‘unknown’, and as a consequence there could be mul-
ticollinearity between occupation and skin-color/ethnicity. However, there was large
variation in height by ethnicity. Indios were shorter than whites by 5 to 6 cm, mestizos
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Table 1.7: Determinants of heights in Lima
(1) (2)
without 
immigrants full sample
1880 ref.cat. ref.cat.
1820/30 -2.22* -2.34**
1840/50 -2.27*** -2.31***
1860/70 0.11 0.07
Unskilled ref.cat. ref.cat.
Semiskilled 0.75 0.39
Skilled 0.32 0.21
Semiprofessional 0.58 0.24
Professional -1.62 0.47
Farmer -0.34 -0.4
White ref.cat. ref.cat.
Indio/Cholo -5.02*** -6.03***
Mestizo -2.91*** -3.37***
Zambo 0.73 -0.45
Black 2.25* 1.01
Asia -3.58***
Constant 165.78*** 166.88***
Observations 884 1139
R-squared 0.14 0.13
Notes:  We estimate an OLS regression with robust 
standard errors. Dependent variable: body height in cm. 
*,**,*** refer to significance levels of 10,5, and 1%.  The 
constant refers to a criminal unskilled male of white skin 
color and age 23-50, born in the 1880s.
by around 3 cm, and Asians (mostly Chinese) by 4 cm. Blacks were not significantly
shorter than whites, and those born in Peru were even significantly taller.16
White people born in the 1880s were 5 to 6 centimeters taller than Indios of the
same age. How different were the heights in Lima from those in other regions of Peru?
The first representative data set on heights with a sufficient number of cases refers to
birth cohorts of 1950 to 1967, when Lima recorded average female heights of 151 cm
(Baten and Fraunholz 2004). The average height of women in the Northeast, East
(Madre de Dios) and South was about 152 cm, while women in the central highlands
and the Northwest measured 150 cm or less. This pattern persisted for birth cohorts of
1968 to 1979, although the region around Lima gained somewhat in height. Assuming
16In a separate regression model, we also checked whether occupational groups became more significant
if we considered only individuals born after the 1840s, but the difference to the original regression
was quite modest.
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that the 19th century and the post-1950 periods were not dramatically different, one
can reasonably conclude that heights not only in Lima but in the rest of Peru as well
were not dramatically different. But this conclusion is tentative, and requires further
study. A number of anthropological studies of height using data derived exclusively
from tribes in the Andes estimates the height of rural male Indios in Peru and Northern
Bolivia born mostly between the 1880s and 1900s at somewhat under 159 cm (Steggerda
1943, Bogin and Keep 1999). The urban Indios of our sample who were born in the
1870s and 1880s were slightly taller (about 160 cm). Although our Lima sample is
small, it seems safe to conclude that the height level of its population was substantially
shorter than that of Brazil. The height gap between white and Indio prisoners steadily
widened.
1.5 Comparative conclusion
Figure 1.5 shows a comparative picture of the height trends in Argentina, Brazil and
Peru. Argentinean height levels were quite impressive during the period under study
compared with other Latin American or with European populations. However, they
did not increase during the GDP boom, as we would have expected from the GDP
estimates in Table 1.1. This finding confirms earlier studies that indicate a stagnation
of average stature during the period when exports were growing the fastest (Salvatore
1998, 2004a, 2004b, 2007). Heights in Brazil started from a comparatively low level
and stagnated during the first half of the 19th century before an upward trend began
in the 1860s. Lima experienced an upward trend, as well, in the 1870s and 1880s but
was still far away from Argentinean or Brazilian height levels. This result is suprising
as GDP estimates for Peru are slightly higher than those for Brazil. We conclude that
lower average heights in Lima are attributable to a higher level of income disparity and
urbanization.
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Figure 1.5: Height trends in Argentina, Brazil, and Lima by birth decade (Brazil,
Argentina), and 20- or 10-year birth cohort (Lima)
Figure 5: Height trends in Argentina, Brazil, and Lima by birth decade 
(Brazil, Argentina), nd 20- or 10-year birth cohort (Lima) 
 
Note: The Lima value for 1830 refers to those born 1820-39, the one for 1850 to 1840-59, the one for 
1870 to 1860-1879, the one for 1880 to 1880-89. The years denote the beginning of a birth decade for 
Brazil and Argentina (1810 for 1810-19 etc.). We adjusted for occupational group and for skin color by 
using the coefficients of the main regression tables, and census weights so as to obtain unbiased 
population averages for each birth cohort and country (the census weights were derived from the 
Peruvian census of 1876, values for the Lima region, and the Brazilian census of 1872) 
 
The analysis of occupational classes and skin color reveals that among the birth cohorts
of the 1810s to the 1880s, the most significant height differences in Brazil were between
the elite and the rest of the population. In contrast, by the 1870s Argentina’s middle
class was considerably taller than the lower class. In Peru, where the height gap
between Indios and whites was particularly wide, skin color may have compounded
the social and economic differences between the races, complicating any attempt at an
analysis of heights according to occupational classifications.
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1.6 Appendix
Figure 1.6: Distribution of heights in Brazil per birth decade
 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
120 140 160 180 200
120 140 160 180 200 120 140 160 180 200
1810 1820 1830
1840 1850 1860
1870 1880
Density
normal ht
D
en
si
ty
ht
Graphs by bdec
 
 
Table 1.8: Descriptive statistics of heights in Brazil per birth decade
Birth 
decade N mean median p10 p25 p75 p90 skewness
1810 75 164.3219 165.165 156.975 161.07 167.895 171.99 -0.88041
1820 323 164.3165 163.8 155.61 159.705 168 171.99 0.86928
1830 705 164.8438 165 155.61 161 169.26 173.355 -0.30131
1840 1265 164.5723 165 156 160 169.26 173.355 -0.14697
1850 1604 164.4832 164 156 160 169.26 173 -0.05359
1860 1740 165.0249 165 157 161 170 173 -0.11104
1870 887 166.5445 166 159 162 171 175 -0.05963
1880 172 166.1453 166 158 162 171 174 -0.39845
Total 6771 164.9791 165 156.975 160 170 174 -0.0838
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Chapter 2
Motivation and employment effects of FDI:
Evidence from German SMEs
2.1 Introduction
Politicians and the media often emphasize the major contribution of small and medium
sized enterprises (SMEs) to job creation in the German economy. SMEs provide 60.5%
of jobs in Germany, they contribute 52.8% to the total value-added and they play a
key role in innovation and R&D (European Commission 2009). However, international
activities in general and foreign direct investment (FDI) in particular are attributed
to large firms rather than to SMEs. Large firms are said to be more productive, they
have better access to finance, are better organized and have better internal expertise
to fully explore a major FDI decision. Nevertheless, particularly in Germany, we have
observed increasing international activities for SMEs in the last decade. International
economic integration provides an important stimulus not only to trade, but also to
FDI (European Commission 2003). German SMEs do not only play a major role in the
export business, they also invest abroad and have foreign affiliates or joint ventures.
This process has been considerably enhanced by the political and economic integration
of Central and Eastern Europe and by a continuous decrease in communication and
transportation costs.
FDI is often associated with relocation of production since several large firms have
in part moved their production from Germany to Eastern Europe, China or India. This
process has created a lot of uproar in the media. News about planned production re-
locations always meet with disapproval or with skepticism from the public. Moreover,
not only employees of big firms are afraid of losing their jobs because of relocation
of production but also employees of SMEs that pursue international activities. Yet,
these concerns are only partly substantiated by empirical work. Empirical studies have
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found both positive and negative effects of outward FDI on home employment. How-
ever, research has not yet addressed international activities of SMEs and the resulting
implications for employment in the home country. There is very little evidence on
SMEs and the related employment effects after FDI. Existing research mainly focuses
on large firms or does not explicitly differentiate between large firms and SMEs.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze the employment
changes at home and abroad for internationally active SMEs using German firm-level
data. We examine a cross-section survey of the German Chambers of Industry and
Commerce (DIHK) from the year 2005 that contains a large share of SMEs. We define
SMEs as firms that have less than 200 employees and a sales volume of less than 50
million Euro. Most data sets do not provide explicit information on the reasons why
firms invest abroad. The DIHK survey asks for detailed self-assessed information on
the motivation for the international activity. This allows us to draw a conclusion on
the effects of motivation for FDI on home employment changes. Beyond descriptively
assessing the international activities and motivations of large firms and SMEs, we
contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we provide evidence on how SMEs
differ from large firms in their employment behavior after having engaged in FDI.
Second, we analyze for all firms if there is a direct relationship between employment at
home and abroad. Third, we provide further evidence on how the motivation to invest
and the host region of investment affect employment changes in the home country.
A firm’s decisions about employment changes at home and abroad are not taken
separately. They depend on each other as well as on the same firm-specific charac-
teristics. To assess this question we estimate an ordered probit model in a bivariate
framework in which the change in employment at home is estimated simultaneously
with the change in employment abroad. The results show that there is a positive cor-
relation between employment change at home and jobs abroad. Thus, employment
changes at home and abroad are complements rather than substitutes. We control for
size in terms of sales and number of employees. We find that firms with more than
200 employees have a significantly lower probability of positive employment change at
home. But, with increasing sales volume the probability of positive employment change
increases significantly. As an alternative to size measures in terms of sales and number
of employees we include a dummy variable for SME status. We find that compared
to large firms, SMEs are more likely to increase their employment at home after FDI.
Horizontal motivations have a positive impact on job changes at home after FDI, we
find no significant effect of vertical motivations. Relocations of production and invest-
ments to Eastern Europe lead to job losses, investments to USA/Canada result in job
gains and FDI to Western Europe or Asia has no significant impact.
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2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 SMEs and FDI
Reduced barriers to international trade and investment as well as advancements in
information and communication technology have created new opportunities for smaller
firms to expand internationally (Prasad 1999). Nevertheless, there is little evidence on
the characteristics of the increased international activities of SMEs. Even less is known
about differences in motivations, investment patterns and related employment changes
between large firms and SMEs. Research on SMEs and FDI is instead concentrated on
business and management studies that examine the rationale for SMEs investing abroad
- their opportunities, threats and benefits. Among the few economic studies, Fujita
(1995) uses survey data from the UNCTAD Programme on Transnational Corporations
to provide descriptive statistical evidence on trends and patterns of FDI by SMEs. He
finds that until 1992 large firms were responsible for the bulk of total FDI in value
terms whereas the absolute size of SME’s FDI was small in value but large in terms of
the number of affiliates with an ongoing upward trend that begun in the 1980s. FDI
by SMEs before 1992 was mainly concentrated in developed countries, particularly in
manufacturing and in industries that produce capital goods.
General approaches and findings on FDI can possibly not directly be assigned to
SMEs as the size of a firm has an important impact on offshoring activities and their
determinants. Most important of all, for smaller firms the costs of production disin-
tegration might be higher than the benefits that can be achieved through exploitation
of factor price differences (Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004). Buckley (1989) gives
an overview of the theoretical background of FDI with special focus on SMEs. He dis-
cusses several approaches to the analysis of SMEs’ FDI, among others the economics
of firm growth and trade theories. He defines two critical issues that may disadvantage
smaller firms in particular: shortages in capital and in management expertise. Finan-
cial constraints for SMEs are on average more severe than for large firms whereas the
fixed monetary costs of FDI and the fixed costs of learning about a foreign environ-
ment are high. Moreover, smaller firms face higher risks when they go international.
First, the proportion of resources that are put into FDI may be greater for small firms.
Second, owner-managers bear higher risks than employed decision makers and third,
one single mistaken investment may have substantial implications for the survival of
the firm. Consequently, risks and costs of an FDI are a greater barrier for small firms
investing abroad than for large firms. Furthermore, recent theoretical and empirical
findings suggest that only more productive firms can undertake a foreign direct invest-
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ment (Melitz 2003, Helpman et al. 2004). Since there is a consensus that SMEs are on
average less productive (Leung et al. 2008, Taymaz 2005) the share of SMEs that can
afford to invest abroad is smaller than for large firms.
2.2.2 Motivations for FDI
Research on multinational firms has explored two main reasons for the internation-
alization of production: Reduction of production costs and market access (see e.g.
Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) for an overview). Horizontally integrated firms
gain access to foreign markets through FDI when distance and other barriers to trade
make exports less profitable. In horizontally integrated firms, parents and affiliates
perform the same stage of production (Markusen 1984). Vertically integrated firms in
contrast aim at reducing production costs through internationalization. They benefit
from existing factor price differentials between countries by splitting up the production
process and relocating labor intensive stages of production into countries where labor
is cheaper (Helpman 1984). Vertical investments are assumed to go prevailingly to
low-wage or less-developed countries whereas horizontal investments are destined to
high-wage or developed countries.
Empirically, the firms’ motivations for FDI are difficult to assess, in most data sets
the motivation for FDI is not explicitly provided. Furthermore, only very few firms
have one clearly defined reason for FDI, most firms pursue both horizontal and vertical
motives in their host country (Feinberg and Keane 2006). Yet, horizontal motives seem
to prevail. Buch and Kleinert (2006) find that a large part of German FDI into Eastern
Europe is driven by the market-access motive, but for some manufacturing sectors the
production cost motive is indeed important. Sethupathy (2010) reveals that the vertical
share of activity in low-income countries is higher than in high-income countries while
vertical and horizontal activities occur in both types of countries.
It is worth asking why SMEs go abroad and whether they differ in their motivations
from large firms. Kuo and Li (2003) apply a hazard rate approach to explore the
internal and external factors that were significant motivations for Taiwanese SMEs to
invest abroad during the period from 1989 to 1996. They find that the motivation
for FDI is similar to that for large firms, namely cost reduction and market access.
The decisive firm-specific factors motivating SMEs in Taiwan to undertake FDI are
size, experience in exporting and low capital intensity. Larger firms and firms with
high export ratios are more likely to invest abroad. Exporting thus seems to be an
important learning experience for further internationalization. The intention to engage
in FDI significantly increases with R&D intensity while a higher capital intensity (or
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a lower degree of labor intensity) has a strong negative effect on the likelihood of
conducting FDI. A firm with higher capital intensity will suffer less when wages rise,
the cost saving motivation is not that essential and thus its hazard rate of investing
abroad is lower. Indeed, cheap labor in the host country is one of the most important
external factors that motivate SMEs to invest abroad. The major external factors
motivating Taiwanese SMEs to conduct FDI in recent years are ‘utilizing local labor’,
‘expanding markets’, and ‘following major clients’.
2.2.3 FDI and labor market effects
Theoretically, jobs in the parent firm and in the affiliate can be complements as well as
substitutes. Both production-cost and market-access driven FDI can have positive as
well as negative implications on employment at home. For both horizontal and vertical
FDI, the demand for headquarter services may rise after FDI. The employment effects
of horizontal FDI are positive if the foreign market is entered through FDI and has not
been supplied before. In contrast, jobs at home and abroad are substitutes if the new
production abroad replaces exports. For FDI that is driven by vertical motives, the
employment effects are likely to be negative in the short run when labor-intensive stages
of production are relocated abroad. In particular employment of low-skilled workers
may decrease in the host country. On the other hand the firm can save production costs
and can thereby improve its competitiveness in the long run such that its market share
increases. This in turn could lead to an increasing demand for labor in the parent firm.
But, on the aggregate level this effect may be negative as other firms lose market share
and consequently shed jobs. Sethupathy (2010) calls this productivity or market share
switching effect also the ‘business-stealing’ effect. Furthermore, the job dynamics after
FDI affect different skill types differently. Vertically investing firms offshore low-skilled
jobs while they create new jobs for high-skilled workers in the home country. Feenstra
and Hanson (1996) were the first to mention this ‘labor composition effect’.
2.2.4 Empirical evidence on labor market effects of FDI
A large empirical literature investigates the effects of trade, outsourcing, offshoring
and FDI on job security, employment composition and wages for several countries, yet
there is no specific research on SMEs.
We focus only on studies that investigate the effects of FDI on the employment level
in the home country. Still, the results are to some extent ambiguous as the studies use
different econometric approaches, aggregation levels and measures for international
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activity. Mostly depending on the host country of FDI, some studies find negative
effects of FDI on job changes in the home country, especially for low-skilled workers,
others find positive or no significant effects. For this reason it is rather difficult to
compare the results.
Just to name a few studies, Becker et al. (2005) come to the conclusion that
affiliate employment of Swedish and German MNEs tends to substitute for employment
at the parent level. Konings and Murphy (2006) analyze European MNEs from 1993-
1998 and find small substitution effects of parent and affiliate employment. Falk and
Wolfmayr (2010) investigate the elasticity of substitution for parent firms from 14
Western European countries and their affiliates in 25 European countries for the period
2000-2004. They also find a low elasticity of substitution for jobs in affiliates located
in the 14 Western European countries. Yet, for affiliates in the CEEC they find no
substitution effect. Debaere et al. (2010) reveal that in the period between 1968
and 1996 South Korean FDI to developed countries did not affect employment growth
whereas firms with FDI to less developed countries had lower employment growth rates
compared to their domestic counterparts. Barba Navaretti et al. (2009) use Italian and
French data for the years 1993-2000 and find that FDI to least developed countries have
had a positive effect on employment. Becker and Muendler (2008) show that German
firms that expanded their FDI between 1999 and 2001 were more likely to secure jobs
in the home country than their non-expanding competitors.
Recently, some authors addressed the question of why the results of existing empir-
ical studies are ambiguous. Moser et al. (2009) claim that the results are contradictory
since they have not been able to disentangle the two effects that determine the em-
ployment changes after vertical investment, the downsizing and the productivity or
market share switching effect. Sethupathy (2010) follows this reasoning and formal-
izes the productivity effect theoretically. Horgos (2009) points out the importance of
measurement for analyzing labor market effects of international outsourcing. He finds
that differences in estimated effects are not only attributable to the use of different
data, but depend strongly on differences in measurement and on the level of industry
aggregation.
Differences in employment changes between SMEs and large firms are a topic only
on the periphery of the literature. Most studies use industry level data, therefore the
heterogeneity of firms cannot be captured. In firm level studies, firm size in terms
of sales and/or number of employees is sometimes included as a control variable into
the regressions. To draw a conclusion on the changes in employment related to size
effects we review some of these studies. Munch (2010) estimates a standard duration
model as well as a competing risks duration model to study the effect of outsourcing on
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individual job separation in the Danish manufacturing sector for the period 1990-2003.
He includes a dummy for whether the worker’s workplace has 50 or more employees as a
control variable without further discussing or interpreting the coefficient in the results.
The coefficient has a negative sign and is significant on the 5% level, indicating that
workers in firms that have 50 or more employees have a lower probability of losing their
jobs after outsourcing. Harrison et al. (2007) explicitly distinguish between ‘small’
and ‘large’ firms by giving extra weights in the regressions to larger firms that hire
relatively more workers. They find that small firms tend to have affiliates only in high-
income countries while large firms tend to have affiliates in both high- and low-income
countries. Buch and Kleinert (2006) state that Eastern enlargement is often viewed
as the key trigger of German SMEs expansion into foreign markets, enabling them to
benefit from lower labor costs and to relocate production abroad. The benefits in labor
costs may however come with employment losses in the home countries of FDI. They
also find that size of the parent has a positive impact on the probability of investing
in Eastern Europe. German affiliates in the CEEC employ more labor than affiliates
in Western Europe. Furthermore, German affiliates in Eastern Europe are smaller
in terms of sales, though this may reflect the age of the affiliates since multinational
activity in the CEEC started only in the 1990s.
Germany’s Federal Statistical Office reports first descriptive evidence in a policy
report based on a pilot survey (Destatis 2008): Firms with 100 to 250 employees are
responsible for the largest share of jobs that have been relocated away from Germany.
Moreover, these firms with 100 to 250 employees created only 45.5 new jobs per 100
relocated jobs while firms with 250 to 500 employees have a job turnover ratio of 58.8
new jobs per 100 relocated jobs. Firms with 500 to 1000 employees have a ratio of
66.9 and firms with 1000 and more employees contribute with 60.2 new jobs per 100
relocated jobs. Yet, an EU commissioned study on internationalization of SMEs con-
cludes that internationally active SMEs report higher employment growth (European
Commission 2010).
2.2.5 Implications for our work
According to the findings above discussed there is no reason to expect that SMEs in-
vest for different reasons than large firms, nor that the impact of motivation and the
host region on employment change is different. The theoretical effects of employment
changes after FDI are multifaceted and depend on several factors that are not observ-
able either in our data or in most other data sets. As a result, the existing empirical
evidence is not unambiguous either. Therefore, it is difficult to derive well-defined pre-
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dictions for our empirical results concerning the effects of motivation and host country
on employment after FDI. Nonetheless, we expect that the employment changes after
FDI are more positive for SMEs than for large firms as firm growth tends to decrease
with firm size (Evans 1986). Although disputed (Davis et al. 1996), there is evidence
that as a consequence net job creation rates are higher for SMEs than for large firms
(OECD 1996, Hijzen et al. 2010).
2.3 Data and descriptives
The data set is based on the survey ‘Going international - success factors in interna-
tional business’, which was collected by the German Chambers of Industry and Com-
merce (DIHK) in autumn 2005. The questionnaire was sent to 55,000 DIHK member
firms from 55 industries that were known to have international business activities and
were located in one of the sixteen German Federal States (excluding Lower Saxony).
Most of the firms are based in the largest federal states Bavaria (17.4%), North Rhine-
Westphalia (15.4%) and Baden-Württemberg (21.1%). The total number of responses
was 4,325, which corresponds to a response rate of 8 percent. According to the DIHK,
practically all firms in Germany that are internationally active are also members of one
local Chamber of Industry and Commerce (IHK) as the membership is mandatory for
all German firms that are active in industry and trade. The participating firms were
not chosen randomly but from an internal IHK database that contains all members that
operate internationally. Members have to report, at least once in three years, whether
they import or export, produce abroad, have a subsidiary, agency, investment or licens-
ing partners abroad. The survey further includes IHK members that have subscribed
to an international business newsletter and firms that make use of the A.T.A. carnet,
an international customs document for temporary admission of tax-free imports.
Apart from the fact that the dataset consists only of internationally active firms
we do not expect to face a selection problem regarding IHK membership. Despite the
low response rate the data set has several advantages that outweigh its drawbacks.
In particular, it allows us to study the behavior of internationally active SMEs and
offers detailed information on several international activities. One further advantage
of the survey is that the firms were asked to report their motivation for the foreign
activity, an important and theoretically decisive piece of information for the changes
in employment after FDI which is often not included in official statistics. However, a
shortcoming of the dataset is that most information is coded categorically.
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2.3.1 International activities and regression sampling
Table 2.1 displays the international activities of large firms and SMEs in nine not
mutually exclusive categories for seven world regions. The share of large firms that
have stated to have a specific activity abroad is almost always higher than the share of
corresponding SMEs. Only non-binding cooperation seems to matter more for SMEs
than for large firms, although the difference is not statistically significant for every
region. Exporting and sourcing of materials are the most common ways to access
foreign markets, for SMEs as well as for large firms. We observe the largest gap between
the activity shares of large firms and SMEs in the categories that can be defined as
FDI: ‘sales office’, ‘affiliate’, ‘joint venture’, ‘purchasing office’ and ‘R&D’. The share
of large firms with these activities is - except for sales offices - more than twice as
large as for SMEs. This points to the fact that FDI is still an activity that prevails
for large firms whereas exports are almost likewise important for SMEs and for large
firms. In this paper we give an assessment of the firms’ employment changes in the
home country after they have invested abroad. For the following analysis the data set
is therefore constrained only to those firms that have at least one sales office, affiliate,
joint venture, purchasing office or R&D abroad. This selection makes sure that we
consider only firms that invest abroad. By considering only firms that have no missing
information in the variables that are relevant for the regression, the sample reduces to
1,051 observations. All the following statistics and results refer to this reduced sample
of FDI firms.1
1For a description of the types and regions of the activities for the firms in the regression sample see
Appendix Table 2.8.
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2.3.2 Motivations for international activity
The questionnaire includes 17 not mutually exclusive response options to inquire about
the motivation for the firms’ international activities. Table 2.2 shows the share of
large firms vs. SMEs that agreed to the respective pre-formulated reasons for their
international activity.
Table 2.2: Motivation for FDITable 2: Motivation for international activities  
 
(in percent of affirmative answers)                 t-test 
            large firms         SMEs          p-value   
              
Horizontal motivations 
Opening up new markets (sale)    96.6  94.7   0.139  
Opening up new markets (purchase)   56.8  62.9  0.065* 
Customer request / proximity to customer  69.3  59.6  0.002*** 
Favourable competitive environment /   59.0  60.4  0.664 
market conditions  
Service / aftersale      29.5  33.4  0.205 
 
Vertical motivations 
Lower labor costs / material costs   45.9  42.9  0.371 
Lower taxes and social security contributions  28.6  30.3  0.561 
Better employment law abroad    28.6  28.8  0.937 
Higher productivity      21.3  24.7  0.224 
 
Other motivations 
Less regulation / bureaucracy     26.1  33.8  0.011** 
Promotion and support programmes   23.1  28.3  0.073* 
Personal reasons / coincidental contacts  19.1  31.6  0.000*** 
Lower customs      20.4  24.6  0.118 
Avoidance of other, non-tariff-related   18.5  21.5  0.267 
barriers to trade 
Better availability and qualification of employees 18.2  24.5  0.019** 
Better know how in R&D     17.0  21.2  0.106 
Better infrastructure     17.6  20.4  0.291 
 
N        329  722 
 
Notes: No category for other, non-preformulated answers available. Two-sample t-test under the assumption 
of equal variances.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.
Five out of the 17 possible answers can be denoted as horizontal (or market seeking)
and four as vertical (or cost saving) motivation. The remaining other potential answers
are neither clearly horizontal nor vertical and are subsumed in the category ‘other
motivations’. This category also contains the traditional reasons for FDI like ‘lower
customs’ and ‘non-tariff-related barriers to trade’. The most important reasons for FDI
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are clearly horizontal. 96.6% of large firms and 94.7% of SMEs agreed that opening up
new markets for selling products is one of their main reasons for being active abroad.
Among the remaining horizontal reasons proximity to customers seems to be more of an
issue for large firms whereas opening up new markets for puchasing is more important
for SMEs. Cost saving reasons come second, both for large firms and for SMEs. This is
in line with Buch et al. (2005) who find that German FDI is mostly driven by market
access motives. Regarding the other non-horizontal and non-vertical motivations, there
are some differences between SMEs and large firms that are noteworthy: Remarkably,
a higher share of SMEs agree that bureaucratical reasons and support programmes
are an important issue for internationalization. Better availability and qualification of
employees are on average more important for SMEs than for large firms as are personal
reasons and coincidental contacts.
From these answers we construct a categorical variable for motivation that will later
serve as explanatory variable. For this purpose we create an index that captures a firm’s
motivation to invest abroad in five categories ranging from purely vertical to purely
horizontal. This index is generated from the ratio of horizontal to vertical answers
that a firm has indicated, giving equal weight to all stated reasons. For example, the
index for a firm which agreed to three out of five horizontal reasons and to one out of
four vertical reasons is 3/51/4 = 2.4. The resulting values from these calculations ranging
from 0 to 4 are subsumed to four ordered categories. For firms with purely horizontal
reasons the index is incalculable, we assign them the highest value of the index. Hence,
the variable ‘motivation’ consists of the five following categories:
• 1 - predominantly vertical motivation (index<1)
• 2 - equal vertical and horizontal motivation (index=1)
• 3 - rather horizontal motivation (1<index<2) or solely other motivations than
horizontal or vertical indicated
• 4 - predominantly horizontal motivation (2<index<4)
• 5 - purely horizontal motivation (no vertical motives and at least one horizontal
motive, index incalculable)
According to this scheme the firm in the example above belongs to category 4.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics regression sample
Table 3: Summary statistics regression sample for SMEs and large firms (N=1,051)
large 
firms SMEs
t-test
p-value
N 329 722
Employment change at home (c)
decreased 24.6 26.0 0.623
unchanged 27.7 37.8 0.001***
increased 47.7 36.2 0.000***
Employment change abroad (c)
decreased 5.5 9.8 0.009***
unchanged 15.2 36.7 0.000***
increased 79.3 53.5 0.000***
Number of employees in 2004 (c)
<20 9.1 38.4 0.000***
20-49 3.0 24.0 0.000***
50-99 4.9 17.4 0.000***
100-199 8.8 20.2 0.000***
>200 74.2 -
Sales in 2004 in EUR (c)
<=0.5mio - 7.8
0.5-2.5mio 0.6 18.3 0.000***
2.5-10mio 3.3 39.2 0.000***
10-25mio 7.9 24.6 0.000***
25-50mio 17.0 10.1 0.000***
>50mio 71.1 -
Amount invested abroad
in the last 5 years in EUR (c)
<200t 13.7 56.4 0.000***
200-500t 7.9 18.7 0.000***
500t-1mio 13.4 10.1 0.137
1-5mio 27.7 12.2 0.000***
>5mio 37.4 2.6 0.000***
Relocation of production (d) 63.1 47.3 0.000***
Motivation (c)
purely vertical (1) 5.7 4.9 0.606
prevailingly vertical (2) 11.7 15.6 0.103
likewise vert. and hor./other (3) 16.1 14.4 0.489
prevailingly horizontal (4) 17.1 10.2 0.006***
purely horizontal (5) 49.3 55.0 0.107
FDI to Eastern Europe (d) 70.5 52.9 0.000***
FDI to Western Europe (d) 84.8 62.7 0.000***
FDI to USA/Canada (d) 57.1 35.0 0.000***
FDI to Asia (d) 57.5 39.9 0.000***
Notes: Summary statistics in percent. N=1,051. SMEs are firms that have less than 200 
employees and a sales volume of less than 50 mio EUR. Comparison of means with two-
sample t-tests under the assumption of equal variances. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. d = dummy variable, c = categorical variable. 
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2.3.3 Summary statistics
Table 2.3 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation of the
bivariate ordered probit model on employment changes after FDI. SMEs are defined as
firms that have less than 200 employees and a sales volume of less than 50 million Euro.2
We cannot quantify aggregate employment effects as the dataset does not contain the
exact number of dismissed and newly hired employees. However, we know the direction
of the employment changes at home and abroad and the motivations for FDI. The firms
were asked if the number of employees at home and abroad has decreased, increased
or stayed the same since the beginning of the international activity. Accordingly, the
two dependent variables in the bivariate ordered probit regressions are the change
in employment at home and the change in employment abroad, each with the three
categories ‘decreased’, ‘unchanged’ and ‘increased’.
2.4 Analysis of employment changes after FDI
We analyze empirically whether FDI leads to job losses or job gains in the home coun-
try while taking into account employment changes in the host country. Our variable
of interest ‘employment change at home’ is ordered in three categories. An ordered
probit model could therefore provide empirical evidence about the changes in a firm’s
work force in the home country after an FDI. However, it can be assumed that while
deciding whether to increase, decrease or to keep the workforce at home constant a
firm also considers the changes in employment abroad. Hence, employment change
at home and abroad are not independent from each other. In fact they are both a
function of possibly the same firm-specific characteristics. Therefore, the estimation
of an ordered probit framework would lead to the following problems: Not considering
the employment change abroad in the regression could result in an omitted variable
bias. In contrast, including the change in employment abroad as explanatory variable
would neglect the endogeneity of the variable, leading to potentially biased parameter
estimates. In order to take account of this fact, the empirical analysis is based on
the estimation of a bivariate ordered probit model with two dependent variables, the
changes in employment abroad and at home. This bivariate approach can capture to
some extent the interactions and tradeoffs between the two interdependent decisions.
2This definition slightly differs from the definition of the EU commission (less than 250 employees
and a sales volume of less than 50 million Euro) because the information on sales and the number of
employees is only available in categories.
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2.4.1 The bivariate ordered probit model
The estimation of the joint probability distribution of two ordered categorical variables
is not very common in the economic literature, although it is applicable in a variety
of settings. Sajaia (n.d.) provides the Stata routine ‘bioprobit’ to estimate the joint
probability distribution of two ordered categorical variables. The program computes
the general full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates of this model for
two variants, the simultaneous and the seemingly unrelated (SUR) variant. As for
the binary probit model, the model specification for bivariate ordered probit can be
derived from the latent variable model (Sajaia n.d.). The idea behind ordered probit
models is that the observed variable represents ranges of an unobserved latent variable
whose cut-offs are unknown. The general specification for a two-equation model with
correlated error terms and the dependent variables y∗1i and y∗2i is:
y∗1i = x
′
1iβ1 + ε1i (2.1)
y∗2i = x
′
2iβ2 + γy∗1i + ε2i (2.2)
where β1 and β2 are vectors of unknown parameters, γ is an unknown scalar, ε1 and
ε2 are the error terms. The explanatory variables in the model satisfy the conditions
of exogeneity such that E(x1iε1i) = 0 and E(x2iε2i) = 0. It can be assumed that ε1
and ε2, the error terms of the two equations, are correlated, because they represent
unobserved factors that may be relevant for both processes, the change in employment
after FDI at home and abroad. The bivariate ordered probit model takes account
of this correlation of the two error terms. The two observed variables ‘employment
change abroad’ (y∗1i) and ‘employment change at home’ (y∗2i) are both categorical with
three possible outcomes and two unknown cutoffs where c11 < c12 and c21 < c22:
y1i =

1 (decreased) if y∗1i ≤ c11
2 (unchanged) if c11 < y∗1i ≤ c12
3 (increased) if c12 < y∗1i
y2i =

1 if y∗2i ≤ c21
2 if c21 < y∗2i ≤ c22
3 if c22 < y∗2i
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The probability that e.g. y1i = j and y2i = k with j,k = 1,2,3 is:
Pr(y1i = j, y2i = k) = Pr(c1j−1 < y∗1i ≤ c1j, c2k−1 < y∗2i ≤ c2k)
= Pr(y∗1i ≤ c1j, y∗2i ≤ c2k)− Pr(y∗1i ≤ c1j−1, y∗2i ≤ c2k)
−Pr(y∗1i ≤ c1j, y∗2i ≤ c2k−1) + Pr(y∗1i ≤ c1j−1, y∗2i ≤ c2k−1)
(2.3)
If the two error terms ε1 and ε2 are distributed bivariate standard normal with cor-
relation ρ, the individual contribution to the likelihood function can be expressed as:
Pr(y1i = j, y2i = k) = Φ2(c1j − x
′
1iβ1, (c2k − γx
′
1iβ1 − x
′
2iβ2)ζ, ρ̃)
−Φ2(c1j−1 − x
′
1iβ1, (c2k − γx
′
1iβ1 − x
′
2iβ2)ζ, ρ̃)
−Φ2(c1j − x
′
1iβ1, (c2k−1 − γx
′
1iβ1 − x
′
2iβ2)ζ, ρ̃)
+Φ2(c1j−1 − x
′
1iβ1, (c2k−1 − γx
′
1iβ1 − x
′
2iβ2)ζ, ρ̃)
(2.4)
where Φ2 is the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function with
ζ = 1√
1+2γρ+γ2
and ρ̃ = ζ(γ + ρ).
If γ 6= 0, the specification is denoted as simultaneous bivariate ordered probit
model. In this case an exclusion restriction has to be imposed for identification of the
parameters in equations (2.1) and (2.2). At least one element in x1i that is correlated
with y∗1i but independent of ε1i must not be comprised in x2i in order to obtain con-
sistent estimates of γ, β2 and ρ. This variable is interpreted as a valid instrument to
correct the endogeneity bias when we estimate the parameters of (2.2).
Under the assumption that γ=0, the model simplifies to the seemingly unrelated
model (SUR) where ζ=1 and ρ̃=ρ. In this case the equations (2.1) and (2.2) are not
directly related to each other, but through the correlation in the error terms ρ. The
logarithmic likelihood of an observation i is then
lnLi =
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
I(y1i = j, y2i = k) lnPr(y1i = j, y2i = k) (2.5)
To get the log likelihood for the entire sample of size N we can sum up (2.5) across all
observations, under the assumption that the observations are independent:
ln Li =
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
I(y1i = j, y2i = k) lnPr(y1i = j, y2i = k) (2.6)
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For our analysis we assume that the processes that determine the two outcomes, i.e.
the change in employment at home and abroad, are not only related through the
correlation of the error terms but have a direct effect on each other, such that γ 6= 0.
More specifically, the employment situation abroad is crucial for a firm deciding about
employment changes at home. Accordingly, we estimate the simultaneous variant. We
determine equation (2.1) to stand for the employment change at home and equation
(2.2) for the employment abroad, because we implement the exclusion restriction, the
explanatory variable ‘amount of FDI’, in equation (2.2). In the SUR specification
without exclusion restriction the ordering of the equations is irrelevant.
2.4.2 Regression results
Table 2.4 shows the results of four different simultaneous bivariate ordered probit
regressions. The two dependent variables are the change in employment at home
and the change in employment abroad, each with the three categories: decreased,
unchanged and increased (in ascending order). The regression results for employment
change at home and abroad are given separately for each regression.
We include the amount of FDI in the last five years as additional explanatory
variable for employment changes abroad. This serves as exclusion restriction, as the
amount of FDI is part of x1i in equation (2.1) but not of x2i in (2.2). We assume
that the level of FDI affects the change in employment abroad directly but has no
direct impact on the change in employment at home, except through the influence of
the changes in employment abroad. It is reasonable to expect that a higher amount
of FDI results in more positive changes in employment abroad, but that it is not
related to the employment changes at home. Admittedly, the use of this instrument
can be viewed as critical. However, the choice of the exclusion restriction is not that
crucial as we repeat our estimation with the SUR specification, where no exclusion
restriction is needed, in the next section. All other exogenous variables that explain
the changes in the levels of the latent dependent variables appear in both equations
of the model. As for probit and ordered probit regressions, the regression coefficients
can not be interpreted quantitatively. The increase in probability attributed to a
one-unit increase in a given explanatory variable depends both on the values of the
other variables and the starting value of the given variable. The interpretations of
the regression coefficients are therefore based only on the significance and the sign of
the coefficient, which indicates the direction of influence. A positive coefficient means
that an increase in the explanatory variable leads to an increase in the probability of
higher outcomes for the dependent variable and vice versa.
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Table 2.4: Estimation results of the bivariate ordered probit model - simultaneous
regression
employment change abroad at home abroad at home abroad at home abroad at home
amount of FDI 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.162***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
sales <0.5 mio -0.434* -0.886***
(0.234) (0.242)
sales 0.5-2.5 mio 0.247 0.201 0.355** 0.134 0.358** 0.134 -0.075 -0.762***
(0.164) (0.170) (0.156) (0.174) (0.157) (0.174) (0.219) (0.203)
sales 2.5-10 mio 0.251 0.409** 0.329** 0.397** 0.329** 0.396** -0.103 -0.528***
(0.165) (0.174) (0.153) (0.170) (0.153) (0.170) (0.207) (0.188)
sales 10-25 mio 0.430** 0.562*** 0.507*** 0.539*** 0.508*** 0.539*** 0.061 -0.429**
(0.181) (0.196) (0.170) (0.201) (0.171) (0.201) (0.193) (0.173)
sales 25-50 mio 0.600*** 0.710*** 0.551*** 0.619*** 0.552*** 0.618*** 0.031 -0.326*
(0.227) (0.246) (0.207) (0.239) (0.207) (0.239) (0.185) (0.169)
sales >50 mio 0.673*** 0.792*** 0.661*** 0.715*** 0.661*** 0.715***
(0.211) (0.251) (0.197) (0.251) (0.197) (0.251)
20-49 empl -0.070 -0.069 -0.046 -0.067 -0.045 -0.067
(0.134) (0.128) (0.125) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124)
50-99 empl 0.061 -0.004 0.077 -0.038 0.078 -0.038
(0.142) (0.145) (0.135) (0.140) (0.135) (0.140)
100-199 empl -0.136 -0.232 -0.061 -0.272* -0.060 -0.272*
(0.153) (0.146) (0.145) (0.142) (0.145) (0.142)
>200 empl 0.018 -0.282* 0.007 -0.368** 0.007 -0.369**
(0.173) (0.170) (0.160) (0.163) (0.160) (0.163)
SME -0.250 0.438***
(0.169) (0.165)
Eastern Europe 0.238*** -0.269*** 0.297*** -0.280*** 0.297*** -0.281*** 0.301*** -0.301***
(0.086) (0.104) (0.083) (0.103) (0.083) (0.103) (0.083) (0.104)
Western Europe 0.053 -0.057 0.107 -0.058 0.106 -0.058 0.101 -0.069
(0.101) (0.089) (0.094) (0.088) (0.095) (0.088) (0.094) (0.089)
USA/Canada 0.063 0.318*** 0.101 0.296*** 0.100 0.296*** 0.102 0.279***
(0.094) (0.087) (0.092) (0.089) (0.092) (0.089) (0.092) (0.090)
Asia 0.254*** -0.013 0.251*** -0.024 0.251*** -0.024 0.252*** -0.039
(0.089) (0.099) (0.085) (0.098) (0.085) (0.098) (0.085) (0.099)
motivation (index) 0.028 0.077**
(0.033) (0.030)
horizontal 0.049 0.267*** 0.046 0.266*** 0.048 0.265***
(0.088) (0.083) (0.088) (0.084) (0.088) (0.084)
vertical -0.050 -0.017 -0.041 -0.023
(0.189) (0.182) (0.189) (0.184)
reloc. prod. 0.077 -0.192** 0.078 -0.192** 0.078 -0.198**
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
gamma 0.175 0.344* 0.345* 0.387*
(0.199) (0.197) (0.197) (0.199)
rho 0.341 0.179 0.178 0.146
(0.201) (0.194) (0.195) (0.193)
Observations 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051
Wald Chi2 194.29
(df=47)
218.91
(df=48)
219.04
(df=49)
221.89
(df=46)
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of ind.equ.
Chi2(1) 3.18 0.87 0.86 0.55
Prob>chi2 0.074 0.350 0.354 0.458
DA B C
Notes: The dependent variable is employment change abroad and at home in 3 categories: decreased, unchanged, increased. Each 
regression includes dummies for industry and region. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 
%, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. The reference category are firms with less than 20 employees and a sales volume of less than 0.5 mio 
Euro (regressions A-C) or large firms with more than 200 employees and a sales volume of more than 50 mio Euro (regression D).
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Motivation and Relocation
We include the categorical variable for a firm’s motivation that ranges from predomi-
nantly vertical motivation (lowest value) to purely horizontal motivation (highest value)
only in specification A. In all other specifications the motivation enters through two
dummy variables for predominantly vertical and purely horizontal motivation, with the
other values in between the two as the reference category.
The coefficient estimates for the dummy variable for horizontal motivation are
significant and positive in the home country equations, suggesting a higher probability
of unchanged or increasing employment level at home after investing abroad for firms
with horizontal motivations. Firms with vertical reasons for investment do not signifi-
cantly differ from firms with mixed or other motivations, but the coefficient shows the
expected negative sign. Vertical motivations are very often associated with relocation
of production. However, not all firms that indicate vertical motives have also relocated
their production, therefore vertical motivations do not necessarily lead to job losses.
We have excluded the dummy variable for vertical motivation in specification B to
test whether the dummy for relocation of production captures this effect. This does
not seem to be the case. However, firms that have relocated their production are
significantly more inclined to reduce their workforce in the home country. For the
changes in employment abroad, however, production relocations and the motivation of
the firm do not have any significant explanatory power.
Regions
The coefficients for the host regions of FDI are more telling. This group of dummy
variables has no reference category as a firm may have investments in more than one
region, therefore the variables are not perfectly multicollinear.3 For investment to
countries with similar factor endowments such as Western Europe and USA/Canada
we would expect a positive or a negative job change in the home country depend-
ing on whether the investments are substituting for exports or not. Investment to
regions with different factor endowments should lead to a decrease in employment
at home. Thus, for Eastern Europe we expect a negative coefficient. The category
for the Asia/Pacific region contains countries with similar (Japan, Korea) as well
as different (China, Vietnam) factor endowments which makes it difficult to make
predictions about the resulting coefficient. The positive coefficient estimate for FDI to
Eastern Europe in the abroad-equations indicates a high probability of an increase in
3However, as a sensitivity check we have estimated the regressions without the dummy for Western
Europe, see Appendix Table 2.9.
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employment abroad after FDI. In the home-equations the coefficient has a negatively
significant sign, confirming the presumption that FDI to Eastern Europe has negative
effects on employment in the home country. In contrast, FDI to Western Europe,
though having a negative sign in the home equations, does not have any significant
influence on employment changes either at home or abroad. The coefficients for FDI
to USA/Canada are again very clear-cut. FDI to USA/Canada does significantly
affect the employment at home in a positive way such that firms investing there have
a higher probability of creating new jobs in the home country. The coefficient for Asia
is difficult to interpret as the countries within this region have very heterogeneous
factor endowments. However, FDI to Asia does not have a significant influence on
employment at home although the coefficient is negative. The probability of job
creation abroad in contrast increases with FDI to Asia. The overall results for the
regions support the hypothesis that investment to countries with lower labor costs
usually leads to employment losses at home and vice versa. The differences in the
coefficients for Western Europe and USA/Canada for investment to countries with
similar factor endowment bring out the importance of distance. Investment to the
more distant region USA/Canada increases employment at home, whereas investment
to Western Europe does not have a significant impact but a negative sign. We suspect
that in order to explore a neighboring market firms start with exports and if this
proves to be successful, the firm replaces the exports by production in subsidiaries
abroad. This could explain the negative sign for Western Europe. For more distant
regions, exports may not be profitable and so the firm enters the market from the
beginning through FDI, therefore employment at home increases through an increase
in headquarter services in the home country.
Sales and number of employees
Size in terms of sales is positively correlated with the probability of positive changes
in employment at home. The higher the sales of a firm, the lower the probability
that this firm will shed jobs after FDI. Regarding the number of employees, firms
with more than 200 employees are less likely to have positive or neutral employment
changes after FDI. In regression D we include a dummy variable for SMEs instead of
the employment categories. The coefficient for SMEs has a positive and significant
coefficient estimate in the home-equation, suggesting that for SMEs the probability of
a positive employment change in the home country after FDI is higher, all else being
equal. Yet, SMEs with a higher sales volume have a higher probability of a positive or
neutral job turnover at home.
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Gamma and rho
The coefficient γ that stands for the partial correlation of the employment changes
abroad and at home is weakly significant in three specifications and has a positive sign,
indicating that there is a positive relationship between employment changes abroad and
at home. This points to the fact that jobs abroad and at home are rather complements
than substitutes. The correlation coefficient for the correlation of the error terms ρ
lies between 15 and 35 percent and is statistically not significant. This means that
after controlling for the interdependence captured by γ there remains no significant
correlation in the error terms of the two equations.
Furthermore the table reports two Wald tests. The first one tests the joint signifi-
cance of the estimation coefficients. The second one tests the hypothesis that the two
equations are independent. As expected, given the comparatively low values of ρ, the
null cannot be rejected, except for the first regression at the 10% level.
Marginal probabilities
Table 2.5 reports the changes in the marginal probabilities for the three possible
marginal outcomes of the home equation if the respective significant dummy variable
changes its value from zero to one.
Table 2.5: Percentage changes in predicted marginal probabilities
employment at home decreased unchanged increased
Motivation horizontal -36.7% -4.9% 38.9%
Relocation of Production 31.3% 2.4% -17.7%
USA/Canada -41.3% -5.6% 43.6%
Eastern Europe 16.3% 0.9% -9.7%
SME -22.5% 2.6% 18.7%
Notes: Results based on simultaneous regression D from Table 2.4, only significant 
variables included.
The probability that an average SME in our sample reports that it has decreased
its employment at home after FDI is 22.3% lower than for a comparable large firm.
Concurrently, the probability that a firm’s employment remains unchanged after FDI
is 2.9% lower for SMEs whereas the probability that a firm increases its employment is
18.8% higher for SMEs. All else being equal, SMEs are less likely to report job losses
after FDI than large firms. The strongest changes in marginal probability can be noted
for firms that have invested in USA/Canada: the probability that employment in the
home country increases, increases by 43.7% if a firm had invested to USA/Canada
compared to firms that have not invested in this region. Finally, firms that have relo-
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cated their production show the most negative employment effects. Their probability
of a decrease in employment at home is 31.3% higher relative to firms that have not
relocated their production.
Predicted outcomes
In Table 2.6 we compare the predicted probabilities for each combination of outcomes
for the change in employment abroad and at home as given by the estimated model
with the actual probabilities in the sample. The percentage of correctly predicted
outcomes is 86.8% opposed to a hit rate of 64.5% with the unconditional probability
of 1/9 for each of the 9 possible outcomes.
Table 2.6: Predicted outcomes for changes in employment after FDI
(in percent predicted by the model, real sample probabilities in parenthesis
employment change abroad decreased unchanged increased total
decreased 5 (6.0) 2.7 (1.2) 1 (1.2) 8.7 (8.4)
unchanged 10.8 (6.3) 11.3 (18.3) 7.4 (5.4) 29.5 (30)
increased 9.8 (13.3) 20.4 (15.1) 31.7 (33.1) 61.9 (61.5)
total 25.6 (25.6) 34.4 (34.6) 40.1 (39.7) 100 (100)
86.8
64.5
Percent correctly predicted by the model
Percent correctly predicted by p=1/9 for each outcome
employment change at home
Notes: Results based on simultaneous regression D from Table 2.4. 
2.4.3 Robustness check
The coefficients for γ in three regressions of the simultaneous specification in Table 2.4
are weakly but still significantly different from zero, suggesting that the two processes
are simultaneous rather than seemingly unrelated and that there is a direct effect
that relates the changes in employment abroad and at home. However, to test the
robustness of the simultaneous specification we re-estimate the bivariate ordered probit
model in its SUR version where we assume that the changes in a firm’s employment
abroad and at home after FDI have no direct effect on each other, i.e. γ=0. Both
processes are determined by the same set of explanatory variables (x1=x2) and by
the same firm-specific unobserved effects that may lead to correlation in the error terms.
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Table 2.7: Estimation results of the bivariate ordered probit model - seemingly unre-
lated regression
employment change abroad at home abroad at home abroad at home abroad at home
amount of FDI 0.158*** 0.026 0.164*** 0.050* 0.164*** 0.051* 0.162*** 0.056*
(0.034) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030)
sales <0.5 mio -0.075 -0.704***
(0.219) (0.197)
sales 0.5-2.5 mio 0.247 0.227 0.355** 0.229 0.358** 0.231 -0.103 -0.506***
(0.164) (0.162) (0.156) (0.154) (0.157) (0.154) (0.207) (0.180)
sales 2.5-10 mio 0.251 0.422** 0.329** 0.458*** 0.329** 0.458*** 0.061 -0.361**
(0.165) (0.169) (0.153) (0.157) (0.153) (0.157) (0.193) (0.169)
sales 10-25 mio 0.430** 0.595*** 0.507*** 0.640*** 0.508*** 0.640*** 0.031 -0.280*
(0.181) (0.181) (0.170) (0.169) (0.171) (0.169) (0.185) (0.163)
sales 25-50 mio 0.600*** 0.760*** 0.551*** 0.725*** 0.552*** 0.725*** -0.434* -0.938***
(0.227) (0.221) (0.207) (0.205) (0.207) (0.205) (0.234) (0.214)
sales >50 mio 0.673*** 0.848*** 0.661*** 0.846*** 0.661*** 0.846*** 0.434* 0.938***
(0.211) (0.213) (0.197) (0.196) (0.197) (0.196) (0.234) (0.214)
20-49 empl -0.070 -0.075 -0.046 -0.075 -0.045 -0.074
(0.134) (0.124) (0.125) (0.115) (0.125) (0.116)
50-99 empl 0.061 0.006 0.077 -0.011 0.078 -0.010
(0.142) (0.141) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135) (0.134)
100-199 empl -0.136 -0.239* -0.061 -0.263* -0.060 -0.262*
(0.153) (0.143) (0.145) (0.137) (0.145) (0.137)
>200 empl 0.018 -0.260 0.007 -0.328** 0.007 -0.328**
(0.173) (0.161) (0.160) (0.151) (0.160) (0.151)
SME (d) -0.250 0.303**
(0.169) (0.144)
Eastern Europe 0.238*** -0.212*** 0.297*** -0.160** 0.297*** -0.160** 0.301*** -0.164**
(0.086) (0.079) (0.083) (0.075) (0.083) (0.075) (0.083) (0.075)
Western Europe 0.053 -0.045 0.107 -0.019 0.106 -0.020 0.101 -0.027
(0.101) (0.086) (0.094) (0.082) (0.095) (0.082) (0.094) (0.082)
USA/Canada 0.063 0.306*** 0.101 0.297*** 0.100 0.296*** 0.102 0.284***
(0.094) (0.087) (0.092) (0.084) (0.092) (0.084) (0.092) (0.084)
Asia 0.254*** 0.029 0.251*** 0.056 0.251*** 0.056 0.252*** 0.052
(0.089) (0.082) (0.085) (0.078) (0.085) (0.078) (0.085) (0.078)
motivation (index) 0.028 0.076**
(0.033) (0.030)
horizontal 0.049 0.255*** 0.046 0.253*** 0.048 0.253***
(0.088) (0.080) (0.088) (0.081) (0.088) (0.081)
vertical -0.050 -0.030 -0.041 -0.035
(0.189) (0.166) (0.189) (0.167)
reloc. prod. 0.077 -0.148* 0.078 -0.148* 0.078 -0.149*
(0.093) (0.084) (0.093) (0.084) (0.093) (0.085)
rho 0.481*** 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.474***
(0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Observations 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051
Wald chi2 194.29
(df=47)
218.91
(df=48)
219.04
(df=49)
221.89
(df=46)
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of ind.equ.
Chi2(1) 88.47 92.86 92.64 94.09
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
A B C D
Notes: The dependent variable is employment change abroad and at home in 3 categories: decreased, unchanged, increased. Each 
regression includes dummies for industry and region. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. The reference category are firms with less than 20 employees and a sales volume of less than 0.5 
mio Euro (regressions A-C) or large firms with more than 200 employees and a sales volume of more than 50 mio Euro (regression D).
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Table 2.7 displays the SUR regression results. Unlike the simultaneous case, we do
not need an exclusion restriction, therefore we include the variable ‘amount of FDI’
in both equations. The coefficients for the abroad-equation - which is again specified
as the first estimated equation - are by definition the same as in the simultaneous
specification. The coefficients of the home-equation do not change substantially. The
coefficient for the amount of FDI has a slightly significant impact on the change of
a firm’s employment at home in two regressions; this indicates that it is only a weak
instrument for identification in the simultaneous case. In the SUR regressions, the
estimates of the correlation of the error terms ρ are statistically significant and about
30 percentage points higher than in the simultaneous regressions. This points to the
fact that in the simultaneous model part of this effect is captured by γ. If γ is assumed
to be zero but in fact is not zero, the correlation of the error terms must increase. The
Wald test for independence of the two equations can be strongly rejected in the SUR
specification. These findings suggest that the two processes are simultaneous rather
than seemingly unrelated, despite the weakness of our exclusion restriction.
2.5 Conclusion
By contrast to previous literature on employment effects of FDI we focus particularly
on SMEs. First, we describe how they differ from large firms in their international
activities and in their motivation for FDI. We then analyze empirically employment
changes at home and abroad after FDI for all firms. The results of a bivariate ordered
probit model reveal that SMEs are more likely to have positive employment changes
in the home country. Horizontal motivations and investment to USA/Canada increase
the probability of positive employment changes. Firms that invest to Eastern Europe
and relocate their production are more likely to have negative employment changes.
Furthermore we gain insights on the interdependence of employment decisions in the
home country and in the host country after FDI. Our results support the hypothesis
that the changes in employment at home and abroad are not independent from each
other, we find a positive relationship. The methodological approach of a bivariate or-
dered probit model is very promising. However, our conclusions need further empirical
confirmation. In particular, exact numbers on job turnover and information on em-
ployees’ qualifications would enable deeper insights. Nevertheless, our results offer a
starting point for further research on SMEs, their investment activities abroad and the
resulting employment changes.
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Table 2.9: Estimation results simultaneous regression - without Western Europe
employment change abroad at home abroad at home abroad at home abroad at home
amount of FDI 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.162***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
sales <0.5 mio -0.447* -0.875***
(0.235) (0.243)
sales 0.5-2.5 mio 0.245 0.202 0.350** 0.136 0.353** 0.136 -0.093 -0.748***
(0.164) (0.170) (0.156) (0.174) (0.157) (0.174) (0.218) (0.204)
sales 2.5-10 mio 0.252 0.408** 0.329** 0.397** 0.329** 0.396** -0.115 -0.518***
(0.165) (0.174) (0.153) (0.170) (0.153) (0.170) (0.207) (0.189)
sales 10-25 mio 0.434** 0.558*** 0.512*** 0.536*** 0.512*** 0.535*** 0.056 -0.424**
(0.181) (0.196) (0.171) (0.201) (0.171) (0.201) (0.193) (0.173)
sales 25-50 mio 0.604*** 0.704*** 0.558*** 0.614** 0.558*** 0.614** 0.028 -0.323*
(0.227) (0.246) (0.207) (0.240) (0.207) (0.240) (0.186) (0.169)
sales >50 mio 0.679*** 0.783*** 0.675*** 0.707*** 0.675*** 0.706***
(0.210) (0.251) (0.196) (0.252) (0.196) (0.252)
20-49 empl -0.072 -0.068 -0.049 -0.065 -0.048 -0.065
(0.134) (0.128) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124)
50-99 empl 0.062 -0.006 0.081 -0.041 0.083 -0.040
(0.142) (0.145) (0.135) (0.140) (0.135) (0.141)
100-199 empl -0.131 -0.238 -0.051 -0.277* -0.0501 -0.276*
(0.152) (0.146) (0.145) (0.142) (0.145) (0.142)
>200 empl 0.023 -0.289* 0.017 -0.373** 0.017 -0.374**
(0.172) (0.170) (0.159) (0.164) (0.159) (0.164)
SME -0.258 0.442***
(0.169) (0.165)
Eastern Europe 0.233*** -0.266** 0.284*** -0.273*** 0.285*** -0.274*** 0.289*** -0.293***
(0.085) (0.103) (0.082) (0.101) (0.082) (0.101) (0.082) (0.102)
Western Europe 
USA/Canada 0.0691 0.309*** 0.115 0.287*** 0.113 0.287*** 0.115 0.269***
(0.092) (0.085) (0.090) (0.088) (0.090) (0.088) (0.091) (0.089)
Asia 0.250*** -0.010 0.244*** -0.020 0.244*** -0.020 0.245*** -0.035
(0.089) (0.099) (0.085) (0.097) (0.085) (0.097) (0.085) (0.098)
motivation (index) 0.029 0.076**
(0.033) (0.030)
horizontal 0.051 0.265*** 0.047 0.264*** 0.049 0.264***
(0.087) (0.082) (0.088) (0.084) (0.088) (0.084)
vertical -0.057 -0.014 -0.048 -0.020
(0.189) (0.181) (0.189) (0.184)
reloc. prod. 0.069 -0.187** 0.070 -0.187** 0.071 -0.192**
(0.092) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
gamma 0.175 0.344* 0.343* 0.386*
(0.201) (0.197) (0.196) (0.198)
rho 0.338 0.177 0.176 0.143
(0.176) (0.188) (0.188) (0.193)
Observations 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051
Wald Chi2 192.60
(df=46)
217.59
(df=47)
217.67
(df=49)
220.77
(df=45)
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of ind.equ.
Chi2(1) 3.14 0.85 0.84 0.54
Prob>chi2 0.076 0.355 0.359 0.464
Notes: The dependent variable is employment change abroad and at home in 3 categories: decreased, unchanged, increased. Each 
regression includes dummies for industry and region. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. The reference category are firms with less than 20 employees and a sales volume of less than 0.5 
mio Euro (regressions A-C) or large firms with more than 200 employees and a sales volume of more than 50 mio Euro (regression D).
A B C D
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Chapter 3
Male vs. female business owners: Are
there differences in investment behavior?
3.1 Introduction
Female participation in business and entrepreneurship has increased considerably in
the last decades. Nonetheless, the gender gap between the entrepreneurial activity
of men and women is substantial, particularly in industrialized countries (Allen et al.
2007). Furthermore, firms that are owned by women differ significantly from male-
owned firms. Female entrepreneurs have smaller firms, they start with less capital and
are more likely to be found in the service sector. Moreover, female-owned firms seem to
underperform male-owned firms in profitability, innovativeness and firm growth (Fairlie
and Robb 2009, Gottschalk and Niefert 2011, Tonoyan and Strohmeyer 2005).
Most studies find that this gender gap in firm performance - or at least a large
part of it - is attributable to differences in industry, human capital of the firm owner,
professional experience or access to finance and networks (Robb and Watson 2010, Du
Rietz and Henrekson 2000). Yet, particularly for the performance indicators of sales
growth and firm size, there still remains a gender gap that cannot be explained with the
usually observed firm- and owner-specific characteristics. The standard explanations
for this phenomenon can be subsumed to two concepts: differences in growth and
size between female- and male-owned firms are caused either by discrimination or
by preferences. Indeed, there is evidence that women prefer to keep their businesses
smaller and more manageable and that they are less likely to have growth on their
entrepreneurial agenda (Cliff 1998). Regarding discrimination in the form of financial
constraints, the proposition that women have more difficult access to external finance
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cannot be validated for industrialized countries (Cole and Mehran 2009).1
So far there is little knowledge about the underlying entrepreneurial decisions that
reflect those gender differences in preferences and also determine the differences in
firm size. We do not know much about how men and women act as firm owners and
managers and how successful they are. Particularly, gender differences in investment
behavior are not well explored yet. This question is highly relevant though, as firm
investment is an important driver of firm growth.
The aim of this paper is to gain new insights into gender differences in investment
activity in order to contribute to a better understanding of observed lower growth
rates and smaller firm sizes of female-owned firms. For this purpose, we attempt to
disentangle the impact of gender on investment activity that remains after control-
ling for firm- and owner-specific characteristics, such as industry, firm age, firm size,
management team size, expectations, innovation activity, cash flow as well as age and
education of the firm owner. Using the KfW Mittelstandspanel, a data set consisting
of roughly 35,000 German SMEs that were observed from 2003 to 2009, we focus on
the extensive and intensive margin of investment as well as on stated investment goals.
Our analysis is threefold: first, we estimate a linear probability model (LPM) with the
binary investment decision as the dependent variable to examine the extensive margin
of investment. Second, we analyze the investment rate, i.e. the intensive margin of
investment, by using a simple reduced form investment model with time-averaged data.
Third, we examine the investment goals of investing firms. We consider both standard
explanations for women’s lower firm sizes: discrimination in the form of financial con-
straints and preferences. The inclusion of cash flow into the analysis of the extensive
and intensive margin of investment serves as a control for financial constraints. The
analysis of investment goals sheds light on gender differences in preferences.
Our results reveal that female firm owners are less inclined to invest, both at the
extensive and intensive margin. The probability that they make an investment is
lower and if they invest, the relative amount of their investment is lower on average,
too. Moreover, we find that the availability of internal funds in the form of cash flow
does not have the same impact on male and female firm owners’ investment behavior.
The investment rate in female-owned firms reacts less to a marginal increase in the
availability of cash flow. This means that under the presence of the same financial
endowment women are more reluctant to invest. The explanation for this behavior
cannot directly be assessed within the estimation framework, but a further analysis
of the firms’ investment goals suggests that women are indeed less growth-oriented as
1We will discuss this issue in detail in Chapter 4.
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they are less likely to name sales increases, innovation/R&D and implementation of
new products as their investment goals.
We conclude that women’s lower propensity to invest and consequently also their
lower firm sizes are a consequence of preferences rather than financial constraints. We
are not able to draw any conclusion on the underlying causes for these gender differences
in investment goals. We have no information on personal conditions and resources of
the firm owners that may affect investment behavior and growth aspirations, such as
attitudes towards risk taking, family status and non-entrepreneurial responsibilities.
However, previous research on gender differences confirms that women are on average
more risk and competition averse, less overconfident, less ambitious and less work-
centered. These findings may not only hold for the average women but also to some
extent for female entrepreneurs, particularly for owners of small, non-growing firms.
3.2 Literature review on gender differences
Two strands of the economic literature are related to this paper: that on firm investment
and that on gender economics. Investment theory provides the background for the
estimation of the reduced form investment model and will briefly be discussed in Section
3.4.1. In the following, we review the literature on gender differences in risk aversion,
overconfidence, competition and personal preferences. We discuss the impact of these
findings on investment behavior of firm owners.
Research on gender differences in investment behavior has concentrated on private
investment; there exists no evidence for firm investment. For private investors, Sunden
and Surette (1998) find that women choose retirement plan assets that are less risky
than the average man’s choice.
Gender differences in risk attitudes have been explored in field and laboratory
experiments. Most studies, in different environments and across a range of tasks, find
that women have on average a lower risk propensity than men (Dohmen and Falk 2011).
Croson and Gneezy (2009) outline three possible reasons for gender differences in risk
taking: different evaluations of risk, differences in the perceptibility of emotions and
male overconfidence. On average, men regard risk as challenge while women perceive
it as threat. Moreover, women report more intense nervousness and fear than men
in anticipation of negative outcomes, they are therefore more reluctant when it comes
to a risky decision. These two explanations refer to different assessments of identical
situations. Overconfidence in contrast refers to differences in the self-evaluation of
one’s own abilities, knowledge and possibilities. Overconfident people underestimate
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risk because they believe they are more capable than they actually are. Risk-aversion
should not be confounded with overconfidence (or even overoptimism), although the
two concepts are closely related. Rational non-overconfident people may differ in their
true risk preferences, while overconfident people underestimate risk because they are
too confident about their ability. Overoptimistic people, in contrast, have unrealistic
and overly positive expectations about the future. The literature indeed finds that
men are more overconfident than women, and particularly so in male-dominated areas
such as finance (Odean and Barber 2001).
Schubert et al. (1999) argue that observed gender differences in risk attitudes in the
average population are possibly confounded with financial literacy and wealth effects
due to gender-specific income differences outside the laboratory. They claim that the
experimental results may not reflect true male and female attitudes towards financial
risks, but may stand for differences in individual opportunity sets. Under controlled
economic conditions they find that the comparative risk propensity in financial choices
strongly depends on the decision frame and that women do not generally make less
risky financial choices than men.
Furthermore, while laboratory experiments may provide strong control of the eco-
nomic environment surrounding risky decisions they may not be adequate for drawing
conclusions on gender-specific risk attitudes of investors and managers. Indeed, most
of these studies were carried out with a subsample of the general population or with
university students. Croson and Gneezy (2009) point out that with a subsample con-
sisting exclusively of business owners and managers, gender differences in financial risk
preferences may be smaller or not observable. Entrepreneurs are a special subsample
of the population with higher risk preferences than the average. The fact that very
few women decide to become business owners could therefore be partly the result of
self-selection due to individual attitudes in risk aversion. Even though the attitude
towards risk is not the central determinant of becoming an entrepreneur, people that
choose entrepreneurial positions are on average more risk-taking (Blanchflower and
Oswald 1998, Caliendo et al. 2009). Women who opt for entrepreneurial positions
therefore might have risk preferences similar to men. Yet, it also seems plausible that
even within the group of entrepreneurs there are gender differences in risk attitudes
and behavior, particularly within owners of small firms. Indeed, there is evidence that
female entrepreneurs are less risk-taking compared to their male counterparts (Sexton
and Bowman-Upton 1990, Orobia et al. 2011). Yet, there is also evidence on the op-
posite: Johnson and Powell (1994) investigate decision-making characteristics of men
and women in a ‘non-managerial’ population with those of a ‘managerial’ population.
Males and females in the managerial population exhibit similar risk propensity and
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make decisions of equal quality, while in the non-managerial population women are
more risk averse than men. Dwyer et al. (2002) come to a similar finding in a different
setting. They analyze whether the gender of an investor is related to risk taking in
mutual fund investment decisions. In line with the experimental literature they find
that women are less risk taking than men, but the impact of gender falls significantly
when they control for knowledge of financial markets.
Gender differences in attitudes toward competitive environments have been in-
vestigated in a number of laboratory experiments, too. Gneezy et al. (2003) run an
experiment where they test for gender differences in performance generated by different
incentive schemes. They observe that with increasing competitiveness of the environ-
ment, the performance of men increases but not that of women. However, in non-
competitive environments there is no gender difference in performance. Then again,
when women compete in a purely female environment their performance increases. It
seems that women like to compete with other women but not against men. As possible
reasons the authors name women’s lower feelings of confidence and competence and
differences in the way how men and women compete against each other. Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007) have found that in choosing incentive schemes in an experimental
setting men select twice as often the competitive environment of a tournament, al-
though ex-post there are no gender differences in performance. This tournament-entry
gap is driven by gender differences in preferences for competitive environments and by
male overconfidence. They conclude that ‘women shy away from competition and men
embrace it’ (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, p. 1067).
Regarding differences in preferences, there is evidence that women on average do
not measure success by the traditional ‘male’ indicators of growth and profitability and
have different motivations for opening their own businesses. Likewise, women view the
value of work differently than men. Hakim (2002) distinguishes three different lifestyles
that are attributed to social preferences: home-centered, work-centered and adaptive.
She finds that a majority of men but only very few women are ‘work-centered’, meaning
that work dominates their lives, even though women have similar educational attain-
ments and despite increasing female work participation over the past three decades.
Most women are ‘adaptive’, they prefer to combine employment and family work in a
balanced manner. Fairlie and Robb (2009) find that female business owners may have
different objectives for their businesses and that they work fewer hours. One major dif-
ference between men and women is that women are more likely to report that they own
a business in order to be able to meet family responsibilities. These stated preferences
are presumably a result of social norms. Women traditionally take more responsibility
for family and child care. They need to balance work and family on average more
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than work-centered men do. This of course may have implications for the outcomes of
female-owned businesses and may induce women to keep their firms smaller and more
manageable.
The objective of this paper is to find out whether and how male and female business
owners differ in their investment decisions. We summarize the discussed findings as
follows: in economic experiments and laboratory settings, women are on average more
risk-averse, less overconfident and less eager to participate in competitive environments.
Moreover, women have different preferences and entrepreneurial objectives, they are
less growth-oriented and have lower goals concerning their desired firm size. There
are good reasons to believe that the described personal attributes have an impact on
investment behavior. Lower growth aspirations may result in lower investment rates.
Moreover, firm investment involves risk-taking and requires certain confidence in the
assessment of the ex-ante unknown profitability of the investment. Based on these
considerations we expect - if the discussed findings hold for female business owners,
too - the following two results: first, women are less likely to invest, and second, if they
invest, they invest lower amounts.
3.3 Data and descriptives
3.3.1 Data source
The analysis is based on the KfW Mittelstandspanel, an annual firm survey which
has been conducted since 2003 by the KfW Bankengruppe, a German public bank in
the ownership of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal States. Among
other business activities, the KfW offers financial support to small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). The collection of the data was initialized by the KfW Research Di-
vision in order to learn more about SMEs as their main clients - their financing needs,
innovative behavior, activities abroad, economic situation, earnings situation, equity
resources, expectations, access to investment and venture capital, in short: every-
thing that is relevant to SMEs and SME policy. The data set is available to external
researchers only upon request and only for research on predetermined topics. The
KfW-Mittelstandspanel is the only panel data set which is representative of all Ger-
man SMEs. It includes firms with maximum annual sales of 500 million Euro without
having restrictions on the number of employees. The inclusion of very small firms is im-
portant for our analysis, as female-owned firms are typically very small. Furthermore,
the survey provides information on characteristics of the firm owner such as gender,
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age and education - a feature that is not available in most public data sets. The owner
characteristics are available only for one firm owner or associate even if the firm has
more than one owner, so we assume that the information holds for the most influential
owner. Additionally, we have information on the size of the management team, con-
sisting of active and responsible executive directors, owners and associates of the firm.
The sample of the survey was selected using stratified random sampling. The stratifi-
cation was done according to six size groups (less than 5 employees, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49,
50-99 and 100 or more employees), five industries (manufacturing, construction, retail,
wholesale and services), region (West and East Germany), and participation in a KfW
support program for SMEs. Firms that are located in East Germany are oversampled.
Small and service firms are underrepresented compared to the population, therefore the
share of large and industry firms is higher in the sample than in the population. As
a result, the share of female-owned firms is underrepresented as these are prevalently
small and belong to the service sector. Yet, in the regressions we control for all stratifi-
cation variables. The survey, which is six pages long, was sent by mail to the firms for
the first time in 2003 and has been repeated in every following year. Participation in
the survey is voluntary, some firms dropped out, others did not respond in every single
year. New firms were included in 2005, 2007 and 2009 in order to keep the sample size
constant. The survey achieved response rates between 18.2% and 23.4%, which is in
the typical range for medium-length mail surveys without incentive to participate for
SMEs.2 This corresponds to 9,000 to 15,000 observations for each year. The panel is
unbalanced, therefore the time dimension of the data is limited. 58% of the firms are
observed only once, 6,800 firms have participated at least three times and more than
1,000 SMEs have participated in all years.3
3.3.2 Regression sampling and descriptives
The analysis is based on three sub-samples. For the first regression in Section 3.4.4
we use the largest sub-sample, which is based on 34,234 firms with a total of 80,543
observations over time. We exclude observations with extreme values. These are those
below the 0.5th and above the 99.5th percentiles-bound for the variables sales, sales
growth, employment growth and return on sales. The use of lagged values requires
at least two subsequent observations for each firm and with the further restriction of
2Mail survey response rates for SMEs are lower than for large firms. Bartholomev and Smith (2006)
have reviewed mail surveys published in ‘Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice’ and ‘Journal of
Small Business Management’ over the period 1998-2004 and have found an average response rate of
27%.
3A detailed description of the data set in German language can be found in Reize (2010).
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non-missing entries in the regression variables the number of observations reduces to
20,254 in the first regression. The second regression in Section 3.4.5 restricts the data
set to firms that are observed in every single year between 2006 to 2009, therefore the
sample shrinks to 1,389 observations. For the third regression, which is discussed in
Section 3.4.6, we consider only those firms that have invested and have stated their
investment goals, reducing the sample size therefore to 7,194 observations.
Table 3.1 provides the variable descriptions and Table 3.2 descriptive statistics dis-
aggregated by gender for the first and largest regression sample. There are statistically
significant gender differences in several dimensions. Female entrepreneurs are on aver-
age three years younger and their firms are younger, too. As expected, female-owned
firms are smaller in terms of sales and employees and they are more likely to be or-
ganized as sole proprietorships and less likely as a corporation. Consequently a larger
share of male-owned firms have more than three owners and/or managers. Female-
owned firms are rarely active in the manufacturing and construction industries and
more often active in services, particularly retail and hotel and restaurant industries.4
Female-owned firms’ propensity to invest and to innovate is lower and they are less
likely to have positive sales expectations.
In Figure 3.1 we present results from kernel density estimates of the distributions
of the logs of number of employees and sales for female- and male-owned firms. The
dashed line represents male-owned firms while the solid line depicts female-owned firms.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis that the male and female
distributions are equally distributed with a p-value of 0.000 for both variables.
Since the interpretation of simple means of performance measures may be mislead-
ing, we run a simple random effects GLS regression of firm performance in terms of
sales growth (Table 3.3). We control for education, age of the firm and the owner, firm
size, management team size and industry. We find that female owners have significantly
lower growth rates, which is in line with previous findings on gender and firm growth.
We are aware that this regression is just a very basic attempt to separate the impact
of female ownership from other underlying variables that might have an influence on
growth and may be correlated with female ownership. However, the aim of this simple
regression is to confirm the finding that female-owned firms have lower growth rates
with our data. Our main question of interest is investment behavior. As investment is
an important determinant of firm growth and size, our analysis contributes to a better
understanding of existing differences in firm size and growth.
4The data set contains firms from 55 industries according to the NACE industry classification. In
order to create industry dummy variables that comprise a reasonable number of female-owned firms,
we merge these 55 industries into eight categories.
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Table 3.1: Variable descriptions
Owner characteristics
Female owner (d) 1 if the principal firm owner/manager is female, 0 else
Graduate (d) 1 if the firm owner has graduated from an institution of 
higher education, 0 else
Age firm owner (c) Age of the firm owner
Firm characteristics
FTE (c) Number of full time employees (FTEs) including the firm owner 
Sales (c) Amount of sales in Euro
FTE (log) (c) Logarithm of the number of full time employees (FTEs) incl. firm owner 
Sales (log) (c) Logarithm of the amount of sales 
Sales growth (c) Growth rate of sales
Cash flow (c) Earnings before taxes+depreciation 
Cash flow/sales (c) Cashlow divided by total lagged sales
Demeaned cashflow (c) Deviation of cashflow from the sample mean
Firm age <5 years (d) 1 if the firm is less than 5 years old, 0 else (reference category)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 1 if the firm is between 5 and 10 years old, 0 else
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 1 if the firm is between 11 and 20 years old, 0 else
Firm age >20 years (d) 1 if the firm is more than 20 years old, 0 else
1 owner-manager (d) 1 if the firm has 1 active owner-manager, 0 else (reference category)
2 owners/managers (d) 1 if the firm has 2 active owners/managers, 0 else
3 or more owners/managers (d) 1 if the firm has 3 or more active owners/managers, 0 else
Investment (d) 1 if the firm has invested, 0 else
Innovation (d) 1 if the firm has innovation activities, 0 else
Sales expectations positive (d) 1 if the expectation for next year's sales is positive, 0 else
Stratification variables and industry dummies
KfW support (d) 1 if the firm has received a KfW promotional loan, 0 else
Region (d) 1 if the firm is located in East Germany,  0 if the firm is located in 
West Germany
Manufacturing (d) 1 if the firm is in manufacturing industry, 0 else (reference category)
Construction (d) 1 if the firm is in construction industry, 0 else
Retail and wholesale (d) 1 if the firm is in retail and wholesale industry, 0 else
Hotel and restaurants (d) 1 if the firm is in hotel and restaurant industry, 0 else
Transport, finance, data processing (d) 1 if the firm is in transport, finance or data processing industry, 0 else
Commercial services (d) 1 if the firm is in commercial services, 0 else
Other business-related services (d) 1 if the firm is in other business-related services, 0 else
Other industry (d) 1 if the firm is in another industry, 0 else
Legal form dummies
Sole proprietorship (d) 1 if the firm is in sole proprietorship, 0 else (reference category)
Private limited company (d) 1 if the firm is a private limited company, 0 else
Limited liability company (d) 1 if the firm is a limited liability company, 0 else
Corporation (d) 1 if the firm is a corporation, 0 else
Other legal form (d) 1 if the firm has another legal form, 0 else
Notes: d = dummy variable, c = continuous variable
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics regression sample
Gender variable Mean St.dev. Min. Max.
Female owner (d) 0.116 0.321 0 1
t-test 
Mean St.dev. Min. Max. Mean St.dev. Min. Max. p-value
Owner characteristics
Graduate (d) 0.540 0.498 0 1 0.524 0.499 0 1 0.140
Age firm owner 48.432 9.944 20 80 44.909 9.025 23 78 0.000***
Firm characteristics
FTE 33.3 54.2 0.5 1253 20.2 36.0 0.5 462 0.000***
Sales (in million Euro) 5.349 10.030 10 104 2.620 6.894 10 102 0.000***
Sales growth 0.041 0.298 -1.542 2.037 0.038 0.276 -1.538 2.004 0.745
Cash flow (in thousand Euro) 327 669 -320 8,150 189 510 -307 6,800 0.000***
Firm age  31.280 36.29 1 384 27.022 34.579 1 312 0.000***
Firm age <5 years (d) 0.151 0.358 0 1 0.242 0.428 0 1 0.000***
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.160 0.366 0 1 0.187 0.390 0 1 0.001***
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.285 0.452 0 1 0.239 0.427 0 1 0.000***
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.404 0.491 0 1 0.332 0.471 0 1 0.000***
1 owner-manager (d) 0.586 0.492 0 1 0.604 0.489 0 1 0.093
2 owners/managers (d) 0.274 0.446 0 1 0.272 0.445 0 1 0.848
3 or more owners/managers (d) 0.107 0.310 0 1 0.079 0.269 0 1 0.000***
Investment (d) 0.650 0.477 0 1 0.537 0.499 0 1 0.000***
Innovation (d) 0.505 0.500 0 1 0.399 0.490 0 1 0.000***
Sales expectations positive (d) 0.309 0.462 0 1 0.272 0.445 0 1 0.000***
Stratification variables 
KfW support (d) 0.682 0.466 0 1 0.687 0.009 0 1 0.602
Region (d) 0.404 0.491 0 1 0.432 0.010 0 1 0.007***
Industry dummies
Manufacturing (d) 0.298 0.457 0 1 0.185 0.389 0 1 0.000***
Construction (d) 0.187 0.390 0 1 0.082 0.274 0 1 0.000***
Retail and wholesale (d) 0.263 0.440 0 1 0.313 0.464 0 1 0.000***
Hotel and restaurants (d) 0.032 0.175 0 1 0.080 0.272 0 1 0.000***
Transport, finance, 
data processing (d)
0.040 0.196 0 1 0.035 0.183 0 1 0.206
Commercial services (d) 0.094 0.291 0 1 0.102 0.302 0 1 0.219
Other business-related services (d) 0.070 0.256 0 1 0.195 0.396 0 1 0.000***
Other (d) 0.016 0.124 0 1 0.007 0.002 0 1 0.002***
Legal form dummies
Sole proprietorship (d) 0.306 0.461 0 1 0.488 0.500 0 1 0.000***
Private limited (d) 0.074 0.262 0 1 0.078 0.269 0 1 0.503
Limited partnership (d) 0.110 0.313 0 1 0.070 0.255 0 1 0.000***
Limited liability corporation (d) 0.502 0.500 0 1 0.354 0.010 0 1 0.000***
Other legal form (d) 0.007 0.083 0 1 0.010 0.098 0 1 0.139
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the sample used in the estimation of a linear probability random effects panel GLS model 
of investment in Table 3.4. N = 20,254. Comparison of means with two-sample t-test of equality of means under the assumption of equal 
variances. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Male owner Female owner
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Figure 3.1: Kernel density estimates, size in terms of sales and number of employees
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Table 3.3: Random effects panel GLS regression of firm growth
Dependent variable: Sales growth 
Female owner (d) -0.044***
(0.007)
Graduate owner (d) 0.013**
(0.005)
Age firm owner -0.001**
(0.0002)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.101***
(0.006)
Lagged sales (log) -0.122***
(0.005)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.089***
(0.009)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -0.109***
(0.008)
Firm age >20 years (d) -0.110***
(0.008)
2 owners/managers (d) 0.024***
(0.006)
3 or more owners/managers (d) 0.035***
(0.008)
Constant 1.538***
(0.064)
R-squared (overall) 0.070
Observations 20,254
Female observations 2,361
Firms 9,949
Avg. obs. per firm 2.0
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel GLS regression for 
the years 2003-2009 with firm-level cluster-robust standard errors. The regression 
includes time, industry and legal form dummies as well as the stratification variables.
The reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are 
younger than 5 years and have one manager. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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3.4 Econometric analysis of gender and firm invest-
ment
3.4.1 Estimating investment functions
Several theoretical models attempt to describe the complex process of firm investment.
Common to almost all recent models is that investment is considered as a dynamic
optimization problem. Hence, a firms lives many periods and increases its optimal,
long-run or equilibrium level capital stock by investing. Firms decide to invest or not
given real and financial factors. Due to limited funds current and future investment
are interdependent. Moreover, investment and its financing have further intertemporal
effects on future profitability and future financing constraints.
When it comes to the empirical estimation of the investment process, a large part
of the empirical investment literature is based on the Q investment model (Tobin and
Brainard 1977) where investment opportunities are measured by the ratio of market to
book value of a firm’s assets. For the present analysis the Q model is not applicable as
the KfW Mittelstandspanel does not provide information on stock market participa-
tion. Anyhow, as most of the firms are rather small, it can be assumed that they are not
listed on the stock market. In neoclassical models investment demand is determined
by measures of output and cost of capital. However, the data set does not contain
information on firm-specific cost of capital. The use of an Euler equation as theoretical
underpinning does not come into consideration, either, because of the strictly implied
assumption of convex adjustment costs of investment. Convex adjustment costs im-
ply that with increasing amounts of investment the adjustment costs that a firm has
to bear grow over-proportionally. This results in investment smoothing: yearly firm
investment is continuous over the years and there are no investment spikes over time.
This assumption may hold for large firms, but what we observe in the data is that a
significant fraction of firms show large variation in investment activity between years.
Particularly for small firms investment is a lumpy activity, most of them do not invest
in every year. Periods of larger amounts of investment are followed by periods of zero
investment. The reason for this behavior is that larger investment projects (e.g. pur-
chase of a production facility) cannot be smoothed over time and many firms cannot
afford to invest every year or rather do not need or want to invest in every year.
Based on these technical limitations we start our analysis with an estimation of a
linear probability random effects panel GLS model of the investment decision in order
to assess gender differences in the probability of investing. To analyze the investment
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rate, we opt for a reduced form model of investment which is not explicitly derived
from an optimal investment behavior assumption and has no specified structure of
adjustment costs.5 Furthermore we investigate gender differences in investment goals,
also with a linear probability random effects panel GLS model. Finally, we conduct
several robustness checks. We re-estimate the investment decision and the investment
goals with a panel probit model and the investment rate, with a panel tobit approach.
Furthermore, we reduce the two samples to firms with only one owner-manager to
make sure that the decision maker in the firm is indeed female. These modifications
in sample size and estimation method do not alter our central findings.
3.4.2 Cash flow as indicator for financial constraints
Cash flow, the amount of internal funds that are available to a firm for financing
investment projects and other expenses, is a measure for a firm’s financial power.
Financial factors such as the availability of internal funds, access to external finance as
well as the quality of credit markets are important determinants of firm investment. A
firm can be considered as financially unconstrained if it has no difficulties to finance the
desired investment level, neither through internal nor external funds. The investment
literature uses different strategies to identify and to measure financial constraints. One
approach is to identify financial constraints by including a firm’s cash flow into the
investment equation as a measure of internal liquidity. The first study that worked with
cash flow as an indicator for financial constraints was written by Fazzari et al. (1988).
The resulting regression coefficient, the ‘investment-cash flow sensitivity’, represents
the potential sensitivity of investment to fluctuations in available internal finance. A
significant cash flow coefficient can be interpreted as evidence of financing constraints.
The intuition behind is that if investment activity reacts strongly to a good internal
financial situation (higher cash flow), then external funds must be to expensive for the
firm or to difficult to acquire.
However, due to interpretation ambiguities and the absence of theoretical justifica-
tions, the use of cash flow as measure for financial constraints is highly controversial.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that there is no strong theoretical reason to ex-
pect a monotonic relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity and the degree
of financial constraints. Their empirical results show that a higher investment-cash
flow sensitivity cannot be interpreted as evidence that a firm is more financially con-
strained, therefore investment-cash flow sensitivities are questionable indicators for
5Bond and Van Reenen (2007, p. 4443) point out that these type of models ‘represent just an empirical
approximation to some more complex underlying process that has generated the data’.
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financing constraints. Another part of the Kaplan and Zingales critique refers to prob-
lems that arise within regressions of the Q-model, mainly caused by measurement error
on the ratio of market to book value of a firm’s assets. These doubts however should
not cause problems in our analysis as we do not employ the Q-model. Yet another
point of criticism that matters for our analysis is that the interpretation of cash flow is
ambiguous because it may contain information about expected future profits. A good
cash flow situation may lead to positive expectations about future profits. Without
controlling for sales or profit expectations, the finding of a significant coefficient on
cash flow cannot directly be interpreted as evidence of financing constraints, as the
cash flow variable could pick up expectations. These expectations on future profits
again are relevant for the investment decision, too (Bond et al. 2003). Since we are
able to control for expectations about future sales, this concern is probably not relevant
for our analysis.
In light of these considerations the use of cash flow is appropriate within our esti-
mation framework. Furthermore, we are interested in gender-specific differences in the
reactions to an increase in cash flow rather than in the effect and interpretation of cash
flow itself. For this purpose, we create a new variable by interacting demeaned cash
flow with the dummy variable for female ownership, as the magnitude of the impact
of cash flow on investment may be different for female-owned firms. The interaction
term approach has the main advantage that we can explicitly test differences in the
investment-cash flow sensitivity of male and female firm owners.
3.4.3 Gender as proxy for personals traits
As we have stated before, if previous findings on gender differences in risk-aversion,
overconfidence and lifestyle preferences hold to some extent for entrepreneurs, too,
we expect female business owners to invest less. We have no information on risk
aversion, overconfidence and preferences in our data, but we can assume that under
the assumption of no gender discrimination the pure gender effect on investment is
zero or at least negligible once we could control for these personal traits. However,
estimating an investment model without in some way accounting for these factors
would result in an omitted variable bias. The inclusion of the binary gender variable
can be considered as a proxy variable to catch these features. Wooldridge (2009, p.
307) calls this the ‘plug-in solution to the omitted variables problem’.
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The true model to be estimated would be
E(Ii) = αi + β1Xi + β2Di + β3Zi + ui
where X denotes a vector of firm-specific characteristics, D is a vector of observed
owner-specific characteristics (age and education of the firm owner) and Z is a vector
of unobserved personal traits that influence investment behavior positively, such as risk-
propensity, over-confidence and work-centered or growth-oriented preferences. Being
female is negatively correlated with risk-propensity, over-confidence and work-centered
as well as growth-oriented preferences, but there are no theoretical reasons to believe
that gender itself has an impact on investment behavior. We cannot observe Z, but
we are interested in gender differences in investment behavior that result from gender
differences in Z, therefore we estimate
E(Ii) = αi + β1Xi + β2Di + β3fi + ui
where f denotes a dummy variable for female ownership.
3.4.4 Investment at the extensive margin: probability of in-
vesting
What is the probability that a female-owned firm invests, compared to a male-owned
firm, and how does this probability change when we control for other influencing vari-
ables? In order to answer this question, we estimate a linear probability model (LPM)
by virtue of its easy and straightforward interpretation. The regression coefficients
should be interpreted as changes in the predicted probability of investing if the re-
spective independent variable increases by one unit. Our estimation equation with the
binary investment decision (invested=1, not invested=0) as dependent variable takes
the form
E(Ii) = P (Ii = 1) = αi + β1Xi + β2Di + β3fi + ui
where f denotes a dummy variable for female ownership, X is a vector of firm-specific
characteristics (size in terms of sales and employees, cash flow, firm age, team size,
sales expectations, innovation activity and sales growth) and D is a vector of further
owner-specific characteristics (age of the firm owner and graduate status). One of
the shortcomings of the LPM are heteroskedastic error terms, therefore we employ
a cluster-robust form for the variance-covariance matrix of the estimator (VCE) as
suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2009) by clustering on firm-level.
84
3 Male vs. female business owners: Are there differences in investment behavior?
Table 3.4 displays the results from five different regressions. In specification (1) we
see that the raw probability difference between investing male and female firm owners
amounts to 0.108. The probability that a female-owned firm invests is 10.8 percentage
points lower than for a male-owned firm. Including industry dummies in specification
(2) does not alter this difference substantially. This is in line with Fairlie and Robb
(2009) who find that industry distributions are not a major explanation for gender
gaps in business outcomes. In contrast, the additional inclusion of firm size in specifi-
cation (3) leads to a substantial reduction of the gender difference in the probability of
investing of about six percentage points to 0.049. Controlling for additional firm- and
owner-specific variables does not reduce this difference considerably. Specification (5)
shows that even after considering further firm- and owner-specific characteristics there
still remains a significant gender difference of 3.3 percentage points in the likelihood
to invest.
We conclude that size in terms of full time equivalent employees seems to account
for the largest bulk of the gender difference in the probability to invest. Furthermore,
firm size has the largest explanatory power in the model as with the inclusion of firm
size the R2 increases from 0.032 to 0.125. In order to check whether the gender effect on
investment is constant over different firm size categories, we re-estimate specification
(5) with interaction terms of female ownership with size categories. We repeat this
procedure with firm age instead of size. We plot the interaction effects against the
constant effect from a regression without interactions in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.6 We find
that women’s lower probability of investing does not vary systematically with increasing
size or firm age.
6see Appendix Tables 3.10 and 3.11 for the regression results.
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Table 3.4: Linear probability random effects panel GLS model of investment
Dependent variable: investment (0/1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female owner (d) -0.108*** -0.097*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.033***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.109*** 0.064*** 0.046***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Lagged sales (log) 0.044*** 0.061***
(0.005) (0.005)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.054*** -0.038***
(0.012) (0.012)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -0.071*** -0.049***
(0.012) (0.012)
Firm age >20 years (d) -0.065*** -0.040***
(0.012) (0.012)
2 managers/owners (d) 0.035*** 0.027***
(0.009) (0.009)
3 or more managers/owners (d) 0.027** 0.017
(0.012) (0.012)
Sales expect. positive (d) 0.051*** 0.039***
(0.007) (0.007)
Graduate (d) 0.024*** 0.012
(0.008) (0.008)
Age firm owner -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Innovation activities (d) 0.112***
(0.007)
Sales growth 0.170***
(0.011)
Cash flow/lagged sales 0.032***
(0.008)
Demeaned cash flow*female 0.010
(0.008)
Constant 0.617*** 0.686*** 0.348*** -0.055 -0.356***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.062) (0.063)
Industry dummies no yes yes yes yes
Legal form dummies no no no yes yes
R-squared 0.019 0.032 0.125 0.140 0.174
Observations 20,254 20,254 20,254 20,254 20,254
Female observations 2,361 2,361 2,361 2,361 2,361
Firms 9,949 9,949 9,949 9,949 9,949
Avg. obs. per firm 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel GLS regression for the years 2003-2009 with firm-level 
cluster-robust standard errors. The regression includes time, industry and legal form dummies as well as the stratification
variables. The reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have 
one owner-manager.*,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Constant effect of female ownership vs. interaction with size categoriesConstant coefficient `female´ vs. interaction with size
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Figure 3.3: Constant effect of female ownership vs. interaction with age categoriesConstant coefficient `f male´ vs. interactions with firm age
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3.4.5 Investment at the intensive margin: investment rates
From an econometric point of view, the process of firm investment with its autore-
gressive distributed lags would be most appropriately estimated within the dynamic
econometric framework of a system GMM estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Yet, the estimation of a dynamic specification
is not very promising when considering that the time dimension of our panel is very
short with only seven years’ data and moreover, only very few firms are present during
the whole time period.
Due to these data limitations we are confined to estimate a simple OLS regression
of a reduced form model with time-averaged data. In doing so, we follow Addison et
al. (2007) who analyze the impact of works councils on investment. We adopt their
approach to examine gender differences in investment. The basic estimation equation
can be written as:
Ii,2008+Ii,2009
2 = α + β1fi + β2
CFi,2008+CFi,2009
2 + β3DemCFi ∗ fi + γXi + u
where I in the dependent variable denotes the investment rate, the amount invested
divided by lagged sales. We average the investment rate over two years in order to
ensure that there are no investment spikes in the data and that investment is smoothed
over the years. f is a dummy variable for female ownership. We average cash flow
(CF ) over the years 2008 and 2009, too. DemCF ∗ f stands for demeaned cash flow
interacted with the dummy variable for female ownership. X represents a vector of
the standard control variables in investment functions and includes also the lagged
investment rate that serves as a rough depiction of the dynamic adjustment process
of investment. Furthermore, we include sales growth as an explanatory variable, since
fluctuations in sales or output motivate changes in investment spending. Sales or
output growth has a positive impact on firm investment and vice versa. Increasing
sales imply that a firm expects rising profits and cash flow as well as a higher degree of
existing capacity utilization. This usually implies that profit expectations rise and this
again encourages firms to invest more e.g. in buildings or machinery (accelerator effect).
According to investment theory firms take into account expectations of the future when
they decide about their investment strategy. Firms invest when the expected return
on investment (ROI) exceeds their costs of investing. Positive expectations of future
sales boosts investment whereas negative expectations may constrain investment. To
incorporate the role of expectations aside from the growth rate of sales we include two
dummy variables for positive expectations for the years 2009 and 2010. The firms were
asked whether they expect their sales situation to improve, to deteriorate or to stay
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unchanged next year. Aspiring investment intentions may not necessarily be reflected
in current growth rate or in sales expectations. Therefore we also include a dummy
variable for ambitious investment goals that takes the value 1 if the firm has stated
implementation of new products, innovation/R&D or sales increases as an objective for
its investment (see Section 3.4.6 for more details). We control for firm size and industry.
There should exist a positive relationship between a firm’s size and its investment as
larger firms have easier access to finance and more ability to bear higher risks (Fazzari
et al. 1988). Investment patterns also vary between different industries. Usually
manufacturing firms are more capital intensive than services and some industries may
experience sector-specific business cycles.
Table 3.5: OLS regression of the average investment rate in 2008/2009
Dependent var: Investment rate 
(Investment/lagged sales, averaged 
over 2008/2009) (1) (1A) (2) (2A) (3) (3A) (4) (5)
Female owner (d) -0.013** -0.014*** -0.012** -0.014*** -0.009* -0.011** -0.010* -0.010*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Investment/sales 2006/2007 0.232*** 0.219*** 0.200*** 0.188*** 0.193*** 0.181*** 0.190*** 0.175***
(0.049) (0.043) (0.048) (0.042) (0.048) (0.042) (0.047) (0.044)
Growth rate sales 2008/2009 0.079*** 0.074*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.045**
(0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020)
FTE (log) 2007 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003* 0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash flow/lagged sales 2008/2009 0.167*** 0.163*** 0.198*** 0.197*** 0.194*** 0.171***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042) (0.039)
Cash flow*female -0.148*** -0.157*** -0.149*** -0.138***
(0.050) (0.045) (0.049) (0.045)
Sales expectation for 2010 pos. (d) 0.017*** 0.013**
(0.006) (0.006)
Sales expectation for 2009 pos. (d) 0.005 0.004
(0.008) (0.007)
Ambitious investment goals (d) 0.044***
(0.005)
Constant 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.015 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.001
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 1,389 1,598 1,389 1,598 1,389 1,598 1,389 1,389
Female observations 155 183 155 183 155 183 155 155
R-squared 0.146 0.144 0.184 0.182 0.191 0.191 0.199 0.248
Notes: This table presents the results of an OLS regression with robust standard errors and time-averaged data for the years 2006-2009. Each 
regression includes industry and legal form dummies as well as the stratification variables. Regressions (1A)-(1C) are repetitions of regressions 
(1)-(3) with a larger sample that due to missing entries in expectations and investment goals could not be used for (4) and (5). The reference 
category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 3.5 reports the results from five OLS regressions of the reduced form investment
equation. We use a sub-sample of firms that are observed in each single year from 2006-
2009. We include only firms that have invested at least once in those years. Table 3.9
in the Appendix contains the summary statistics for this reduced sample. Investing
firms are larger and are more likely to be organized as a corporation than non-investing
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firms. Moreover, the share of firm owners that hold a graduate degree is higher.
Again, we start with a basic specification in (1) that does not include cash flow,
the interaction term and the dummy variables for positive expectations and ambitious
investment goals. We gradually include these variables in specifications (2)-(5). As the
number of observations is quite small, we re-estimate the smaller specifications (1)-(3)
with all available observations (1A)-(3A). All control variables enter the regressions
with the expected signs. Lagged investment and sales growth are positively correlated
with investment and so are expectations and ambitious goals. The coefficient for cash
flow is significant and shows the expected sign, firms with higher internal funds are
more inclined to invest higher amounts. Interestingly, the negative coefficient of the
interaction term suggests that cash flow has a greater impact on the investment rate
of male-owned firms than of female-owned firms.
The dummy variable for female ownership has a negative sign and is significant in
all specifications, suggesting a higher degree of investment reluctance for women. The
significance decreases from the 1% level in (1) and (2) to merely 10% in (4) and (5)
and the size of the coefficient reduces from 0.014 to 0.010 as we include more explana-
tory variables. However, the gender difference is economically not trivial. Using the
coefficients from specification (5), we calculate an exemplary investment rate of 0.081
for a male-owned firm and 0.07 for a female-owned firm with the same characteristics.7
With 1 mio. Euro annual sales, a male-owned firm would invest 81,000 Euro and a
female-owned firm only 70,000 Euro which makes a non-trivial difference of about 15%.
This result is open to multiple interpretations and cannot completely be explained
within the regression framework. We might reason that female-owned firms are appar-
ently less financially constrained because they react less to an increase in cash flow.
However, the results confirm our expectation that gender differences in risk-aversion,
over-confidence and attitudes towards entrepreneurship may result in lower investment
activity. Yet, all these assertions are pure speculation as they cannot be tested directly
within the investment function. A further analysis of the investment goals in the next
section reveals that there are gender differences in the stated reasons for investing.
These differences may also serve as a valid explanation for women’s lower investment
activity.
7We use the following values for this calculation: investment rate in 2006/2007: 0.05, growth rate
sales 2008/2009; 0.01, 18.5 FTEs, cash flow/sales: 0.11, positive expectations for 2009 and 2010 and
ambitious investment goals.
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3.4.6 Investment goals
Investing firms stated their motivations for the previous year’s investment by choosing
between eight pre-formulated non mutually exclusive investment goals: environment
protection, rationalization (cost cutting), implementation of new products, technical
replacements, innovation/R&D, governmental requirements, sales increases and other
goals. We identify three goals as growth-oriented and/or risky investment goals:
implementation of new products, innovation/R&D and sales increases. The other
reasons (environment protection, cost cutting, technical replacements and governmen-
tal requirements) can be viewed as entrepreneurial necessities which can take place
without the intention for growing or expanding.
Table 3.6: Summary statistics investment goals
t-test 
Investment goals Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. p-value
Environment protection 0.105 0.306 0.076 0.265 0.015**
Rationalization 0.527 0.5 0.471 0.5 0.004***
Implementation new products 0.309 0.462 0.252 0.434 0.001***
Technical replacements 0.599 0.49 0.613 0.487 0.475
Innovation / R&D 0.116 0.32 0.052 0.223 0.000***
Governmental requirements 0.061 0.239 0.089 0.286 0.003***
Sales increase 0.492 0.5 0.424 0.494 0.001***
Other goals 0.073 0.26 0.105 0.306 0.002***
Average number of stated goals 2.282 1.109 2.083 1.045 0.000***
Male owner Female owner
Notes: The variables take the value 1 if the firm has indicated the respective goal, 0 else. Comparison 
of means with two-sample t-test of equality of means unser the assumption of equal variances. *,** 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3.7: Correlation table investment goals
Environm.
protection
Rational-
ization
Implement.
new prod.
Technical
replacem.
Innovation/
 R&D
Governm.
requirem.
Sales 
increase
Environment protection 1
Rationalization 0.102* 1
Implementation new products -0.011 -0.061* 1
Technical replacements 0.075* 0.038* -0.119* 1
Innovation / R&D 0.065* 0.011 0.176* -0.006 1
Governmental requirements 0.123* 0.008 -0.024 0.038* -0.008 1
Sales increase -0.003 0.029 0.184* -0.171* 0.142* -0.014 1
Other goals -0.055* -0.180* -0.121* -0.183* -0.069* -0.026 -0.119*
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.6 and 3.7 show summary statistics and a correlation table of investment goals.
The growth oriented goals are significantly correlated to each other and are more often
stated by male firm owners than by female owners. We estimate a linear probability
random effects GLS model for each investment goal separately (Table 3.8).
Table 3.8: Linear probability model of investment goals
Dependent variable:
Investment goal (0/1)
Environm.
protection
Rational-
ization
Implement.
new prod.
Technical
replacem.
Innovation/
 R&D
Governm.
requirem.
Sales 
increase
Other
goals
Female owner (d) -0.018 -0.009 -0.049** 0.015 -0.040*** 0.018 -0.054** 0.019
(0.012) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.013)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.002 0.070*** -0.005 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.039*** -0.009
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006)
Lagged sales (log) 0.012* -0.009 0.004 0.014 0.008 0.005 0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.002 0.045* -0.008 0.004 -0.001 0.013 -0.027 -0.007
(0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.004 0.010 -0.030 0.062*** -0.027* -0.002 -0.058** -0.014
(0.013) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.024) (0.013)
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.020 0.033 -0.054** 0.077*** -0.055*** 0.013 -0.106*** -0.016
(0.014) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.015) (0.013) (0.024) (0.014)
Sales expect. positive (d) -0.016** -0.002 0.047*** -0.046*** 0.031*** -0.001 0.150*** -0.002
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007)
Graduate owner (d) -0.032*** 0.004 -0.031** 5.45e-06 0.029*** -0.012* -0.052*** 0.008
(0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008)
Age firm owner -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.002*** 0.001** -0.0007* -0.001 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004)
2 owners/managers (d) 0.005 -0.008 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.0002 0.016 -0.003
(0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008)
3 or more owners/managers (d) -0.012 0.017 -0.031 5.37e-05 0.003 -0.009 0.002 0.017
(0.013) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.014) (0.010) (0.021) (0.011)
Sales growth 0.023* 0.033 -0.022 -0.014 0.007 -0.003 0.165*** -0.035***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.023) (0.013)
Cash flow in t/sales t-1 -0.0001 0.001*** 0.0001 -0.002*** -0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002)
Constant -0.002 0.525*** 0.331*** 0.468*** -0.021 0.065 0.403*** 0.120*
(0.085) (0.127) (0.111) (0.126) (0.079) (0.071) (0.124) (0.064)
R-squared overall 0.030 0.060 0.038 0.027 0.075 0.016 0.028 0.097
Observations 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194
Female observations 726 726 726 726 726 726 726 726
Firms 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999
Avg. obs. per firm 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Notes: This table presents the results of a linear probability random effects panel regression with robust standard errors for the years 2005-2009. Only 
investing firms considered. The definitions and constructions of the variables can be found in Table 1. Each regression includes industry dummies as well 
as a dummy for region and participation in a promotional loan program. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The explanatory variables are the same as in the estimation of the binary investment
decision. The only regressions where the dummy variable for female ownership is
significant with a negative sign are those for the growth-oriented and risky investment
goals. Hence, the probability that a female business owner indicates that she strives
for these investment goals is significantly lower. For women the probability of pursuing
these investment goals is about 0.05 lower for sales increases and implementation of
new products and 0.04 lower for innovation/R&D. For the other investment goals there
is no statistically significant gender difference. This result contributes to a better
understanding of the puzzling outcome that women react less to an increase in cash
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flow. We can infer that female-owned firms are on average less eager to expand and
to invest in more risky business areas. This may also be an explanation for the fact
that - even with higher cash flow - female firm owners invest less and are less inclined
to increase their investments. One caveat of the regression may be the relatively low
explanatory power of the estimated model with an R2 between 0.027 and 0.097.
3.4.7 Robustness checks
In order to validate our findings we employ several robustness checks for each re-
gression. These robustness checks essentially confirm our findings from the main
regressions, as the signs and the significances do not differ substantially.
1. Check: other model specification, panel probit instead of LPM.
Typically, binary dependent variables are estimated with non-linear regression models.
We therefore re-run the regressions of the binary investment decision (Section 3.4.4)
and the investment goals (Section 3.4.6) with a panel probit model (Appendix Tables
3.12 and 3.13).
2. Check: other model specification, tobit instead of OLS.
The investment rate in our data is a censored variable. We have a significant proportion
of zero outcomes for investment and we do not know which part of these zeros are
latent non-zero observations. In other words, we do not know if the zero observations
for investment are ‘true’ zeros because the firm owner did not want to invest or if the
zeros are in fact negative observations, firms that could not invest. We have tried to
overcome this problem by time-averaging the data in the estimation of an investment
function in Section 3.4.5. However, the standard approach for this type of analysis
is the use of censored regression models. In using a censored regression model it
would be appropriate to estimate a two part (or Heckman) model to overcome the
strong assumption of one part models that the same probability mechanism generates
both the zeros and the positives values. These models, however, need at least one
exclusion variable that has a substantial impact on the probability of selection but not
on the positive outcome variable for robust identification. Unfortunately we are not
able to justify any of the available variables as exogenous for the investment rate but
substantial for the selection into investing. We therefore re-run the OLS regression of
the investment rate with a tobit maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). However, the
tobit approach is based on strong assumptions about the conditional data distribution
and functional form. These strong assumptions are likely to be violated and this makes
the tobit MLE a non-robust estimator (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). Using the tobit
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model we are able to estimate the regressions with a larger sample compared to the
small sample size of the OLS regression, as we do not need to time-average the data
(Appendix Table 3.14).
3. Check: considering only firms with one owner.
We only have information about the gender of the primary firm owner and not about
all members of the management team. In order to make sure that the decision maker
in the firm is indeed female, we repeat all regressions considering only firms with one
owner-manager (Appendix Tables 3.15, 3.16, 3.17).
3.5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the question of whether female-owned firms differ in their in-
vestment activity from male-owned firms. Our results offer valuable insights to gender
differences in investment behavior and enhance the understanding of the causes of
smaller firm size for firms owned by women. Even after controlling for other owner and
firm characteristics we find that women invest significantly less than men, at the ex-
tensive as well as at the intensive margin. Furthermore, women react less to a marginal
increase in cash flow, suggesting that even in the presence of the same internal funds
women invest less. This difference in the impact of cash flow on investment rate is
probably the most astonishing result in the paper. Of course we cannot infer any
statements about causality, the observed differences are mere correlations. However,
previous findings suggest that women are more risk and competition averse, less over-
confident and have different preferences in life. These personal traits are correlated
with gender and are likely to have a negative influence on investment behavior. Our
estimation results confirm our hypothesis that women invest less if these findings do
not only hold for the average women but for female entrepreneurs, too. Therefore, the
significant gender effect from the regressions on the extensive and intensive margin of
investment possibly contains these unobserved features that are best able to explain
the differences in investment. An additional regression on investment goals reveals that
women are less likely to invest for reasons that indicate an ambition to expand their
businesses. This result points to the fact that women’s lower investment is attributable
rather to differences in preferences than to discrimination. However, size and growth
are not the only criteria for business success, pursuing lower-pace growth may also
be beneficial for a firm. Further research is needed in order to shed light on gender
differences in business outcomes after investment.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.9: Summary statistics regression sample intensive margin
Gender variable Mean St.dev.
Female owner (d) 0.115 0.318
t-test 
Mean St.dev. Min. Max. Mean St.dev. Min. Max. p-value
Dependent variable
Inv./lagged sales, 2008/2009 0.049 0.094 0 1.063 0.035 0.060 0 0.413 0.079*
Independent variables
Inv./lagged sales, 2006/2007 0.065 0.116 0 1.232 0.056 0.111 0 1.028 0.371
Av. growth rate sales 2008/2009 0.001 0.149 -0.605 0.974 -0.008 0.126 -0.412 0.366 0.461
FTE (log) 37.4 54.5 0.5 822 23.2 30.5 1 162 0.001***
Cash flow/lagged sales 2008/2009 0.114 0.129 -0.198 1.184 0.142 0.177 -0.110 0.823 0.015**
Interaction cash flow*female 0.026 0.014 -0.226 0.707
Sales expectation for 2010 pos. (d) 0.322 0.467 0 1 0.316 0.466 0 1 0.872
Sales expectation for 2009 pos. (d) 0.144 0.351 0 1 0.142 0.350 0 1 0.938
Ambitious investment goals (d) 0.567 0.496 0 1 0.484 0.501 0 1 0.049**
Stratification variables and industry dummies
KfW support (d) 0.784 0.412 0 1 0.761 0.428 0 1 0.526
Region (d) 0.414 0.493 0 1 0.419 0.495 0 1 0.900
Manufacturing+other (d) 0.341 0.474 0 1 0.206 0.406 0 1 0.001***
Construction (d) 0.185 0.388 0 1 0.090 0.287 0 1 0.003***
Retail and wholesale (d) 0.260 0.439 0 1 0.303 0.461 0 1 0.252
Services (d) 0.214 0.410 0 1 0.400 0.491 0 1 0.000***
Legal form dummies
Sole proprietorship (d) 0.271 0.444 0 1 0.393 0.490 0 1 0.001***
Private limited (d) 0.070 0.256 0 1 0.103 0.305 0 1 0.143
Limited liability (d) 0.118 0.323 0 1 0.071 0.258 0 1 0.079*
Corporation (d) 0.532 0.499 0 1 0.419 0.495 0 1 0.008***
Other legal form (d) 0.008 0.090 0 1 0.013 0.113 0 1 0.543
Male owner Female owner
Notes: this table provides summary statistics for the reduced sample used in the estimation of a OLS model of investment in Table 3.5. 
N=1,389. Only firms that are observable from 2006-2009 and firms that have invested at least once in those years are included. 
Comparison of means with two-sample t-test of equality of means under the assumption of equal variances. *,** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.10: Linear probability RE panel GLS model with interactions (size)
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: 
investment (0/1) with size cat
with size cat 
& size interact
Female owner (d) -0.033*** -0.120***
(0.012) (0.039)
2/2.5 empl 0.041* 0.025
(0.022) (0.025)
3/3.5 empl 0.047** 0.028
(0.024) (0.026)
4-5.5 empl 0.099*** 0.075***
(0.023) (0.025)
6-7.5 empl 0.106*** 0.095***
(0.024) (0.026)
8-11.5 empl 0.167*** 0.147***
(0.024) (0.026)
12-14.5 empl 0.183*** 0.167***
(0.027) (0.029)
15-19.5 empl 0.247*** 0.229***
(0.027) (0.028)
20-34.5 empl 0.248*** 0.232***
(0.028) (0.029)
35-59 empl 0.262*** 0.243***
(0.030) (0.031)
>60 empl 0.297*** 0.278***
(0.032) (0.033)
fem*2/2.5 empl 0.078
(0.051)
fem*3/3.5 empl 0.092
(0.058)
fem*4-5.5 empl 0.131***
(0.051)
fem*6-7.5 empl 0.044
(0.053)
fem*8-11.5 empl 0.105**
(0.050)
fem*12-14.5 empl 0.075
(0.061)
fem*15-19.5 empl 0.090
(0.056)
fem*20-34.5 empl 0.070
(0.052)
fem*35-59 empl 0.118**
(0.054)
fem*>60 empl 0.111**
(0.052)
Firm age -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Lagged sales (log) 0.036*** 0.035***
(0.005) (0.005)
2 managers/owners (d) 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.008)
3 or more managers 0.018 0.018
/owners (d) (0.012) (0.012)
Graduate (d) 0.017** 0.017**
(0.008) (0.008)
Age firm owner -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Sales expect. positive (d) 0.037*** 0.036***
(0.007) (0.007)
Innovation activities (d) 0.108*** 0.108***
(0.007) (0.007)
Sales growth 0.160*** 0.160***
(0.011) (0.011)
Cash flow 2.82e-08*** 2.83e-08***
(4.85e-09) (4.86e-09)
Constant -0.070 -0.050
(0.066) (0.067)
R-squared 0.169 0.176
Observations 20,254 20,254
Female observations 2,361 2,361
Firms 9,949 9,949
Avg. obs. per firm 2.0 2.0
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel GLS regression for the 
years 2003-2009 with firm-level cluster-robust standard errors. The regression includes 
time dummies and the stratification variables. The reference category are manufacturing 
firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have one owner-manager.
*,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.11: Linear probability RE panel GLS model with interactions (age)
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: 
investment (0/1) with age cat
with age cat 
& age interact
Female owner (d) -0.036*** -0.055
-0.012 (0.038)
3 -<6 y. -0.042** -0.051**
(0.018) (0.020)
6 -<9 y. -0.070*** -0.075***
(0.019) (0.020)
9 -<13 y. -0.055*** -0.056***
(0.018) (0.020)
13 -<17 y. -0.084*** -0.082***
(0.018) (0.020)
17 -<20 y. -0.081*** -0.085***
(0.020) (0.021)
20 -<30 y. -0.067*** -0.069***
(0.020) (0.022)
30 -<50 y. -0.057*** -0.060***
(0.019) (0.021)
50 to 80 y. -0.071*** -0.079***
(0.020) (0.021)
>80 y. -0.077*** -0.080***
(0.020) (0.021)
fem*3 -<6 y. 0.048
(0.046)
fem*6 -<9 y. 0.028
(0.050)
fem*9 -<13 y. 0.004
(0.049)
fem*13 -<17 y. -0.030
(0.049)
fem*17 -<20 y. 0.021
(0.058)
fem*20 -<30 y. 0.005
(0.057)
fem*30 -<50 y. 0.020
(0.055)
fem*50-80 y. 0.074
(0.054)
fem*>80 y. 0.018
(0.049)
Firm size 0.069*** 0.069***
(number of FTE) (0.006) (0.006)
Lagged sales (log) 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.005) (0.005)
2 managers/owners (d) 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.008) (0.008)
3 or more managers 0.015 0.015
/owners (d) (0.012) (0.012)
Graduate (d) 0.016* 0.016**
(0.008) (0.008)
Age firm owner -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Sales expect. positive (d) 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.007) (0.007)
Innovation activities (d) 0.109*** 0.109***
(0.007) (0.007)
Sales growth 0.156*** 0.155***
(0.011) (0.011)
Cash flow 1.42e-08*** 1.43e-08***
(4.85e-09) (4.86e-09)
Constant -0.079 -0.077
(0.066) (0.066)
R-squared 0.170 0.175
Observations 20,254 20,254
Female observations 2,361 2,361
Firms 9,949 9,949
Avg. obs. per firm 2.0 2.0
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel GLS regression for 
the years 2003-2009 with firm-level cluster-robust standard errors. The regression includes
time dummies and the stratification variables. The reference category are manufacturing 
firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have one owner-manager.
*,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.12: Panel random effects probit model of investment
Dependent variable: investment (0/1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female owner (d) -0.446*** -0.398*** -0.188*** -0.181*** -0.123**
(0.054) (0.055) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.450*** 0.268*** 0.198***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.025)
Lagged sales (log) 0.179*** 0.252***
(0.021) (0.022)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.222*** -0.156***
(0.046) (0.046)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -0.295*** -0.208***
(0.048) (0.048)
Firm age >20 years (d) -0.268*** -0.168***
(0.048) (0.048)
2 owners/managers (d) 0.141*** 0.110***
(0.037) (0.037)
3 or more managers/owners (d) 0.135** 0.090*
(0.054) (0.053)
Sales expect. positive (d) 0.225*** 0.172***
(0.030) (0.030)
Graduate (d) 0.103*** 0.051
(0.034) (0.033)
Age firm owner -0.007*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Innovation activities (d) 0.465***
(0.028)
Sales growth 0.690***
(0.046)
Cash flow/lagged sales 0.342***
(0.065)
Demeaned cash flow*female 0.285
(0.183)
Constant 0.463*** 0.755*** -0.658*** -2.345*** -3.583***
(0.0390) (0.0496) (0.0580) (0.252) (0.262)
Industry dummies no yes yes yes yes
Legal form dummies no no no yes yes
Prob > chi2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Observations 20,254 20,254 20,254 20,254 20,254
Female Observations 2,361 2,361 2,361 2,361 2,361
Firms 9,949 9,949 9,949 9,949 9,949
Avg. obs. per firm 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel probit regression for the years 2003-2009 with firm-
level cluster-robust standard errors. All regressions include time and legal form dummies as well as the stratification 
variables. The reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have 
one owner-manager. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.13: Panel probit regression of investment goals
Dependent variable:
Investment goal (0/1)
Environm.
protection
Rational-
ization
Implement.
new prod.
Technical
replacem.
Innovation/
 R&D
Governm.
requirem.
Sales 
increase
Other
goals
Female owner (d) -0.153 -0.036 -0.193** 0.049 -0.535*** 0.151 -0.205** 0.158
(0.129) (0.082) (0.079) (0.072) (0.178) (0.122) (0.084) (0.099)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.026 0.255*** -0.016 -0.008 0.032 -0.0148 0.146*** -0.096*
(0.063) (0.043) (0.041) (0.038) (0.080) (0.067) (0.044) (0.057)
Lagged sales (log) 0.104* -0.035 0.012 0.047 0.087 0.059 0.004 -0.011
(0.055) (0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.070) (0.058) (0.0380) (0.049)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.015 0.162* -0.029 0.014 -0.002 0.158 -0.100 -0.056
(0.143) (0.088) (0.084) (0.079) (0.157) (0.140) (0.090) (0.116)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.052 0.038 -0.109 0.209*** -0.240 -0.045 -0.219** -0.096
(0.132) (0.085) (0.081) (0.076) (0.155) (0.139) (0.087) (0.112)
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.163 0.123 -0.201** 0.257*** -0.505*** 0.154 -0.397*** -0.117
(0.131) (0.086) (0.082) (0.077) (0.161) (0.136) (0.088) (0.113)
Sales expect. positive (d) -0.153** -0.010 0.179*** -0.156*** 0.302*** -0.011 0.553*** -0.016
(0.071) (0.047) (0.045) (0.043) (0.080) (0.077) (0.047) (0.065)
Graduate owner (d) -0.309*** 0.014 -0.117** 0.002 0.340*** -0.174** -0.196*** 0.059
(0.081) (0.054) (0.051) (0.048) (0.105) (0.086) (0.055) (0.070)
Age firm owner -0.005 -0.002 0.0002 -0.007*** 0.008 -0.009** -0.003 -0.0007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
2 owners/managers (d) 0.058 -0.028 0.014 0.015 0.070 0.013 0.063 -0.041
(0.082) (0.056) (0.053) (0.050) (0.097) (0.089) (0.057) (0.077)
3 or more owners/managers (d) -0.081 0.061 -0.123* 0.009 0.041 -0.131 -0.004 0.154
(0.114) (0.077) (0.074) (0.069) (0.132) (0.129) (0.078) (0.102)
Sales growth 0.216 0.113 -0.091 -0.046 0.094 -0.049 0.631*** -0.305**
(0.134) (0.086) (0.085) (0.080) (0.149) (0.146) (0.091) (0.123)
Cash flow in t/Sales t-1 -0.027 0.007 0.0003 -0.010 -0.004 0.004 0.002 -0.054
(0.050) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.006) (0.067)
Constant -2.780*** 0.092 -0.535 -0.123 -3.841*** -2.142*** -0.345 -1.530***
(0.671) (0.450) (0.433) (0.400) (0.866) (0.707) (0.460) (0.594)
Observations 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194
Female observations 726 726 726 726 726 726 726 726
Firms 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999
Avg. obs. per firm 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Notes: This table presents the results of a panel probit regression with robust standard errors for the years 2005-2009. Only investing firms considered. Each 
regression includes industry dummies as well as a dummy for region and participation in a promotional loan program. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.14: Random effects panel tobit regression of investment
Dependent Variable: 
Investment rate
(investment/sales) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female owner (d) -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Investment/sales t-1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Sales growth    0.101***    0.085***  0.085***   0.084***    0.060***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cash flow in t/sales t-1 0.096*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.105***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Interaction cash flow*female -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.075***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Sales expect. pos. (d) 0.031*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002)
Ambitious investment goals (d) 0.145***
(0.002)
Constant -0.006 -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.070***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 23,130 23,130 23,130 23,130 23,130
left-censored 8,515 8,515 8,515 8,515 8,515
uncensored 14,615 14,615 14,615 14,615 14,615
Female obs. 2673 2673 2673 2673 2673
Firms 10,966 10,966 10,966 10,966 10,966
Avg. obs. per firm 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel tobit regression  for the years 2003-2009.  
Each regression includes industry and time dummies as well as the stratification variables. The reference 
category are manufacturing firms that are younger than 5 years. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.15: Linear probability random effects panel GLS model of investment
(only firms with 1 owner-manager)
Dependent variable: investment (0/1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female owner (d) -0.129*** -0.119*** -0.068*** -0.065*** -0.045***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.107*** 0.057*** 0.039***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Lagged sales (log) 0.051*** 0.070***
(0.007) (0.007)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.051*** -0.035**
(0.015) (0.015)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -0.059*** -0.039***
(0.015) (0.015)
Firm age >20 years (d) -0.056*** -0.031**
(0.015) (0.015)
Sales expect. positive (d) 0.062*** 0.048***
(0.009) (0.009)
Graduate (d) 0.026** 0.010
(0.011) (0.011)
Age firm owner -0.003*** -0.002***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Innovation activities (d) 0.124***
(0.009)
Sales growth 0.165***
(0.015)
Cash flow/lagged sales 0.110***
(0.030)
Demeaned cash flow*female 0.056
(0.054)
Constant 0.575*** 0.647*** 0.352*** -0.0930 -0.419***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.082) (0.082)
Industry dummies no yes yes yes yes
Legal form dummies no no no yes yes
R-squared 0.023 0.035 0.116 0.133 0.17
Observations 11,918 11,918 11,918 11,918 11,918
Female observations 1,427 1,427 1,427 1,427 1,427
Firms 6,244 6,244 6,244 6,244 6,244
Avg. obs. per firm 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel GLS regression for the years 2003-2009 with firm-level 
cluster-robust standard errors. The regression includes time dummies and the stratification variables. The reference 
category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years.*,** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.16: Random effects panel tobit regression of investment
(only firms with 1 owner-manager)
Dependent variable: 
Investment/sales (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female owner (d) -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Investment/sales t-1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sales growth 0.106***   0.090***    0.090***  0.089***    0.062***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Cash flow in t/sales t-1 0.090***   0.094***  0.097***    0.090***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Interaction cash flow*female -0.040 -0.041* -0.034
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023)
Sales expect. pos. (d) 0.036*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.003)
Ambitious Inv. goals (d) 0.166***
(0.003)
Constant -0.016* -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.044*** -0.080***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 13,551 13,551 13,551 13,551 13,551
left-censored 5,642 5,642 5,642 5,642 5,642
uncensored 7,909 7,909 7,909 7,909 7,909
Female observations 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580
Firms 6,852 6,852 6,852 6,852 6,852
Avg. obs. per firm 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel tobit regression  for the years 2003-
2009.  Each regression includes industry and time dummies as well as the stratification variables. The 
reference category are manufacturing firms that are younger than 5 years. *,** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.17: Linear probability model of investment goals
(only firms with 1 owner-manager)
Dependent variable:
Investment goal (0/1)
Environm.
protection
Rational-
ization
Implement.
new prod.
Technical
replacem.
Innovation/
 R&D
Governm.
requirem.
Sales 
increase
Other
goals
Female owner (d) -0.036** -0.047 -0.011 -0.015 -0.050*** 0.014 -0.065** 0.004
(0.015) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.015) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.010 0.063*** -0.011 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.045*** -0.011
(0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008)
Lagged sales (log) 0.0005 -0.009 0.011 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.011 0.037 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.004 -0.035 -0.008
(0.016) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.017) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.022 0.022 -0.036 0.089*** -0.024 -0.005 -0.067** -0.018
(0.017) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.017) (0.016) (0.030) (0.018)
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.046*** 0.024 -0.063** 0.104*** -0.034* 0.004 -0.110*** -0.021
(0.017) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.017) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018)
Sales expect. positive (d) -0.020* -0.004 0.049*** -0.023 0.025** -0.013 0.156*** 0.002
(0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010)
Graduate owner (d) -0.021* 0.001 -0.030* -0.003 0.030** -0.020** -0.072*** 0.011
(0.012) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011)
Age firm owner -0.001* -0.001 -0.0004 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001** 4.56e-05 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sales growth 0.040** 0.025 -0.003 -0.003 0.005 0.023 0.167*** -0.060***
(0.020) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.020) (0.017) (0.032) (0.018)
Cash flow in t/Sales t-1 -5.93e-05 0.001*** 0.0003 -0.002*** -0.0004** 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Constant 0.157 0.591*** 0.261* 0.601*** 0.026 0.132 0.366** 0.036
(0.108) (0.169) (0.148) (0.166) (0.101) (0.089) (0.163) (0.085)
R-squared overall 0.031 0.052 0.036 0.030 0.071 0.022 0.033 0.090
Observations 3,949 3,949 3,949 3,949 3,949 3,949 3,949 3,949
Female observations 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369
Firms 2,336 2,336 2,336 2,336 2,336 2,336 2,336 2,336
Avg. obs. per firm 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Notes: This table presents the results of an random effects panel regression with robust standard errors for the years 2005-2009. Only investing 
firms with one owner-manager considered. The definitions and constructions of the variables can be found in Table 1. Each regression includes 
industry dummies as well as a dummy for region and participation in a promotional loan program. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Chapter 4
Gender, investment financing and credit
constraints
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have found that female-owned firms invest less than male-
owned firms. This holds for the probability of investing, the extensive margin of invest-
ment, as well as for the investment rate, the intensive margin. Furthermore, women’s
investments seem to react less to a marginal increase in cash flow, which can be in-
terpreted as women being effected less by financial constraints. An analysis of stated
investment goals reveals that women less often indicate growth oriented goals for their
investment. Hence, women’s lower propensity to invest is rather driven by preferences
than by financial constraints. Certainly, proxying financial constraints by cash flow has
its limits in providing insights on a firm’s financial possibilities. Restricted access to
financial resources is one of the main obstacles for investing, therefore it is highly rele-
vant to gain direct evidence on firms’ financing behavior. In this chapter we revisit the
issue of financial constraints and take a closer look at gender differences in investment
financing, credit application and denial.
To the best of our knowledge we are the first to empirically analyze gender differ-
ences in the composition of firm investment financing, the credit application behavior
and application outcome of German firm owners. As in the previous chapter, we use
the KfW Mittelstandspanel, a data set on German SMEs for the years 2003-2009.1 We
analyze both the supply side and demand side of access to bank loans and we are able
to control for various firm and owner characteristics.
1See Chapter 3 for a detailed description of the data set.
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Most of the few previous studies have not found that female firm owners are affected
more by financial constraints than male owners (e.g. Cavalluzzo et al. 2002). However,
women seem to have different financing patterns. Already at start-up stage female-
owned firms use less external debt and rely more on personal sources (Carter et al.
2007). Also women are less likely to seek external finance for follow-up investments
(Coleman and Robb 2009, Sena et al. 2010). Muravyev et al. (2009) find that on
average female firm owners have a higher proportion of retained earnings and a smaller
share of bank financing. Robb and Robinson (2010) reveal that the average female-
owned firm holds about 5% less debt than a comparable male-owned business.
Our analysis on gender differences in financing structure confirms previous evidence
on financing patterns. We examine the respective shares of equity capital, external
capital, business development capital and other funds in investment financing. We find
that in financing their investments female firm owners rely more on internal capital
and less on external funds than male firm owners, irrespective of the relative size of
the investment. This difference in firm financing could be either a result of individual
preferences on getting into debt or of gender discrimination on the capital market. In
our empirical analysis we address both approaches. We analyze the demand side and
the supply side on the credit market. More precisely, we examine the impact of the firm
owner’s gender on the probability of applying for credit and the probability of a non-
successful outcome. We consider only investing firms. Our analysis of credit application
behavior reveals that female firm owners who invest are significantly less likely to
apply for credit than investing male firm owners. After splitting the sample according
to positive and non-positive sales expectations we find that the gender difference in
the probability of applying for credit is only evident among firm owners that have
non-positive sales expectations. Female-owned firms with neutral or negative sales
expectations are less likely to apply for credit when they invest compared to their male
counterparts. For firms with positive expectations the probability of applying does not
significantly differ between men and women.
An analysis of application denial rates shows that female-owned firms are not more
likely to be denied credit. This result however suffers from sample selection bias, as it is
likely that the female-owned firms that apply for credit represent a positive subsample
of all applying firms. Potentially successful female applicants may be more reluctant
to apply for credit because they fear and misconceive a rejection (Sena et al. 2010).
Our results suggest that differences in investment financing are not attributable to
discrimination against women on the credit market. Despite this finding, women might
still be more credit constrained because they are more likely to be discouraged from
applying and therefore self-constrain themselves. This result is probably attributable
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to certain personal traits that are associated typically with being female. Previous
studies have found that women are more risk-averse, less self-confident and report more
intense nervousness and fear than men in anticipation of negative outcomes (Croson
and Gneezy 2009). In anticipation of non-positive sales development, these traits may
prevent women more from securing external funds or even from applying for credit.
Several robustness checks underpin our results.
4.2 Investment financing
4.2.1 Theoretical and empirical background
Several theories have tried to explain the complex issue of firm financing and capital
structure. The starting point was the model of Modigliani and Miller (1958) who state
that under the assumption of perfect and frictionless capital markets a firm’s financial
decisions do not affect the firm’s market value and the cost of capital. In contrast, later
theories on capital structure account for the fact that in an imperfect world financial
decisions may be influenced by taxes, information asymmetries and agency costs.
The most prominent two competing theories are the pecking order theory and the
trade-off theory. The pecking order theory focuses on information asymmetries between
managers and external investors. Managers and firm owners have better information
about their firms and prefer to keep control over the firm. This leads to a hierarchical
order of financial resources in a firm’s policy according to the involved level of infor-
mation costs and risk. The preferred source of financing are internal funds as they
involve no information costs, low risk and highest control. The second most preferred
source is debt, and the last alternative is new equity capital, which is associated with
the highest information costs and risks (Myers 1984, Myers and Majluf 1984).
The trade-off theory in contrast refers to an optimal capital structure resulting
from a profit-maximizing balance of tax advantages and bankruptcy costs of debt.
The implications of this theory are, particularly for Germany, not that straightforward
as governmental subsidies for firm investment are very complex and generate different
firm-specific financing incentives. Yet, there is empirical work supporting both theories
(Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999, Cole 2011).
Traditional capital theories as well as most empirical studies focus on large, pub-
licly traded firms and do not consider the influence of owner-characteristics on firm
financing. However, there is evidence that both firm size and owner characteristics can
have an influence on financing behavior.
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López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) show how small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs) differ from large firms in regards to financing. SMEs are affected more by
information asymmetries and are usually not listed on the stock market. Therefore
SMEs depend more on internal funds and their financing structure is less diversified.
Female-owned firms are on average smaller than male-owned firms, therefore gender
differences in capital structure could possibly also be attributed to size. Regarding
owner-characteristics, Ang et al. (2010) demonstrate that individual socioeconomic and
demographic factors of the firm owner (e.g. age, gender, education, wealth, experience
etc.) can add to a better understanding of capital structure decisions. Individual
preferences and risk tolerance of the owner have an important impact on the firm’s
capital structure if the personal financial situation is directly affected by the firm’s
outcome. Owners of small firms that are individually liable may opt for different
financial decisions than owners of larger firms with limited liability. Typically, the
smaller the firm the more financing decisions depend on the firm owner and his or her
personal features.
Myers (2001, p. 99) points out that ‘the theories (on capital structure) are not de-
signed to be general’ and that the understanding of firms’ financing structures is still
limited. There exists no universal theory as the topic of firm financing is too complex
and diverse. Every firm has individual objectives and needs. Accordingly, we do not
perform a hypothesis test of a particular capital structure theory in our empirical anal-
ysis, as we do not expect any of the traditional theories to provide useful predictions.
Instead, we opt for an explorative approach where we try to reveal the determinants of
the composition of investment financing and particularly the correlation with gender.
A firm’s financing strategy is not self-determined but subject to external and internal
constraints. In light of the findings discussed above we expect investment in female-
owned firms to be financed by a higher share of internal funds than in male-owned
firms.
4.2.2 Gender differences in financing patterns
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics on the composition of investment financing aver-
aged over the years 2004-2009 for female and male-owned firms.2 Investment financing
consists of the sum of internal capital, external capital, business development capital
and other funds that are used to finance the investment. All together the shares of
these financing resources sum up to 100 percent. The category external capital contains
2Table 4.4 in the Appendix contains descriptive statistics of all variables included in the regression on
investment financing.
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all types of capital that are raised outside the firm, namely venture capital, mezzanine
capital, bank loans and capital from external shareholders. Business development cap-
ital refers to subsidy loans provided by promotional institutions like e.g. the KfW
Bankengruppe.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics investment financing
t-test 
Percentage of Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. p-value
~ internal capital 54.7 41.1 58.5 42.3 0.000***
~ external capital 30.2 37.3 26.8 37.1 0.000***
~ business development capital 8.0 20.3 7.6 21.1 0.348
~ other funds 7.1 21.3 7.1 21.7 0.963
total 100 100
Male owner Female owner
Notes: N=24,302. The category external capital consists of venture capital, mezzanine capital, 
bank loans and external shareholder capital. Business development capital refers to subsidy 
loans provided by promotional institutions. Comparison of means with two-sample t-test of 
equality of means under the assumption of equal variances. *** indicates significance at the 
10% levels.
A two-sample t-test of equality of means reveals significant differences in the shares
of external and internal capital used for investment financing. The share of internal
capital is by 58.5% to 54.7% significantly higher for female-owned firms, while the share
of external capital is lower (26.8% vs. 30.2%). For the share of business development
capital and other funds there are no significant differences. However, this difference in
the shares of internal vs. external capital is not necessarily a gender effect, it may be
attributable to differences in firm characteristics such as size, industry etc.
In order to separate the impact of gender from other owner- and firm-specific
characteristics we estimate a random effects panel tobit model for the share of each
financing resource separately. The model has the following specification:
y∗it = αi + γfi + βx
′
it + vi + uit (4.1)
yit =

0 if y∗it ≤ 0
yit if 0 < y∗it < 100
100 if y∗it ≥ 100
(4.2)
with yit denoting the share of internal, external, business development or other capital
with left-censoring at the lower bound of 0 percent and right-censoring at the upper
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bound of 100 percent. fi is a dummy variable for female ownership, vi stands for
time-invariant individual effects, and uit is the remaining disturbance. xit is a vector
including firm- and owner-specific variables, i.e. firm size, firm age, age of the firm
owner, graduation status of the owner, size of the management team, sales growth
as a performance indicator, and cash flow as indicator for financial constraints. As a
further control variable we add the investment rate to depict the relative size of the
investment.
The regression results in Table 4.2 confirm the descriptive pattern. The share of
internal capital in investment financing is higher in female-owned firms than in male-
owned firms while the share of external capital is lower. For business development
capital and other funds we observe no significant difference. These gender differences in
the use of external vs. internal capital in investment financing could be either a result
of gender differences in firm owner’s willingness to get into debt or of differences in
credit availability. In the following section we will address both approaches, differences
in preferences and discrimination.
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Table 4.2: Random effects panel tobit model of investment financing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
investment financing, share of ~
internal 
capital
external
capital
business
development
capital
other 
funds
Female owner (d) 5.030** -5.842** -4.298 1.582
(2.458) (2.557) (2.864) (4.167)
Lagged FTE (log) -9.546*** 7.701*** 3.697*** 13.94***
(1.143) (1.195) (1.357) (2.035)
Lagged sales (log) 0.713 2.423** 0.140 -6.169***
(1.030) (1.079) (1.227) (1.815)
Investment rate (inv./sales) -10.74*** 6.680*** 9.766*** 4.775***
(0.794) (0.802) (0.751) (1.154)
Cash flow 1.06e-05*** -9.72e-06*** 1.92e-06* -9.61e-06***
(1.03e-06) (1.09e-06) (1.13e-06) (1.90e-06)
Sales growth 0.380 -2.549 8.705*** 7.163*
(1.972) (2.110) (2.534) (3.773)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -1.631 6.916*** -8.274*** -3.413
(2.224) (2.369) (2.749) (4.111)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -4.323** 9.834*** -4.906* -6.781*
(2.173) (2.290) (2.576) (3.849)
Firm age >20 years (d) -4.938** 10.88*** -7.531*** -9.248**
(2.218) (2.325) (2.609) (3.884)
2 managers/owners (d) -2.406 1.318 2.054 4.495*
(1.523) (1.597) (1.830) (2.698)
3 or more managers/owners (d) -0.102 -1.974 1.669 4.862
(2.187) (2.295) (2.609) (3.840)
Graduate (d) 12.69*** -13.93*** -2.033 0.263
(1.524) (1.577) (1.756) (2.579)
Age firm owner 0.186** -0.255*** -0.162* -0.173
(0.076) (0.079) (0.088) (0.129)
Constant 84.59*** -51.03*** -66.15*** -78.41***
(12.21) (12.81) (14.51) (21.45)
Observations 24,302 24,302 24,302 24,302
Female observations 2,347 2,347 2,347 2,347
left-censored 4,294 12,632 19,869 20,928
uncensored 10,578 9,165 4,197 2,894
right-censored 9,430 2,505 236 480
Number of firms 13,057 13,057 13,057 13,057
Avg. Obs. per firm 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel tobit regression of investment financing for the years 
2004-2009.  Each regression includes industry, legal form and time dummies as well as the stratification variables. The 
reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years. *,** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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4.3 Credit application and application outcome
Credit constraints can be driven by demand-side or supply-side factors (Coleman and
Robb 2009, Bellucci et al. 2010, Verheul and Thurik 2001). On the demand-side,
different preferences, higher risk and debt aversion as well as lower financial literacy
may, ceteris paribus, prevent women more from applying for credit. On the supply-
side, discrimination on the financial market may result in lower credit approval rates
or worse credit conditions for women. In this chapter we examine both sides of the
credit application process of investing firms.
4.3.1 Previous evidence
Previous empirical studies have focused mainly on the US economy and have not found
strong evidence that female-owned firms have greater difficulties in funding their in-
vestments. Most authors use the same data base for their analysis, namely the Federal
Reserve’s Surveys of Small Business Financing (SSBFs). Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) find
that denial rates of female owners increase to some extent with lender concentration
but they find no evidence for discrimination in terms of interest rates. Blanchflower
et al. (2003) and Blanchard et al. (2008) confirm that gender differences in denial
rates are negligible. For Italy in contrast, Bellucci et al. (2010) reveal that female
owned firms do not pay higher interest rates but are disadvantaged in terms of col-
lateral requirements and credit availability. Muravyev et al. (2009) analyze gender
differences in credit constraints with the World Bank’s Business Environment and En-
terprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) which contains data for 34 countries. They find
that female entrepreneurs are more likely to be denied credit and pay higher interest
rates, but that these differences vanish with increasing level of a financial development.
Yet, their cross-country analysis does not allow to draw country-specific conclusions.
On the demand side, none of the authors cited above find clear evidence that women
have lower application rates. Cole and Mehran (2009) find only very weak evidence of
higher application discouragement for women. Regarding gender specific perceptions,
Roper and Scott (2009) find that women in the UK at start-up stage - independent
from their real financial situation - are more likely to perceive that they have problems
in accessing external funds.
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4.3.2 The credit application process
Figure 4.1 describes the credit application process in three conditional stages. Ac-
cording to Cole (2010), firms can be classified into four categories of ‘borrower types’:
non-borrower, discouraged borrower, denied borrower and approved borrower. Unfor-
tunately, we cannot observe the first stage of the application process in our data, we
do not know whether firms need or do not need credit. We cannot differentiate be-
tween non-borrowers and discouraged borrowers, in our data they form one group, the
non-applicants. We are constrained to analyzing the application process without its
first stage and dealing with the problem of selection bias. Discouraged borrowers may
decide not to apply because they anticipate or fear a loan denial. Their firm specific
characteristics could be similar to applying firms that were not credit approved. We
know from the literature that women are less over-confident, more risk-averse and also
have a greater fear of negative outcomes when the get involved in a risky decision (Cro-
son and Gneezy 2009). Consequently, women may be more reluctant and discouraged
to apply than men are. As a result, female-owned firms which do apply could be a
positively selected subgroup with better performance and creditworthiness than the
average male-owned firm that applies for credit. As a consequence, our results suffer
from sample selection bias, therefore discrimination in the form of credit denial could
be underestimated.
Figure 4.1: Credit application process
Source: Borrowed and customized from Cole (2010)
(1)
Need 
Credit?
(2)
Apply
for
Credit? (3)
Get
Credit?
Approved
Borrower
No
Non-
Borrower
Denied
Borrower
Discouraged
Borrower
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Non-Applicants
The issue of sample selection is a well known problem in econometric modeling of
discrimination as well as the omitted variable bias. The problem can be tackled to some
extent if the necessary information on all application stages is available. Cavalluzzo et
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al. (2002) regard discouraged borrowers as potential applicants and model this self-
selection into applying by estimating the two models jointly with a selection model.
Then, the main equation models the application outcome while the selection equation
models the decision whether to apply or not. Alternatively, successful credit applicants
can be compared to all firms with unmet credit needs, the rejected and discouraged.
Blanchflower et al. (2003), Blanchard et al. (2008), Cole (2010) and Cole and Mehran
(2009) employ similar approaches to deal with sample selection. Muravyev et al. (2009)
point to the fact that - in contrast to not considering the discouraged applicants - this
approach overestimates discrimination. The results are however often similar to the
single equation model employed by us.
4.3.3 Empirical analysis
We estimate the following two equations separately, each with a linear probability
random effects panel GLS model.
Prob(Applied = 1) = α + β1fi + γ1Xit + δ1Dit + uit (4.3)
Prob(Denied = 1) = α + β2fi + γ2Xit + δ2Dit + eit if Applied = 1 (4.4)
With the first equation we estimate the demand-side of the application process, the
probability of applying for credit, and with the second equation we estimate the supply-
side, the application outcome. The dependent variable is binary in both equations. In
the application decision it takes the value 1 if a firm has applied for credit and 0
if the firm did not apply. For the application outcome it takes the value 1 if a firm’s
application was denied and 0 if the firm’s application was approved. f denotes a dummy
variable for female ownership, X is a vector of firm-specific characteristics (size in terms
of sales and employees, cash flow, firm age, team size, sales expectations, innovation
activity and sales growth) and D is a vector of further owner-specific characteristics
(age of the firm owner and graduate status). For our analysis we consider only investing
firms.3 Table 4.3 shows the results of five regression for the application decision and
one for the application outcome.
3see Appendix Table 4.5 for descriptive statistics of all variables included in the regression.
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Table 4.3: Linear probability RE panel GLS model of credit application and outcome
Dependent 
Variable (1/0)
(1)
applied for 
credit
(2)
application 
denied
(1A)
applied for 
credit
with
expect.
(1B)
applied for 
credit
with exp.
 interact.
(1C)
applied for 
credit
 firms with 
pos. exp.
(1D)
applied for 
credit
 firms without 
pos. exp.
Female owner (d) -0.047*** 0.001 -0.047*** -0.067*** -0.010 -0.068***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020)
Positive sales expect. (d) 0.023** 0.018*
(0.009) (0.010)
Interact fem.*pos. exp. (d) 0.055*
(0.030)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.036*** 0.005 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.051*** 0.023**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010)
Lagged sales (log) 0.045*** -0.018** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.054***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
Planned investment rate 0.802*** 0.014 0.797*** 0.795*** 0.734*** 0.851***
(0.031) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.046) (0.042)
Cash flow -4.99e-08*** -1.96e-08*** -4.97e-08*** -4.98e-08*** -4.39e-08*** -5.89e-08***
(7.46e-09) (4.71e-09) (7.45e-09) (7.44e-09) (1.11e-08) (9.67e-09)
Return on sales (lag) -0.011** -0.161*** -0.010** -0.011** -0.014 -0.012***
(0.005) (0.035) (0.005) (0.005) (0.050) (0.003)
Sales growth 0.038** -0.044*** 0.038** 0.037** 0.042 0.038*
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.029) (0.021)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.022 -0.032** 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.019
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.021)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.028* -0.019 0.031* 0.031* 0.045* 0.029
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027) (0.020)
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.033** -0.037** 0.037** 0.037** 0.043 0.039*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027) (0.020)
2 managers/owners (d) 0.031*** -0.039*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.028 0.036**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014)
3 or more manag./own. (d) 0.032** -0.048*** 0.032** 0.032** 0.023 0.045**
(0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.019)
Graduate (d) -0.090*** 0.005 -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.102*** -0.087***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013)
Age firm owner -0.002*** 0.0004 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Innovation activities (d) 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.017 0.031***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.012)
Constant -0.088 0.373*** -0.089 -0.087 0.053 -0.186*
(0.092) (0.086) (0.092) (0.092) (0.148) (0.113)
R-squared 0.210 0.048 0.211 0.211 0.187 0.225
Observations 10,796 5,599 10,796 10,796 3,824 6,972
Female observations 1,018 450 1,018 1,018 366 652
Firms 6,334 3,778 6,334 6,334 2,834 4,630
Avg. obs. per firm 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.5
sample split 
Notes: This table presents the results of random effects panel GLS regressions for the years 2003-2009 with firm-level cluster-robust standard 
errors. The regression includes time, industry and legal form dummies as well as the stratification variables. The reference category are 
manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have one owner-manager.*,** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The number of firms in (1C) and (1D) does not add up to the number of firms in the full sample (N=10,796), 
as the firms may have differing expectations over the years and therefore may be present in both samples after the split.
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Regression (1) is the basic specification of the application decision. We find that
female owners are significantly less likely to apply for a credit. The probability that
an investing female-owned firm applies for credit is on average 4.7 percentage points
lower than for a male-owned firm with the same characteristics. Yet, the results from
regression (2) show that if women apply, there is no difference in the probability of
being denied credit as compared to male-owned firms. This result may be suggestive
but for the above stated reasons of self selection it cannot be interpreted as absence
of discrimination. Given that women apply significantly less often for credit, it is very
likely that the female-owned firms that do apply represent a positive selection.
This raises the question on the underlying reasons for women’s lower probability
of applying for credit. Croson and Gneezy (2009) conclude that women’s higher risk
aversion can be traced back to different evaluations of risk, differences in the percepti-
bility of emotions and male overconfidence. Furthermore, women report more intense
nervousness and fear than men in anticipation of negative outcomes. The application
for credit involves the possibility of being rejected and borrowing money involves the
risk of not to be able to bear the costs. This suggests that women may be less likely to
apply for credit because they are more risk averse and would cope worse with a credit
denial. We cannot test for this assumption as our data do not provide a valid measure
for risk aversion. Instead, we try to better understand this fact by accounting for the
sales expectations of the firm owner. The firms were asked about their sales expec-
tations for the next year and had to answer in three categories, ‘positive’, ‘negative’
or ‘neutral’ expectations. These expectations may be realistic, overoptimistic or even
too pessimistic. Interesting for our analysis are gender differences in credit application
that go together with these expectations. If women indeed have a stronger fear in
anticipation of negative outcomes, they should be more reluctant to apply for credit
when they do not have positive expectations about the future.
In regression (1A) we re-estimate regression (1) with an additional explanatory
dummy variable for positive sales expectations. We find that firms with positive ex-
pectations are significantly more likely to apply for a credit while the quantitative
impact of our dummy variable for female ownership does not change. Next, we include
an interaction term for positive sales expectations and female ownership in regression
(1B). As a further sensitivity check we split the sample into firms that have positive ex-
pectations in a given year and firms with neutral or negative expectations (regressions
(1C) and (1D)). The results show that female-owned firms with positive expectations
do not differ significantly from male owned firms in their probability of applying for
a credit. But, as expected, female-owned firms with non-positive expectations exhibit
higher reluctance of applying for credit. The probability that a female-owned firm with
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non-positive expectations applies for credit is 6.8 percentage points lower than for a
male-owned firm with non-positive expectations. We interpret this result as evidence
of higher risk aversion and higher fear of failure for female business owners that have
non-positive expectations. We also observe that the model has a higher explanatory
power for firms with non-positive expectations (R2 of 0.225 vs. 0.187).
4.4 Robustness checks
We run several robustness checks for each regression in order to test for reliability of
our findings. These robustness checks essentially confirm our central findings, as the
signs and the significances do not differ substantially.
1. Check: other model specification, GLS instead of tobit.
The tobit approach is based on strong assumptions about the conditional data dis-
tribution and functional form. As these strong assumptions are likely to be violated,
tobit is a non-robust estimator (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). We therefore re-run
the regressions of the composition of investment financing with a more robust simple
random effects panel GLS model (Appendix Table 4.6) which confirms the results from
the tobit regression in Table 4.2.
2. Check: other model specification, probit instead of GLS.
The decision to apply as well as the application outcome are both binary dependent
variables. These are usually estimated with a non-linear regression model. We there-
fore repeat all regressions on credit application with a random effects panel probit
approach (Appendix Table 4.7).
3. Check: considering only firms with one owner.
In the main regressions the dummy variable on female ownership refers to the gender
of the principal owner. To make sure that the decision maker in the firm is indeed
the principal owner, we repeat the estimations on the composition of investment fi-
nancing and on credit application and its outcome considering only firms with one
owner-manager (Appendix Tables 4.8 and 4.9). The results do not substantially differ
from our main regressions, except for the regression on investment financing where
the gender variable in the regression for internal capital turns out to be not significant.
However, the magnitude of the coefficients is approximately the same, the insignificance
is probably driven by a higher standard error.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigate how male-owned and female-owned firms differ in in-
vestment financing, credit application behavior and application outcome. Our analysis
shows that women rely more on internal funds and finance their investment with a
lower share of external capital than male-owned firms, independently of the magnitude
of the investment. Female firm owners are significantly less likely to apply for credit
but not more likely to be credit denied. However, the last result may underestimate
discrimination on the credit market as applying female-owned firms might represent
a positively selected sample. Interestingly, gender differences in credit application be-
havior depend on the firm owner’s expectation of future sales outcomes. We find that
female-owned firms with non-positive sales expectations are significantly less likely to
apply for credit than male-owned firms. For firms with positive sales expectations we
find no gender difference in the probability to apply for credit. This points to the fact
that female risk aversion is only prominent in anticipation of decreasing or constant
sales volume. With positive sales prospects female firm owners are not more hesitant
than male owners to bear the risks and the costs of a credit.
Yet, with our data we cannot judge whether women’s more retentive or men’s more
offensive behavior leads to a better outcome for the firm as we have no information
on credit repayment behavior and return on investment. On one hand side, through
more cautious investment behavior a firm could miss growth opportunities. On the
other hand, a too optimistic investment behavior could result in financial losses or
even in business failure. A further analysis of gender differences in firm performance
after investment with more appropriate data could shed more light on this question.
Regarding the supply side on the credit market, our results may motivate future em-
pirical research to gain more insights into gender differences in interest rates, credit
conditions and collateral requirements.
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4.6 Appendix
Table 4.4: Summary statistics regression sample investment financing
Gender variable Mean St.dev. Min. Max.
Female owner (d) 0.096 0.295 0 1
t-test 
Firm characteristics Mean St.dev. Min. Max. Mean St.dev. Min. Max. p-value
Investment financing in %
~ internal capital 54.7 41.1 0 100 58.5 42.3 0 100 0.000***
~ external capital* 30.2 37.3 0 100 26.8 37.1 0 100 0.000***
~ development capital 8.0 20.3 0 100 7.6 21.1 0 100 0.348
~ other funds 7.1 21.3 0 100 7.1 21.7 0 100 0.963
FTE (number of employees) 42.7 64.9 0.5 1,501 29.3 44.3 0.5 462 0.000***
Sales (in million Euro) 6.808 11.700 0.010 104 4.023 8.839 0.010 102 0.000***
Investment rate (Inv./Sales) 0.125 0.713 0.1 1.497 0.120 0.191 0.1 1.125 0.243
Cashflow (in thousand Euro) 433 778 -324 8,224 273 619 -251 7,400 0.000***
Sales growth 0.089 0.284 -1.540 2.037 0.092 0.297 -1.539 1.997 0.546
Firm age 32 37 1 384 29.2 37 1 377 0.001***
Firm age <5 years (d) 0.150 0.357 0 1 0.236 0.425 0 1 0.000***
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.135 0.342 0 1 0.155 0.362 0 1 0.008***
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.302 0.459 0 1 0.242 0.428 0 1 0.000***
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.412 0.492 0 1 0.367 0.482 0 1 0.000***
1 owner-manager (d) 0.548 0.498 0 1 0.548 0.498 0 1 0.516
2 owners/managers (d) 0.303 0.459 0 1 0.317 0.466 0 1 0.146
3 or more owners/managers (d) 0.117 0.321 0 1 0.103 0.304 0 1 0.040**
Owner characteristics
Graduate (d) 0.559 0.496 0 1 0.547 0.498 0 1 0.256
Age firm owner 48.6 10.1 20 80 45.1 9.3 23 78 0.000***
Female owner
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the sample used in the estimation of a random effects panel tobit model of 
investment financing in Table 4.2. N = 20,254. Comparison of means with two-sample t-test of equality of means under the 
assumption of equal variances. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Male owner
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Table 4.5: Summary statistics regression sample credit application and outcomeTable : Summary statistics regression sample credit application and ist outcome
Gender variable Mean St.dev. Min. Max.
Female owner (d) 0.094 0.292 0 1
t-test 
Firm characteristics Mean St.dev. Min. Max. Mean St.dev. Min. Max. p-value
Applied for credit 0.527 0.499 0 1 0.442 0.497 0 1 0.000***
Credit denied (only applying firms) 0.082 0.275 0 1 0.096 0.295 0 1 0.320
Sales expectations positive (d) 0.354 0.478 0 1 0.359 0.480 0 1 0.709
FTE (number of employees) 44.2 64.3 0.5 1253 30.5 46.3 1 462 0.000***
Sales (in million Euro) 7,177 12,100 0,010 104 4,111 8,850 0,010 102 0.000***
Planned investment rate 0.104 0.167 0.1 1.497 0.120 0.191 0.1 1.455 0.003***
Cashflow (in thousand Euro) 457 794.7 -320 8,150 296 670.2 -251 6,800 0.000***
Return on sales 0.067 0.118 -3.523 1.522 0.099 0.167 -0.449 1.348 0.000***
Sales growth 0.065 0.269 -1.540 2.019 0.063 0.261 -1.522 1.923 0.881
Firm age 33.3 37.6 1 384 30.4 37 1 312 0.000***
Firm age <5 years (d) 0.129 0.335 0 1 0.207 0.406 0 1 0.000***
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.132 0.339 0 1 0.171 0.377 0 1 0.001***
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.313 0.464 0 1 0.256 0.437 0 1 0.000***
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.426 0.494 0 1 0.365 0.482 0 1 0.000***
1 owner-manager (d) 0.538 0.499 0 1 0.509 0.016 0 1 0.077*
2 owners/managers (d) 0.306 0.461 0 1 0.345 0.475 0 1 0.011**
3 or more owners/managers (d) 0.128 0.334 0 1 0.111 0.314 0 1 0.122
Innovation (d) 0.505 0.500 0 1 0.399 0.490 0 1 0.000***
Owner characteristics
Graduate (d) 0.593 0.491 0 1 0.568 0.496 0 1 0.113
Age firm owner 48.8 10 20 80 45.1 9 23 78 0.000***
Male owner Female owner
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Table 4.6: Random effects panel GLS regressions of investment financing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
investment financing, share of ~
internal 
capital
external
capital
business
development
capital
other 
funds
Female owner (d) 2.428** -2.302** -0.291 0.225
(1.083) (0.950) (0.543) (0.544)
Lagged FTE (log) -4.051*** 2.377*** 0.349 1.362***
(0.524) (0.460) (0.272) (0.260)
Lagged sales (log) 0.005 1.050** -0.263 -0.775***
(0.566) (0.435) (0.279) (0.244)
Investment rate (inv./sales) -5.789* 2.388* 2.900* 0.417
(3.065) (1.302) (1.505) (0.307)
Cash flow 4.77e-06*** -3.58e-06*** 2.06e-07 -1.45e-06***
(4.53e-07) (3.94e-07) (2.37e-07) (2.09e-07)
Sales growth 0.763 -1.858** 0.942 0.254
(1.163) (0.862) (0.594) (0.539)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.592 2.296** -1.392*** -0.438
(0.990) (0.900) (0.520) (0.538)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -1.785* 3.407*** -0.850* -0.753
(0.966) (0.855) (0.503) (0.512)
Firm age >20 years (d) -1.481 3.676*** -1.468*** -0.736
(0.986) (0.880) (0.511) (0.509)
2 managers/owners (d) -1.213* 0.329 0.305 0.522
(0.695) (0.620) (0.343) (0.386)
3 or more managers/owners (d) -0.315 -1.060 0.486 0.844
(0.995) (0.890) (0.486) (0.568)
Graduate (d) 5.540*** -5.231*** -0.460 0.117
(0.676) (0.613) (0.328) (0.345)
Age firm owner 0.095*** -0.077** -0.023 0.003
(0.034) (0.030) (0.016) (0.018)
Constant 65.05*** 9.927* 12.04*** 12.66***
(6.988) (5.203) (3.452) (2.927)
R-squared 0.047 0.057 0.025 0.072
Observations 24,302 24,302 24,302 24,302
Female observations 2,347 2,347 2,347 2,347
Firms 13,057 13,057 13,057 13,057
Avg. obs. per firm 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects GLS regression of investment financing for the years 2004-
2009.  Each regression includes industry, legal form and time dummies as well as the stratification variables. The 
reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years. *,** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.7: Random effects panel probit regressions of credit application and outcome
Dependent 
Variable (1/0)
(1)
applied for 
credit
(2)
application 
denied
(1A)
applied for 
credit
with
expect.
(1B)
applied for 
credit
with exp.
 interact.
(1C)
applied for 
credit
 firms with 
pos. exp.
(1D)
applied for 
credit
 firms without 
pos. exp.
Female owner (d) -0.196*** 0.019 -0.197*** -0.290*** -0.042 -0.303***
(0.074) (0.182) (0.074) (0.089) (0.116) (0.092)
Positive sales expectat. (d) 0.068* 0.045
(0.041) (0.043)
Interact female*pos. exp. (d) 0.258*
(0.136)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.143*** 0.059 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.201*** 0.091**
(0.037) (0.087) (0.037) (0.037) (0.056) (0.046)
Lagged sales (log) 0.221*** -0.104 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.173*** 0.262***
(0.034) (0.082) (0.034) (0.034) (0.052) (0.043)
Planned investment rate 4.263*** 0.219 4.237*** 4.228*** 3.747*** 4.679***
(0.180) (0.247) (0.181) (0.181) (0.274) (0.256)
Cash flow -2.29e-07*** -8.71e-07*** -2.28e-07*** -2.29e-07*** -2.00e-07*** -2.67e-07***
(3.22e-08) (1.74e-07) (3.22e-08) (3.22e-08) (4.76e-08) (4.37e-08)
Return on sales (lag) -0.051 -2.042*** -0.048 -0.049 0.021 -0.348
(0.076) (0.435) (0.073) (0.074) (0.130) (0.230)
Sales growth 0.141** -0.471*** 0.140* 0.138* 0.178 0.125
(0.072) (0.176) (0.072) (0.072) (0.117) (0.094)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.103 -0.319* 0.108 0.110 0.100 0.099
(0.077) (0.183) (0.077) (0.077) (0.119) (0.099)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.129* -0.161 0.137* 0.137* 0.168 0.146
(0.071) (0.166) (0.071) (0.071) (0.112) (0.090)
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.150** -0.390** 0.162** 0.161** 0.188* 0.170*
(0.071) (0.174) (0.072) (0.071) (0.112) (0.090)
2 managers/owners (d) 0.140*** -0.441*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.129* 0.161***
(0.049) (0.123) (0.049) (0.049) (0.076) (0.061)
3 or more manag./own. (d) 0.144** -0.675*** 0.144** 0.143** 0.106 0.198**
(0.067) (0.187) (0.067) (0.067) (0.103) (0.085)
Graduate (d) -0.398*** 0.0303 -0.400*** -0.400*** -0.449*** -0.396***
(0.048) (0.111) (0.048) (0.048) (0.077) (0.059)
Age firm owner -0.008*** 0.006 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Innovation activities (d) 0.135*** 0.457*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.083 0.136***
(0.041) (0.105) (0.041) (0.041) (0.070) (0.051)
Constant -3.012*** -0.551 -3.008*** -3.002*** -2.362*** -3.392***
(0.409) (0.981) (0.408) (0.408) (0.627) (0.525)
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 10,796 5,599 10,796 10,796 3,824 6,972
Female observations 1,018 450 1,018 1,018 366 652
Firms 6,334 3,778 6,334 6,334 2,834 4,630
Avg. obs. per firm 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.5
sample split 
Notes: This table presents the results of random effects panel probit regressions for the years 2003-2009 with firm-level cluster-robust standard 
errors. The regression includes time, industry and legal form dummies as well as the stratification variables. The reference category are 
manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have one owner-manager.*,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. The number of firms in (1C) and (1D) does not add up to the number of firms in the full sample (N=10,796), as the 
firms may have differing expectations over the years and therefore may be present in both samples after the split.
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Table 4.8: Random effects panel tobit regressions of investment financing
(only firms with 1 owner-manager)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
investment financing, share of ~
internal 
capital
external
capital
business
development
capital
other 
funds
Female owner (d) 5.405 -7.795** -0.849 1.911
(3.340) (3.524) (3.978) (5.968)
Lagged FTE (log) -10.41*** 6.969*** 5.424*** 17.31***
(1.564) (1.647) (1.888) (2.898)
Lagged sales (log) -0.637 3.940*** 1.316 -8.143***
(1.399) (1.477) (1.703) (2.557)
Investment rate (inv./sales) -20.72*** 12.21*** 18.24*** 9.453***
(1.416) (1.396) (1.351) (2.076)
Cash flow 1.34e-05*** -1.07e-05*** 8.13e-07 -8.79e-06***
(1.69e-06) (1.78e-06) (1.91e-06) (3.12e-06)
Sales growth 3.850 -4.058 6.991** 1.377
(2.702) (2.906) (3.535) (5.277)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -3.947 11.33*** -12.57*** -2.524
(2.927) (3.142) (3.728) (5.564)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -4.818* 11.05*** -6.717* -8.950*
(2.863) (3.048) (3.468) (5.257)
Firm age >20 years (d) -6.548** 14.23*** -7.772** -11.63**
(2.942) (3.112) (3.522) (5.356)
Graduate (d) 14.34*** -15.13*** -3.101 -1.183
(2.079) (2.175) (2.465) (3.700)
Age firm owner 0.310*** -0.339*** -0.264** -0.323*
(0.109) (0.115) (0.131) (0.195)
Constant 107.0*** -76.92*** -85.45*** -54.17*
(16.63) (17.59) (20.24) (30.14)
Observations 13,294 13,294 13,294 13,294
Female observations 1,269 1,269 1,269 1,269
left-censored 2,425 7,023 10,981 11,576
uncensored 5,567 4,820 2,170 1,453
right-censored 5,302 1,451 143 265
Number of firms 7,847 7,847 7,847 7,847
Avg. Obs. per firm 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel tobit regression of investment financing for the years 
2004-2009. Only firms with one owner/manager included. Each regression includes industry, legal form and time 
dummies as well as the stratification variables. The reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship 
that are younger than 5 years. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.9: Random effects panel GLS regressions of credit application and outcome
(only firms with 1 owner-manager)
Dependent 
Variable (1/0)
(1)
applied for 
credit
(2)
application 
denied
(1A)
applied for 
credit
with
expect.
(1B)
applied for 
credit
with exp.
 interact.
(1C)
applied for 
credit
 firms with 
pos. exp.
(1D)
applied for 
credit
 firms without 
pos. exp.
Female owner (d) -0.044* -0.017 -0.044* -0.053** -0.014 -0.056**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.038) (0.027)
Positive sales expectat. (d) 0.027** 0.025*
(0.013) (0.013)
Interact female*pos. exp. (d) 0.026
(0.042)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.030*** 0.016 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.064*** 0.013
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013)
Lagged sales (log) 0.053*** -0.023** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.031* 0.065***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013)
Planned investment rate 0.778*** 0.044 0.772*** 0.771*** 0.747*** 0.791***
(0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.040) (0.065) (0.051)
Cash flow -4.87e-08*** -3.45e-08*** -4.85e-08*** -4.85e-08*** -4.40e-08** -5.94e-08***
(1.29e-08) (8.31e-09) (1.28e-08) (1.28e-08) (1.82e-08) (1.74e-08)
Return on sales (lag) -0.010** -0.185*** -0.010** -0.010** 0.021 -0.014***
(0.005) (0.054) (0.005) (0.005) (0.052) (0.004)
Sales growth 0.025 -0.073*** 0.025 0.025 -0.014 0.042
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.040) (0.028)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.0007 -0.054** 0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.005
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.035) (0.027)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.007 -0.027 0.011 0.011 -0.034 0.036
(0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.025)
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.018 -0.061*** 0.023 0.023 0.007 0.033
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.026)
Graduate (d) -0.104*** 0.009 -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.110*** -0.103***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.017)
Age firm owner -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -4.42e-05 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Innovation activities (d) 0.033*** 0.049*** 0.031** 0.030** 0.007 0.041***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.015)
Constant -0.175 0.413*** -0.178 -0.179 0.008 -0.270*
(0.121) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) (0.197) (0.148)
R-squared 0.231 0.060 0.232 0.232 0.212 0.243
Observations 5,777 2,875 10,796 10,796 1,964 3,813
Female observations 518 210 1,018 1,018 174 344
Firms 3,635 2,046 6,334 6,334 1,527 2,652
Avg. obs. per firm 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.5
sample split 
Notes: This table presents the results of random effects panel GLS regressions for the years 2003-2009 with firm-level cluster-robust standard 
errors. Only firms with one owner-manager included. The regression includes time, industry and legal form dummies as well as the stratification 
variables. The reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have one owner-manager.*,** 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The number of firms in (1C) and (1D) does not add up to the number of 
firms in the full sample (N=10,796), as the firms may have differing expectations over the years and therefore may be present in both samples 
after the split.
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